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ABSTRACT
When Richard Nixon took the oath of office as the thirty- 
seventh President of the United States on January 20, 1969, 
his Administration faced a foreign policy disaster in Vietnam. 
President Nixon, as well as his National Security Advisor 
Henry Kissinger, recognized that American disengagement from 
Vietnam was of the highest strategic priority. As long as the 
United States remained involved in the quagmire of Vietnam, 
the country could not exercise its role as the leader of the 
West on the world stage. Vital foreign policy matters, such 
as Soviet-American detente and Sino-American rapprochement, 
would remain atrophied. Thus, all ranking members of the 
Nixon Administration realized that a successful conclusion of 
the Paris Peace Talks had to be Washington's principal 
concern.
The purpose of this study is to provide a critical 
analysis of the Paris Peace Talks and the dynamics that led to 
the settlement of the Paris Peace Accords. Two hypotheses 
will be put forward and addressed: Only a fundamental shift in 
the negotiating position of Hanoi by October of 1972 allowed 
the Paris Peace Talks to be eventually settled in January of 
1973, and second, the Nixon administration was compelled to 
accept a settlement because of strong domestic anti-war 
sentiment, especially in the Congress and business community.
In order to address the two key hypotheses that are central to
• • *in.
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this study, an analytical framework will be put forward.
In the literature review, it will be clearly 
demonstrated that there is no existing comprehensive 
analytical framework to address a topic of such importance. 
Instead, most of the literature was found to focus on the 
foreign policy process which led the United States into the 
quagmire of Vietnam, the actual progress of the war itself 
once the huge American military build-up began in 1965, and 
the nature and internal dynamics of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam(DRV). So, an analytical framework will be created 
using the theoretical works on conflict resolution.
Three dominant themes can be found in the theoretical 
literature on conflict resolution. These themes, military 
stalemate/military reversal, the threat of domestic 
instability, and the international balance of power, are 
directly applicable to the Paris Peace Talks. By reference to 
these three factors, to be called "catalysts" in this 
study, the two hypotheses will be addressed. The three 
catalysts will also address four inter-related questions that 
are directly related to the hypotheses: What were the factors 
that led the respective parties to enter into the Paris Peace 
Talks in November of 1968, and subsequently, to conclude the 
Paris Peace Accords in. January of 1973?; Why did the Paris 
Peace Talks drag on for so long? Why did the United States 
accept a peace settlement which from the Perspective of South 
Vietnamese President Thieu(1967-1975) was not in Saigon's
iv.
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interests?, and finally, Why did Hanoi accept a peace 
settlement that apparently thwarted its two long-term 
objectives: reunification of Vietnam and Vietnamese hegemony 
in South-East Asia?
These vital issues will be addressed by applying the 
analytical framework to four "historical snapshots." These 
four snapshots have been isolated because their influence on 
the Paris Peace Talks was vital. The four snapshots are as 
follows: the Communist Tet Offensive, the decision made by 
President Johnson to begin deescalation of the war by entering 
into peace talks in March of 1968, the American and South 
Vietnamese incursions into Cambodia and Laos in April of 1970 
and February of 1971, respectively, and the North Vietnamese 
Nguyen Hue Offensive of March of 1972. The framework 
developed for this study will succeed in clarifying many of 
the most controversial aspects of the Second Vietnam War in 
general and the Paris Peace Talks in particular.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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PART I: INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER I:
THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS OF 1973 AND CONFLICT TERMINATION
On January 27, 1973, American Secretary of State William 
P. Rogers and North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy 
Trinh signed the Agreement for Ending the War and Restoring 
the Peace in Vietnam.1 The conclusion of the Paris Peace 
Accords in that year would herald the end of American 
involvement in the quagmire of Vietnam. For the first time 
since 1956, American advisors would not be in the field with 
the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) . Yet, in no sense, 
had the United States "abandoned" South Vietnam. Instead, the 
Nixon Administration had successfully disengaged the United 
States from the conflict, but just as importantly, had allowed 
the Republic of Vietnam to remain in a relatively advantageous 
military position against the People's Army of Vietnam(PAVN). 
President Richard Nixon had kept his promise to the American 
people, made in 1969, to achieve an "honourable peace."
When Richard Milhous Nixon(1913-1994) took the oath of 
office as the thirty-seventh President of the United States on 
January 20, 1969, his new administration faced a foreign
1 Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years. (Boston:Little, 
Brown, and Company, 1978), p.1476.
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policy disaster in Vietnam. The complexity of the foreign 
policy debacle inherited by the Nixon Administration was as 
serious as any problem encountered by anv administration in 
this century. Prior to the end of World War Two, a clear 
tenet of American strategy had developed: avoid a war of
attrition on the Asian mainland. This strategic point of view 
was most strongly expounded by General of the Army George C. 
Marshall, as Chief of Staff of the United States Army in World 
War Two, and as Secretary of State from 1947 to 1949.2
To General Marshall, American strategy in the Pacific, 
both during and after World War Two, had to be based on the 
concept of mobility, provided by overwhelming American air and 
naval strength.3 A strategy of encirclement would not only 
succeed in isolating strategic strong points, but would also 
provide the initiative to the United States, both tactically 
and strategically. By contrast, Marshall believed that a war 
on the Asian mainland could not possibly safeguard American 
interests. Instead, the United States would find itself 
waging a war of attrition with tenuous supply lines.
Marshall's assessment of American strategic requirements 
in the Pacific\Asia would profoundly influence the post-1945 
administrations of Harry S. Truman (1945-1953) and Dwight D.
2 Clay Blair, The Korean War: America's Forgotten War. (New
York: Anchor Press, 1984), p.78.
3 Ibid.
\
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3 .
Eisenhower (1953-1961). Perhaps Marshall's role in shaping 
American strategy reached its climax in 1948, when he served 
as Secretary of State. In the autumn of 1948, the Truman 
Administration was being vehemently berated for not 
intervening in the Chinese civil war on behalf of Chiang Kai- 
shek's Nationalists. If Truman had been seen to "be soft on 
Communism," his political career would have certainly ended.
Such influential Republican Senators as Robert Taft were 
openly calling for American military intervention in China, a 
theme also adopted by such popular periodicals as Time.4 
Truman could only ignore this pressure at his political peril. 
Yet, George C. Marshall would counter the interventionist 
diatribes of Senator Taft with a cold analysis of strategic 
reality. Unless the United States was willing to countenance 
the use of nuclear weapons, the Communist victory could not be 
averted. Marshall would declare: "We must not get sucked 
ini"5 President Truman would wisely follow this advice, which 
had the support of Secretary of Defence James V.Forrestal and 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Marshall's strategic doctrine would influence American 
policy-makers long after he left public office. The decisions 
to limit the war in Korea (1950-1953) and to refuse to 
intervene at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 were a legacy of the policy
4 Ibid.
5 David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest. (New York:
Random House, 1972), p.141.
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4 .
of this sagacious man. Every American President from Franklin 
Roosevelt to Dwight Eisenhower was aware of the futility of a 
war on the Asian mainland and these men did everything in 
their power to avoid such a war* In fact, one can argue that 
the avoidance of a land war in Asia had become a central tenet 
of American strategic policy by 1961.
Nonetheless, when Richard Nixon entered office in 1969, 
the United States was engaged in a full-scale Asian land war! 
The warnings from Secretary of State Marshall and retired army 
officers, such as General of the Army Omar N. Bradley and 
General Matthew B. Ridgway had been essentially ignored by the 
Democratic Administrations of John F. Kennedy (1961-1963) and 
Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-1969). For President Johnson, and to 
a lesser extent President Kennedy, concern over "another 
Korea" was tempered by an erroneous perception of a communist 
monolith, directed from Beijing, that threatened Western 
interests in East Asia, in general, and South-East Asia in 
particular. To President Johnson and his senior civilian 
advisors, Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara, and National 
Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, South Vietnam became a test 
of American resolve to resist "Communist aggression." The 
erroneous appraisal of the international situation that was 
held by the Johnson Administration was best expounded by the 
President himself: "If we don't stop the Reds in South
Vietnam, tomorrow they will be in Hawaii, and next they will
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be in San Francisco.1,6
Therefore, in retrospect, the Johnson Administration’s 
fallacious analysis of the international situation would lead 
to the worst foreign policy debacle for the United States this 
century. Yet, Richard Nixon must have appeared to be the 
wrong man in the White House in 1969 to end the war in 
Vietnam. During the 1950s, Nixon, then Vice-President, had 
been one of the most ardent of the Cold War warriors. In the 
1952 Presidential campaign, for example, Nixon referred to the 
State Department as the Dean Acheson College for the Cowardly 
Containment of Communism.7 Nixon would perhaps best 
demonstrate his hawkish views in 1960 when he stressed the 
strategic importance of defending the Nationalist off-shore 
islands of Matsu and Quemoy against the People's Republic of 
China (PRC).8
Yet, these same qualities would actually help Richard 
Nixon in his efforts to conclude the Paris Peace Talks. Nixon 
was above all a consummate politician. He recognized that it 
was the Vietnam War that had destroyed the Presidency of 
Lyndon Johnson, elected in 1964 with a historic 61 percent of 
the popular vote. Nixon, who had endured many travails in his 
political career, was determined not to repeat the tragedy of
6 John T. Rourke, International Politics on the World Stage.
(Guildford, Connecticutt: Lushkin Publishing, 1993), 
p.25.
7 Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, p.95.
8 Ibid.
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Lyndon Johnson. The United States had to negotiate a "peace 
with honour" to the war in Vietnam.
In addition, despite all his other weaknesses, Nixon had 
a realistic appraisal of the international situation. Unlike 
his immediate predecessors, he recognized that there was no 
Communist monolith directed from Moscow or Beijing. Instead, 
the Socialist bloc was seriously divided. If there ever had 
been a "Moscov-Beijing Axis," it had certainly been shattered 
by the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (CPSU), Nikita Khrushchev, with the decision to recall 
Soviet economic advisors and to refuse to share nuclear 
technology with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in I960.9 
During the 1960s, the schism between Moscow and Beijing would 
worsen, due to differences in ideology and national interests, 
to the point of corps-sized clashes between the PLA and the 
Red Army along the Ussuri and Amur Rivers. Nixon recognized 
that dissension in the Socialist bloc could help facilitate a 
settlement to the war in Vietnam.
Thus, Richard Nixon, along with his National Security 
Advisor, Henry Kissinger, would successfully conclude the 
Paris Peace Talks by using a combination of military pressure 
and the "China Card." In January of 1973, the American 
Secretary of State signed an agreement that allowed the United 
States to extricate itself from a war that did not serve its
9 Harrison E. Salisbury, The New Emoerors: China in the Era 
of Mao and Pena. (New York: Avon, 1992), p.209.
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national interests. However, the Paris Peace Accords also 
provided a chance for an independent South Vietnam, despite 
the fact that the regime in Saigon was not at all pleased with 
the settlement. The problem was that American attention, and 
thus military power, was diverted from South-East Asia by the 
devastating impact of Watergate. As noted by both Nixon and 
Kissinger in various works, the Paris Peace Accords were far 
from perfect, but American military might would act as the 
lynchpin that would safeguard the peace.
The successful conclusion of the Paris Peace Accords 
in January of 1973 represented a partial victory for Hanoi as 
well. Since 1946, the Vietnamese Communists had been 
constantly at war to achieve their ultimate goal: the
reunification of an independent Vietnam. This noble goal had 
apparently been achieved when the French Army suffered a 
disastrous rout at Dien Bien Phu in May of 1954. Yet, Vietnam 
would not be reunited by the Geneva Accords of 1954. Ho Chi 
Minh found himself under great pressure from Soviet Foreign 
Minister Andrei Gromyko and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai to make 
huge concessions. The most important of these was the division 
of Vietnam at the 17th parallel with national elections to be 
held in 1956. These nation-wide elections would never be held 
because of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem's refusal 
to participate, a position backed by the Eisenhower 
Administration.
By January of 1959, the Central Committee of the Lao
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Dong Party called for armed insurrection in the South. This 
decision resulted in the Kennedy Administration’s commitment 
of almost 16,000 advisors by November of 1963. By the summer 
of 1965, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam(DRV) was in effect 
at war not only with the Republic of Vietnam, but also the 
United States. As long as the American people were willing to 
support a major war effort in South-East Asia, it was unlikely 
that Vietnam would be reunified.
Thus, it was in this context that the Paris Peace 
Accords represented a victory for Hanoi. One of the central 
purposes of the Paris Peace Accords, as noted by both Richard 
Nixon and Henry Kissinger, was to allow the United States to 
disengage itself from direct combat in Vietnam. For Hanoi, the 
Accords represented a drastic American retrenchment in South- 
East Asia. American ground troops were finally withdrawn and, 
perhaps most importantly, the punishing airstrikes against 
North Vietnam were finally brought to a halt. Hanoi now had
good reason to doubt that American airpower would ever be
decisive in the future conflict because of war-weariness in 
the United States and the actions being taken by the Congress 
to limit the President’s scope of action in the use of
military force, best exemplified by the War Powers Act of
1973.
The purpose of this introductory discussion has been to 
outline the complexity of the situation facing Nixon in 
Vietnam upon his inauguration. If the Vietnam War was a
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quagmire for the United States, then the Paris Peace Accords 
must be considered one of the great American diplomatic 
triumphs since the Korean War. As noted by Henry Kissinger, 
the successful conclusion of the Paris Peace Talks 
demonstrated that the United States was still capable of 
decisive action on the world stage.10 No less critical, the 
United States was now free to exert its influence in areas of 
real strategic importance, such as the Middle East.
For the reasons outlined in the above discussion, the 
Paris Peace Accords must be considered one of the great 
achievements of American foreign policy. The purpose of this 
thesis will be to determine and analyze the major factors that 
led to a successful resolution of the Paris Peace Talks. That 
outcome will be studied by addressing four questions that are 
very much inter-related: What were the factors that led the 
respective parties to enter into the Paris Peace Talks in 
November of 1968, and eventually, to conclude the Paris Peace 
Accords in January of 1973?; Why did the Paris Peace Talks 
drag on for so long?; Why did the United States accept a peace 
settlement that, from the perspective of South Vietnamese 
President Nguyen Van Thieu(1967-1975), was not in Saigon’s 
interests?, and finally, Why did Hanoi accept a peace 
settlement that apparently did not promote its two ultimate 
objectives: the reunification of Vietnam and the establishment 
of Vietnamese hegemony in Indochina?
10 Kissinger, White House Years, p.1436.
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In the course of addressing these four questions, two 
central hypotheses will also be tested. The first will be that 
a settlement of the Paris Peace Talks was only possible after 
a fundamental shift had taken place in the negotiating 
strategy of the North Vietnamese Politburo by October of
1972. Only in the wake of the serious failure of the 1972 
Nguyen Hue Offensive did North Vietnam accept peace terms in 
1973 that had been essentially available in 1970. The second 
key hypothesis to be tested will be that the Nixon 
Administration was likewise under pressure to conclude the 
Paris Peace Talks because of the continued anti-war sentiment 
in the country, especially in the Congress and the business 
community. A review of the relevant theoretical and 
substantive literature reveals three dominant themes, each of 
which individually helps to explain why the two principal 
parties were finally able to reach a settlement in January of
1973. However, nowhere were these themes, to be called 
"catalysts" in this study, developed within a comprehensive 
framework. The specific contribution of this thesis to the 
literature on the Second Vietnam War will be to provide a 
comprehensive systematic framework within which to analyze the 
process and factors that led to a settlement of the conflict.
The first catalyst or theme to be analyzed will be 
military defeat\military stalemate. This catalyst is 
introduced in Getting to the Table by Janice Gross stein,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 1 .
although she uses the term "trigger.1,11 Despite the fact 
that Stein's book deals with the process of prenegotiation, 
the concept is nonetheless relevant to the present study for 
two reasons. First, the thesis will explore the factors that 
motivated Lyndon Johnson to announce that he would not run for 
a second term, to declare a bombing halt above the 20th 
parallel in the DRV, and to announce that the United States 
was prepared to enter in peace talks with Hanoi, all of which 
were announced by Mr. Johnson in a national television address 
on March 31, 1968. Second, the thesis will argue that if
reverses on the battlefield can lead to prenegotiations, then 
a major battlefield reversal may lead to an actual settlement.
In Getting to the Table. Stein recognizes the importance 
of military stalemate\military reversal leading to 
prenegotiations. She notes: "Most directly, as Zartroan
argues, mutual perception of a hurting stalemate informed by 
a recent or impending crisis leads policy-makers to consider 
actively the option of negotiation.1,12 Clearly, Lyndon 
Johnson had been left devastated by the enemy's Tet Offensive 
of 1968. To the American public, the war appeared to be a 
hopeless stalemate. Johnson believed that negotiations were 
the only option because of the PAVN and Viet Cong (VC) 
"victory" at Tet. In other words, American public opinion was
11 Janice Gross Stein, Getting to the Table. ( Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), p.242.
12 Ibid. p.245.
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obviously important.
Military reversal would act as a powerful catalyst in 
influencing the dramatic policy shift of the North Vietnamese 
Politburo in October of 1972 as well. C.R. Mitchell, in The 
Structure of Conflict, has argued that the likelihood of 
military defeat can lead to a peace settlement. As noted by 
Mitchell:
Rather than continue costly, and possibly 
ineffective, military operations either because a 
perceived stalemate exists or because defeat seems 
more likely than victory, a national government may 
take the difficult decision to send out peace 
feelers to the adversary through a neutral 
government, or prepare to make a direct compromise 
offer to the opposing party.13
This study will contend that Mitchell's analysis is not only 
applicable to the dramatic policy shift of the North 
Vietnamese Politburo in October of 1972, but also to the 
Johnson Administration's decision to enter into the Paris 
Peace Talks in March of 1968.
Another concept that is closely related to military 
stalemate\military reversal is tolerance of costs. In The 
Logic of International Relations. Walter Jones argues: "A
party inferior in strength and yet superior in cost tolerance 
may be more powerful than a strong opponent less willing to 
suffer."14 This theory is very applicable to the Vietnam
13 C.R. Mitchell, The Structure of International Conflict.
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p.165.
14 Walter S. Jones, The Logic of International Relations.
(New York: Harper Collins Publisher,1991), p.252.
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War. Because the United States was unwilling to accept heavy 
casualties, as clearly demonstrated in the collapse of popular 
support for the war after the Tet Offensive, Washington found 
itself compelled to enter into the Paris Peace Talks. Thus, 
Ho Chi Minh's warning to the United States in 1965 was proven 
correct: "In the end the Americans will kill ten patriots for 
every American who dies, but it is they who will tire 
first.”15 The United States by 1973 was unwilling to endure 
further costs.
Clearly, the high morale and discipline of the North 
Vietnamese people were great assets. However, the relative 
importance of cost tolerance cannot be overestimated. Despite 
the obvious fact that by 1973 the Nixon Administration had 
lost all popular support for a continuation of the war, the 
Politburo accepted a peace settlement in January of 1973 that 
had bean categorically rejected in May of 1972. This thesis 
will argue that Hanoi's crucial "volte face" in October, 1972, 
was precipitated by its own cost tolerance having been reached 
in the form of military reversal.
Cost tolerance is closely related to the second 
"trigger" identified by Stein: domestic instability. Stein 
writes: "[P]renegotiation is triggered by an attempt to
prevent a crisis or to manage a relationship in the wake of a 
recent crisis."16 This catalyst is especially pertinent to
15 Ibid.
16 Stein, Getting to the Table, p.240.
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the Paris Peace Talks of 1968-1973. Domestic pressures were 
clearly very important in the decision of both parties to 
enter into the negotiation phase and the eventual decision to 
conclude a peace agreement.
Stein limits domestic instability as a "trigger" only to 
the prenegotiation stage. Yet, domestic instability, if 
greatly exacerbated, perhaps by military defeat, can also lead 
to a settlement. This factor can take many forms. Such 
manifestations of domestic unrest as food riots, student 
strikes, and growing political opposition can all threaten the 
survival of the regime. This thesis will also consider 
divisions within a country's leadership as a manifestation of 
domestic unrest. If a belligerent is suffering critical 
reverses on the battlefield and there are signs of domestic 
unrest, usually a "dovish" faction will emerge, calling for an 
end to hostilities.
Yet, at the same time that one faction may be calling for 
an end to hostilities, another faction may be tempted to fight 
on if military reverse is not clear. Mitchell has noted that: 
"[F]actions within each party arguing for a continuation of 
the coercive strategies, for 'more of the same,' for a little 
greater effort to bring final success will be stronger and 
more persuasive."17 Thus, only with clear military reversal, 
which had occurred for Hanoi by September of 1972, would the 
views of the "dovish" faction dominate.
17 Mitchell, The Structure of International Conflict, p.179.
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Clearly, military stalemate\military reversal and 
domestic instability are two catalysts that are inextricably 
linked. Obviously from the theoretical literature on conflict 
resolution and the various case studies presented, it is 
futile to consider one catalyst in isolation from the other. 
Stein has written that the fear of a domestic crisis resulting 
from military stalemate will often lead a belligerent to 
prenegotiation.18 This study will extend Stein's argument 
beyond the prenegotiations stage to the actual peace 
settlement.
Therefore, a strong argument can be made that the
combination of disastrous military reversal and domestic
problems was the determining factor in Hanoi's decision to
conclude the Paris Peace Talks, as clearly expounded by the
"Nine Points" put forward by North Vietnamese Special Advisor
Le Due Tho to Henry Kissinger in Paris on October 8, 1972.
The North Vietnamese decision to offer a new negotiating
position in the autumn of 1972 that, with some modifications,
was essentially the one put forward by the Nixon
Administration in 1969, can again be explained by reference to
the two catalysts. Mitchell has observed:
Those wishing to terminate the conflict will argue 
that the costs and risks of prolonging the conflict 
far outweigh those of compromising now, and that 
the, admittedly uncertain benefits of a settlement 
soon also outweigh more uncertain benefits to be 
obtained at some unspecified future time, when an 
even greater position of dominance may have been
18 Stein, Getting to the Table, p.240.
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gained over the opposing party.19
Surely, similar arguments were made in the Politburo of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam by such "moderates’' as the 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Pham Van Dong, and 
Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, in the autumn of 1972. 
Yet, the same arguments held true for Washington, as well. 
The theoretical works that were surveyed were generally found 
to define possible manifestations of domestic unrest in a very 
narrow manner. Only one work, C.R. Mitchell's The Structure 
of International Conflict, was found to consider intra-party 
factionalism a legitimate obstacle in any negotiations. All 
too often in the literature on the Second Vietnam War, the 
respective parties, especially the North Vietnamese Politburo, 
are treated as monolithic entities. As this thesis will 
demonstrate, a leading factor that led to the Paris Peace 
Talks being so dragged out were serious divisions within the 
Politburo in Hanoi. After the death of the President of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh, on September 3, 
1969, at least three factions emerged within the Central 
Committee of the Lao Dong Party.
The recognition of intra-party factionalism is vital to 
understanding the dynamic of negotiations. Mitchell has again 
presciently noted that:
A more realistic approach is one which acknowledges
that many parties in conflict have a more complex
19 Mitchell, The Structure of International Conflict, p.167.
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structure than that of a single individual, and 
takes into account such factors as intra-party 
conflicts and rivalries, the distribution of 
factional influence, bureaucratic factors making 
for slow decision-making and differing perceptions 
of the adversary held by intra-party factions.20
Thus, Hanoi could not move towards a conclusion of the Paris
Peace Talks until a consensus had been reached in the
Politburo to do so.
So far, the theoretical literature clearly indicates that
two catalysts are often decisive in leading to conflict
termination. This thesis will present the argument that it
was primarily military reversal\military stalemate, along with
domestic concerns, that led to the acceptance of the Paris
Peace Accords for both belligerents. In addition, this thesis
will further contend that a third catalyst enhanced the effect
of the above two catalysts.
This third catalyst, the role of the international
balance of power, would prove crucial to the eventual
conclusion of the Paris Peace Talks. Yet, strangely, there is
virtually nothing in the theoretical literature that would
anticipate the unique roles of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR) and the People's Republic of China (PRC).
The literature on conflict resolution considers the role
of third players in two broad ways: as mediators and as direct
participants in hostilities. Clearly, neither the USSR nor
PRC acted as third players in these forms. Yet, the role of
20 Ibid. p. 185.
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the two Communist giants would be paramount in the successful 
conclusion of the Paris Peace Accords in January of 1973. 
Indeed, no less an eminent person than Richard Nixon himself 
considered the "triangular diplomacy" with the USSR and PRC as 
the key to the successful conclusion of the Paris Peace 
Talks.21
The theoretical work on the role of third players as
mediators in conflict resolution is extensive. One leading
exponent is Dean G. Pruitt who has argued that third players
can often influence stalemated negotiations through mediation:
Third parties frequently become involved in
negotiation...They may also intrude themselves, as 
when a powerful state intervenes in a controversy 
between two client states that threatens the 
broader aims of the alliance. Third party
intervention ordinarily has the function of
resolving a difficult conflict that is dangerous to
continue.22
Likewise, Janice Gross Stein, in her case studies in Getting 
to the Table, recognized the importance of the roles of third 
actors as mediators. Yet, the mediatory role of third 
players, as described by Pruitt and Stein, is clearly not 
applicable to the Paris Peace Talks of 1968-1973.
Fred Ikle's Every War Must End also fails to provide any 
useful theoretical background, as he only considered third 
players in the most classical role: direct military
21 Richard M. Nixon, No More Vietnams. ( New York: Avon,
1984), p.147.
22 Dean G. Pruitt, Negotiation Behaviour. (New York: Academic
Press, 1981), p.201.
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intervention. In establishing strategy and war aims, Ikle
notes that a belligerent must consider third parties:
One's own mobilization potential and that of the 
enemy are not isolated from the rest of the world.
On the one hand, they may be augmented by friendly 
powers and future allies; on the other hand, some 
military forces may have to be reserved for further 
contingencies. External aid might enlarge the 
resources available for the war effort, real or 
imagined threats from other powers might draw 
forces to another front, and new conflicts between 
third parties in other theaters might radically 
alter the ambitions and restraints of the original 
belligerents.23
Ikle's analysis is not without merit. This argument provides 
useful background to President Johnson's dramatic speech of 
March 31, 1968. Johnson believed that the war could not be 
won. If the United States attempted to escalate the war, as 
called for by the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) 
Commander-in-Chief, General William C. Westmoreland, (USA), the 
President was convinced that Soviet and/or Chinese 
intervention would ensue.
Yet, Ikle's work Every War Must End predated the 
successful conclusion of Nixon's "triangular diplomacy." Thus, 
it can not specifically provide any in depth analysis of the 
"strategic triangle." In retrospect, the "triangular 
diplomacy" of Richard Nixon was perhaps unique in the history 
of international relations. Super Power detente and Sino- 
American rapprochement in the early 1970s were both diplomatic
23 Fred C.Ikle, Every War Must End.( New York: Columbia 
University, 1971), p.23.
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milestones of the post-Korean War world. Thus, there is no
true historical parallel for comparison purposes, so the
reader can gain a greater understanding of the importance of
this third catalyst.
Nixon's successful "triangular diplomacy" was, in many
respects, a crucial factor or catalyst in the Paris Peace
Talks. Even Gareth Porter, a staunch critic of Nixon's
Vietnam policy, has noted:
The DRV had not reckoned, however, with Nixon's 
ability to manipulate detente with the Soviet Union 
and China for his own internal political benefit, 
thus nullifying, in effect, the damaging political 
impact of the offensive and the re-escalation of 
American military involvement in South Vietnam. By 
showing that he could take unprecedented military 
measures against North Vietnam without jeopardizing 
detente, Nixon was able to regain public confidence 
at home in his ability to end the war, and to 
resist the DRV demand for a transitional coalition, 
which would have signified a clear-cut defeat for 
the American effort.
Thus, there is a clear consensus in the literature, from 
right-wing writers such as Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, 
as well as left-of-centre writers, such as Gareth Porter, that 
the "triangular diplomacy" of the Nixon Administration was 
indeed a catalyst that was very crucial to the eventual 
conclusion of the Paris Peace Accords in January of 1973.
This introductory chapter has had two broad goals. 
First, it has attempted to justify the importance of the Paris 
Peace Accords. Second, it has explained the analytical
24 Gareth Porter, A Peace Denied. (Bloomington, Indiana: 
Indiana University Press, 1975), p.102.
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framework to be used to argue the two central hypotheses: the 
Paris Peace Accords resulted from a fundamental shift in the 
negotiating position of Hanoi in October of 1972 and the Nixon 
Administration was under great domestic pressure to end 
American involvement in Vietnam. These hypotheses were formed 
in relation to four central questions: What were the factors 
that led the two respective parties to enter into the Paris 
Peace Talks in 1968, and subsequently, to conclude the Paris 
Peace Accords in 1973? Why did the Paris Peace Talks last for 
almost fifty-one months? Why did the United States accept a 
peace settlement, which from the point of view of South 
Vietnamese President Thieu, was not in Saigon's interests? and 
finally, Why did Hanoi accept a peace settlement that 
apparently failed to achieve its paramount objective, 
reunification of Vietnam?
With a basic theoretical framework in place, the thesis 
will now proceed to analyze specific "historical snapshots." 
In developing these "snapshots," the three catalysts will be 
used to justify the two hypotheses presented.
For the purposes of this thesis, four "historical 
snapshots" have been chosen. The first two and the last one, 
the Tet Offensive, President Johnson's decision to enter into 
the Paris Peace Talks, and the Nguyen Hue Offensive (1972) 
have already been briefly mentioned. The third " historical 
snapshot" relates to the South Vietnamese-American incursions 
into Cambodia and Laos in April of 1970 and February of 1971,
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respectively. The two separate campaigns are being studied 
together because they resulted from the same strategy: disrupt 
the supply lines of the PAVN to buy time for American troop 
withdrawals and the process of Vietnamization.
The following sections and chapters of the thesis will 
make use of a wide variety of sources. Sources will include 
right-of-centre sources, such as the memoirs of President 
Nixon and his National Security Advisor, as well as books by 
senior American military men, such as General Bruce R. Palmer, 
Jr.,(USA). To provide a more balanced perspective, left-of- 
centre sources will also be utilized, including Gabriel 
Kolko's Anatomy of a War and Gareth Porter's A Peace Denied. 
Such a rich and diverse range of substantive literature will 
provide the basic answers to the four questions raised in this 
introduction.
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PART II: THE ROAD TO THE PARIS PEACE TALKS 
CHAPTER II: THE TET OFFENSIVE OF 1968
As General William C. Westmoreland, Commander-in-Chief, 
United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), 
prepared to retire in the late evening of January 30, 1968, 
his mind was troubled.25 He remained fixated on the threat 
posed by the People's Army of Vietnam's(PAVN) build-up in the 
two northern-most provinces of South Vietnam, Quang Tri and 
Thua Thien. Above all, Westmoreland was deeply concerned 
about the beleaguered Marine garrison under siege at the 
isolated outpost of Khe Sanh. General Westmoreland's chief of 
military intelligence, Brigadier-General Phillip B. Davidson, 
Jr., (USA), had become convinced that the decisive North 
Vietnamese effort would come during or after Tet.26
For almost two months, General Westmoreland had been 
preparing for this "decisive battle" in the two northern-most 
provinces of South Vietnam. The PAVN threat to the densely 
populated coastal lowlands of Quang Tri and Thua Thien became 
most obvious on December 20. On this date, the commanding 
officer of the 3rd Marine Division, Major-General Rathvon McC.
25 General William C. Westmoreland, (USA-Retired),
" Perspectives," Vietnam, edited by Colonel H.G. 
Summers, (USA-Retired), January, 1993, p.62.
26 Brigadier-General Edwin H. Simmons, (USMC-Retired),
Marines, (New York: Bantam Books, 1987), p.74.
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Tompkins, (USMC), alerted the commander of the III Marine 
Amphibious Force, Lieutenant-General Robert E. Cushman, 
(USMC), that the 308 and 325C PAVN divisions were digging in 
around Khe Sanh. If the Marine outpost at Khe Sanh,
garrisoned in mid-December by only the 3rd battalion, 26th 
Marines, was allowed to fall, then the entire Marine line 
along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) could be outflanked, 
leaving the cities of Dong Ha, Quang Tri, and Hue extremely 
vulnerable. Yet, if Khe Sanh was to be held, it would have to 
be reinforced and reserves would have to be committed for the 
eventual lifting of the siege. General Westmoreland decided 
that Khe Sanh would be held, a decision supported by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff in far-off Washington, D.C.27
By January 30, 1968, all of the forces committed by 
Westmoreland to hold and then to relieve Khe Sanh were in 
place. The alacrity of the American response to the threat to 
Khe Sanh was due to the fact, as argued by Robert Pisor in End 
of the Line, that Westmoreland had begun a military build-up 
in Quang Tri and Thua Thien as early as November of 1967.28 
Westmoreland was preparing the stage for the move that he 
believed would end the war: interdiction of the Laotian
panhandle by American ground forces. At the New Year, the 
XXIVth Provisional Corps, under the command of Lieutenant-
27 Westmoreland, nPerspectives," p.63.
28 Robert L.Pisor, End of the line. (New York: Viking Press,
11981), p.34.
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General William B. Rosson, (USA), was combat-ready with two of 
its three divisions, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and 
the 3rd Marine Division, deployed in Quang Tri. Westmoreland 
was convinced that 1968 would be the decisive "turning point" 
in the war.29 Little did he know that his judgement would be 
proven valid for the wrong reasons.
At the same time that General Westmoreland was preparing 
to retire for the evening, another senior American military 
man, Lieutenant-General Frederick C. Weyand, (USA), commanding 
officer of II Field Force Vietnam (II FFV), was also deeply 
disturbed by recent trends in his command.30 During 
September and early October of 1967, the 1st and 25th Infantry 
Divisions had engaged in bloody firefights with the 9th Viet 
Cong (VC) Division at Tay Ninh, Loc Ninh, and Song Be.31 
However, by mid-October, the VC regiments had withdrawn to 
their sanctuaries in eastern Cambodia to rest and refit. This 
occurrence was hardly unusual: it was the general tactic of 
the enemy. Lieutenant-General Weyand became deeply concerned 
about events that followed, however.
For the next three and a half months, there would be 
virtually no enemy activity in the II FFV area. There were 
very few skirmishes between the VC and American or South
29 General William C. Westmoreland, (USA-Retired), A Soldier
Reports. (New York: Random House, 1976), p.341.
30 Jack Shulimson, Tet-1968. (New York: Bantam Books, 1988),
p.14.
31 Pisor, End of the Line, p.41.
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Vietnamese troops. In addition, the enemy had stopped regular 
patrols. Perhaps most strangely, there was a heavy influx of 
refugees coming from the western provinces of South Vietnam to 
Saigon. To Lieutenant-General Weyand it must have seemed like 
deja vu: as a young officer in France in 1944, he had
witnessed similar conditions prior to the Battle of the Bulge!
Weyand's fears were exacerbated by American military 
intelligence. Intelligence estimates for 1967 placed total 
North Vietnamese infiltration at 200,000.32 Yet, in the 
first month of 1968, the rate of enemy infiltration actually 
increased.33 Aerial reconnaissance also indicated a major 
increase in enemy activity in the Cambodian sanctuaries. 
Weyand came to the conclusion that the enemy was preparing for 
a major offensive against Saigon itself.34
At a meeting of senior American military men in Saigon on 
January 10, 1968, Lieutenant-General Weyand presented his
views. In attendance at this conference were General 
Westmoreland, Brigadier-General Davidson, Brigadier-General 
John M. Chaisson,(USMC), Westmoreland's director of 
operations, and Lieutenant-General Bruce R. Palmer, Jr., 
commanding general, United States Army Vietnam.35 Although 
Weyand’s colleagues were somewhat sceptical of the possibility
32 Lanning and Cragg, Inside the VC and the NVA. p.58.
33 Ibid.
34 Shulimson, Tet. p.23.
35 Ibid.
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of a full-scale enemy attack against Saigon, they recognized 
that Saigon was very vulnerable. General Westmoreland 
supported Weyand1s request to withdraw the 1st and 25th 
Infantry Divisions from the Cambodian border and to relocate 
them near Saigon.36 In retrospect, this decision was one of 
the most important taken by the American military in 1968. If 
the Viet Cong 5th and 9th Divisions had not encountered strong 
American forces guarding the strategic western approaches to 
Saigon, then surely Lieutenant-General Tran Van Tra, the 
senior military officer of the Central Office for South 
Vietnam (COSVN), would have infiltrated at least one of his 
divisions into Saigon to support the local force VC units. As 
it was, the only sustained heavy fighting in Saigon was 
largely localized, in Cholon.
Although senior American military men had some serious 
concerns, they had no doubt that the war could be won. The 
same cannot be said of their Commander-in-Chief, however. By 
the fall of 1967, Lyndon Johnson had become utterly 
disenchanted with the war in Vietnam. Johnson saw no way to 
end the war without risking Chinese intervention. In April of 
1967, General Westmoreland declared in a private session with 
the President that "the war could go on indefinitely11 unless 
he was allowed to interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail with ground
36 Ibid.
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forces.37 Johnson's rationale for refusing this logical 
request was evinced in a comment made to an aide: "I am not 
going to spit in China's face."38
The attitude of the Administration, in general, and the 
President, in particular, is perhaps best symbolized by the 
fate of Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara (1961-1968). 
McNamara, more than any other senior official in the Johnson 
Administration, was the driving force behind the American 
military commitment and then build-up in Vietnam. By January 
of 1965, the reports coming from the American Ambassador in 
Saigon, General Maxwell D. Taylor (USA-Ret) and the MACV 
Commander-in-Chief, General Westmoreland, were painfully 
clear: unless American combat troops were introduced into
South Vietnam immediately, the country would fall to the 
Communists. McNamara, along with National Security Advisor 
MacGeorge Bundy, formulated the American response which would 
lead the United States into its worst foreign policy debacle 
of this century.
The Secretary of Defence believed that the key to ending 
the conflict in South Vietnam was forcing Hanoi to accept a 
settlement. The Pentagon was convinced that a gradually 
escalating strategic air campaign against North Vietnam would
37 Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History. (New York: Penguin,
1985), p.543.
38 Ibid.
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lead the Politburo in Hanoi to capitulate to American 
demands.39 Thus, in February of 1965, President Johnson 
authorized Operation Rolling Thunder. At the same time, the 
situation on the ground in South Vietnam had to be stabilized. 
To achieve this objective, McNamara endorsed General 
Westmoreland's dramatic request for forty-four battalions (34 
from the United States, 9 from the Republic of Korea, and one 
from Australia) to be committed to the conflict.40 On June 
28, 1965, President Johnson announced on national television 
that he had accepted Westmoreland's proposal and that the 1st 
Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was to be deployed immediately.
By November and December of 1965, as noted by David 
Halberstam in The Best and the Brightest. Mr. McNamara had 
become deeply alarmed about the conduct of the war.41 
Operation Rolling Thunder, according to intelligence reports, 
was not restricting infiltration along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. 
Most ominously, the Politburo in Hanoi showed no evidence that 
it was prepared to accept American demands for a negotiated 
settlement to the war in South Vietnam. Indeed, the strategic 
bombing campaign against North Vietnam actually strengthened 
the resolve of the North Vietnamese people to resist American 
"imperialism."
Therefore, Mr. McNamara now found himself in a
39 Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, p.349.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
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complicated dilemma. The underlying premise of the American 
military build-up, that a strategic air campaign would quickly 
lead to a negotiated peace settlement, was proven invalid by 
December of 1965. McNamara could either advise his President 
to gradually withdraw from Vietnam, a decision that would have 
been political suicide for Lyndon Johnson in 1965-1966, or to 
gradually escalate American troop strength in South-East Asia 
(a rapid military build-up, which would have necessitated the 
activation of the reserves was considered to be politically 
risky), without anv clear strategic objective in sight. 
McNamara, because of his misguided faith in statistics and 
behavioural procedures, had unwittingly led the Administration 
into a land war in Asia. Up to his last days in the Pentagon, 
Mr. McNamara would never fully understand why Operation 
Rolling Thunder had failed to lead Hanoi to accept a 
negotiated settlement. To the former President of the Ford 
Motor Company, Hanoi's intransigent position must have seemed 
utterly illogical. McNamara's confusion about the state of 
the war, according to many of his senior aides, reached its 
zenith in June of 1966, when President Johnson ordered a 
temporary bombing halt. The Johnson Administration informed 
Hanoi, through the Soviet Ambassador to Washington, Anatoly 
Dobrynin, that the United States was prepared to extend the 
bombing halt and to implement a $1 billion development project 
for the Mekong Delta, in return for a North Vietnamese
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commitment to end its support for the war in the South.42 
The Politburo in Hanoi categorically rejected the offer.
President Johnson, Secretary of Defence McNamara, and 
National Security Advisor MacGeorge Bundy were utterly 
perplexed. According to The Pentagon Papers, it was at this 
time that serious divisions emerged within the Johnson 
Administration.43 The split within the Administration was 
perhaps best symbolized by MacGeorge Bundy's resignation in 
November of 1966. Bundy had been one of the staunchest 
advocates of an American military build-up in the debates of 
the winter of 1964-1965. By the autumn of 1966, Bundy was 
convinced that the war was hopeless.44 Upon his resignation, 
President Johnson replaced him with a "hawk,” Walt W. Rostow.
Robert McNamara was no longer an effective war manager 
for President Johnson. The Secretary of Defence realized that 
the gigantic American military build-up in South Vietnam was 
only reinforcing Hanoi1s determination to continue the 
conflict. Nevertheless, McNamara could not envision any way 
that Washington might extricate itself from the quagmire in 
Vietnam. By 1966, the American war effort in Vietnam no 
longer had a sound strategic direction.
42 George Esper, The Associated Press Eve-Witness History of
the Vietnam War. (New York: Associated Press, 1985), 
P.106.
43 James W. Gibson, The Perfect War. (Boston: Atlantic Press,
1990), p.398.
44 Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, p.498.
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The Secretary of Defence was a broken man. He had 
advised his President to commit his country to a land war in 
Asia, in which, if Operation Rolling Thunder failed to force 
Hanoi to accept a negotiated settlement, there was no 
alternative strategy to end the conflict. By December of 
1965, McNamara realized that Operation Rolling Thunder had 
failed in its central objective. American troop strength in 
South Vietnam would gradually increase, to a peak of 582,000 
personnel in March of 1968, but there was no ultimate 
strategic objective that the build-up was meant to achieve.
In the autumn of 1967, McNamara submitted his resignation 
to the President. Johnson deferred his acceptance of the 
resignation until March of 1968, for two reasons. First of 
all, the President had to find a suitable successor. Second, 
President Johnson was concerned about the negative impact that 
such a high-level resignation might have in the media and in 
the Congress. Finally, on March 1, 1968, a prominent
Washington lawyer, Clark W. Clifford, succeeded Mr. McNamara 
at the Pentagon.45
Perhaps what was most relevant in relation to the 
decision-making process in the Johnson Administration and 
perhaps even symbolic about Mr. McNamara's resignation as 
Secretary of Defence regarded his health. In all of the 
literature on the Vietnam War, there is an implicit consensus 
over the McNamara resignation: it was prompted by emotional
45 Karnow, Vietnam, p.532.
I
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instability. Indeed, Lyndon Johnson himself stated that one 
of the reasons he accepted his Secretary of Defence's 
resignation was a fear that the pressures of the job would 
lead to a suicide attempt on Mr. McNamara's part.*6 Thus, by 
the end of January, 1968, the war in South Vietnam had claimed 
another victim.
Clearly, senior officials in both the Administration and 
the military believed that 1968 would be a decisive year in 
the war. Yet, what is most remarkable about the American 
leadership was the deep foreboding of the Commander-in-Chief. 
Lyndon Johnson, just like Richard Nixon, was a political 
animal: he recognized that the war was eroding his Presidency. 
On the eve of the Tet Offensive, Johnson's popular approval 
stood at 48 percent of the electorate, his lowest standing 
since taking office .*7 The President recognized that the 
situation was only going to worsen. In December of 1967, 
while addressing the Australian cabinet of Prime Minister John 
McEwen, Johnson declared that "dark days lie ahead in 
Vietnam."*8 The remark was truly prophetic.
At the same time that Administration officials and 
American military men were preparing for the decisive year of 
the war, their opposite numbers in Hanoi were now ready to 
execute perhaps the boldest strategy of the war— a
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Shulimson, Tet. p.61.
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countrywide, general offensive. The Tet Offensive is 
generally associated with the Minister of Defence of the DRV, 
Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap. In fact, Giap was not the 
progenitor of the radical strategy. The Tet Offensive was the 
"brainchild” of Senior General Nguyen Chi Thanh, Chairman of 
COSVN from its establishment in June of 1964, until his death 
in July of 1967. By the spring of 1967, Thanh believed that 
the American war effort was in serious trouble. American 
combat units were operating in areas, particularly along the 
Demilitarized Zone(DMZ) and the Cambodian border, where North 
Vietnamese forces enjoyed short lines of communication which 
left the tactical initiative to the North Vietnamese
commanders. Thanh argued to his colleagues in the Politburo
that a series of coordinated, countrywide offensives could 
lead to a military disaster for the United States.49
However, before Senior General Thanh could forge the needed 
consensus within the Politburo, he died of heart failure in 
Hanoi in July of 1967.50
Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap now emerged at the
forefront. Giap agreed that a large scale, countryside 
offensive could prove decisive to the North Vietnamese war 
effort. Yet, he fundamentally altered Senior General Thanh’s 
concept in two crucial ways. Apparently, Thanh had envisioned
49 Edward Doyle, Samuel Lipsman, and Terence Maitland,
The North. (Boston: Little, Brown, and.Company, 1984),
p.61.
50 Ibid.
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the Tet Offensive as a series of regimental-size attacks upon 
American ground forces near the DMZ and in the western Central 
Highlands. Senior General Giap changed the focus of the Tet 
Offensive from remote border areas to the most populous 
regions of South Vietnam, Saigon and the Mekong Delta.51 In 
addition, the Communist forces were to concentrate the bulk of 
their offensive against the ARVN, not American ground 
units.52 These changes were implemented by Senior General 
Giap to exacerbate the perceived political instability and 
military weakness of the Saigon regime.
Vo Nguyen Giap intended the Tet Offensive to have three 
stages. In the first stage, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong 
forces would engage American units and draw American strength 
away from the most heavily populated regions of the 
country.53 Once this stage had been completed, by December 
of 1967, the offensive was to enter into its all important 
second stage. By launching a massive, countrywide offensive, 
the Communist political and military leadership hoped that a 
series of disastrous reverses would lead to the collapse of 
the ARVN and a "General Uprising" in South Vietnam against the 
Saigon regime.54 with the legitimacy and authority of the
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Robert Pisor, "Faking MACV Out of Position,"
Vietnam, edited by Co 1 one 1 H. G. Summers, (USA-Retired) , 
January, 1993, p.40.
54 Ibid.
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Saigon regime shattered, the Communist forces would launch a 
series of countrywide, coordinated attacks against American 
forces, beginning in May.ss The collapse of the South
Vietnamese government and army would force the American 
military leadership to withdraw American ground units to a 
series of enclaves along the coast. Giap expected that the 
final series of large scale attacks, against the American 
coastal enclaves, would force the United States out of the 
war. Sometime in the late summer of 1967, the North
Vietnamese Politburo approved Senior General Giap’s concept of 
the Tet Offensive.
The Tet Offensive was the boldest and most ambitious 
strategy ever conceived and executed by the senior leadership 
of the Lao Dong Party and the PAVN. Beginning on January 30 
and 31, over 84,000 Communist troops, almost exclusively drawn 
from the ranks of the Viet Cong, struck military and civilian 
targets the length and breadth of South Vietnam. Thirty-six 
of the forty-four provincial capitals, five of the six
autonomous cities, sixty-four of the two hundred forty-two 
district capitals, and over 50 hamlets were struck by the 
Communists in at least battalion level size attacks.56 With 
the exception of Saigon, the Viet Cong main force units
avoided American units and concentrated the full thrust of 
their offensive against the ARVN. Almost without exception,
55 Ibid. p.43.
56 Shulimson, Tet, p.86.
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ARVN units succeeded in weathering the initial onslaught from 
the Viet Cong, despite the facts that the attacking forces 
enjoyed the element of surprise and that most ARVN units were 
at barely fifty percent strength. The ability of the ARVN 
regular line units to withstand the initial assault from the 
Viet Cong would drastically affect the overall Communist 
strategy.
The Tet Offensive would be characterized by fundamental 
differences in its execution in the two northern corps and the 
two southern corps. In I Corps and the Central Highlands, the 
Communist forces, either by error or design, would begin their 
offensive almost twenty-four hours ahead of the Viet Cong 
units around Saigon and in the Mekong Delta.57 In addition, 
in I and II Corps, the North Vietnamese high command committed 
a large number of PAVN regiments. By contrast, the Tet 
Offensive in the two southern corps only began on January 31 
and did not involve PAVN regulars. The fighting in I and II 
Corps also involved a far larger American troop commitment 
than in the southern corps. Thus, it is not invalid to argue 
that the Tet Offensive was actually two separate offensives, 
from a tactical viewpoint.
In northern-most I Corps, the Tet Offensive began on 
January 30 with a heavy rocket and mortar barrage against the 
giant Marine air station at Da Nang. The artillery barrage 
was followed by a ground assault from the R-20 and V-25 Viet
57 Ibid.
-)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
38.
Cong battalions. In heavy fighting, the units of the 1st 
Marine Division stationed south-west of Da Nang decimated the 
Viet Cong battalions.58 The next day, the enemy offensive 
spread. The US 7th Marine Regiment routed the 31st Viet Cong 
Regiment in the An Hoa region.59 In the remainder of I 
Corps, large scale enemy attacks against Quang Tri, Quang Nam, 
Quang Ngai, and Tam Ky were repulsed by the ARVN. Only in the 
city of Hue, which was seized by the 4 th and 6th PAVN 
regiments on the morning of January 31, would heavy fighting 
last for more than forty-eight hours.
The fighting in II Corps would follow a similar pattern 
as in I Corps: a limited number of large scale attacks by
PAVN regiments, beginning on January 30. By the early morning 
hours of January 31, the Communists launched attacks against 
seven of the twelve provincial capitals and over ten 
regimental size ground assaults.60 Nonetheless, the fighting 
in the Central Highlands was never as desperate as in Hue or 
Saigon. By February 1, the ARVN had weathered the initial 
onslaught and had moved to the counter-attack. Only in the 
city of Kontum, which was attacked on the morning of January 
30 by a PAVN regiment and two Viet Cong battalions, did 
substantial American ground units have to be committed.61
58 Simmons, Marines, p.97.
59 Ibid.
60 Shulimson, Tet. p.83.
61 Ibid. p.82.
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By contrast, the Tet Offensive was far more widespread in 
the Mekong Delta, the ARVN IV Corps area. Regiment size 
attacks were launched against Ben Tre, Chau Doc, Cai Be, Cai 
Lay, Can Tho, My Tho, Soc Trang, True Giang, and Vinh Long.62 
National Route 4, the major road in the Mekong Delta, was cut 
in sixty-two different places.63 Nonetheless, despite the 
scale of the Viet Cong offensive and the fact that most South 
Vietnamese units were caught off-guard, the ARVN in IV Corps 
fought extremely well. The ability of the units of IV Corps 
to blunt the Viet Cong offensive and then to go over to 
counter-attack without reinforcements from the American II FFV 
or the South Vietnamese strategic reserve is clear evidence to 
support this argument.
However, the greatest effort was made by the Viet Cong in 
the attack upon Saigon. Clearly, the military commander of 
COSVN, Lieutenant-General Tran Van Tra, considered Saigon the 
key to the Tet Offensive. A total of thirty-five battalions, 
under the command of Lieutenant-General Tran Do, were 
committed to the assault on Saigon.64 The capital of South 
Vietnam was held by the five battalions of the 5th ARVN Ranger 
Group and the 1st and 8th ARVN Airborne battalions. Only a 
single American unit, the 716th Military Police battalion, was 
in Saigon on January 31, although an additional twenty-three
62 Ibid. p.87.
63 Ibid. p.85.
64 Ibid. p.82.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
40.
American battalions could reinforce the capital within a 
relatively short period of time.65
The Viet Cong attack upon Saigon began at 2:45 AM on 
January 31 with a daring commando raid. A squad from the 
elite C-10 Sapper Battalion launched a bold attack on the 
bastion of American power in South Vietnam, the United States’ 
embassy.66 For six and a half hours, the Viet Cong waged a 
running battle with American and South Vietnamese forces. The 
fact that such a small force was tasked with such an important 
mission, without reinforcements, indicated that the Communists 
never actually planned to capture the embassy. Instead, the 
attack was designed to have a symbolic effect for the American 
people.
The truly substantive fighting in Saigon took place in 
the Chinese quarter of the city, Cholon, and at the large 
American bases at Long Binh, Bien Hoa, and Tan Son Nhut.67 
In Cholon, the equivalent of two Viet Cong regiments 
established themselves in strong defensive positions. After 
two weeks of extremely heavy fighting, South Vietnamese and 
American forces succeeded in clearing Cholon.68 At the large
65 Ibid. p.76.
66 Ibid.
67 General Bruce R. Palmer, Jr., (USA-retired), The__25 Y.ear_
War: America’s Military Role in Vietnam,
(Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press,
1984), p.197.
68 Ibid.
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bases north of Saigon, the commitment of American reserves 
from II FFV routed regimental size Viet Cong attacks.
Thus, by February 26, the Tet Offensive had finally been 
defeated by South Vietnamese and American ground units. In 
the context of the analytical framework introduced in Chapter 
I, the Tet Offensive was to prove the determining factor in 
Washington's decision to initiate peace talks with the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Hanoi's decision to enter 
into the talks. Washington was motivated by the perception of 
an impossible military stalemate, while Hanoi had to gain time 
to recover from the disastrous losses suffered in the Tet 
Offensive.
Clearly, the Tet Offensive was a serious failure for the 
PAVN and the Viet Cong, tactically. Total casualties suffered 
during the offensive, according to American estimates, were 
40,000 personnel killed in action (KIA). Most of the KIAs 
were Viet Cong cadres, who could not be easily replaced. 
Therefore, the Viet Cong urban infrastructure was left 
devastated. For the remainder of the war, the bulk of the 
heavy fighting would be conducted by the PAVN, not the Viet 
Cong.
Yet, the Tet Offensive was not a clear cut success for 
the South Vietnamese and the Americans. Although the ARVN 
generally fought well, the heavy casualties suffered greatly 
reduced its combat effectiveness. The elite units which 
comprised the corps' reserves and the strategic reserve were
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left decimated. The Ranger battalions were reduced to 4 0 
percent strength, while four of the nine battalions of the 
Airborne Division were rated as "combat ineffective.1,69 
Perhaps more serious, the pacification programme of the Saigon 
government was in a shambles. Only the cities were firmly in 
government control.
The military weakness of the South Vietnamese government 
was complicated by incompetent leadership. During the Tet 
Offensive, South Vietnamese corps and division commanders had 
not performed their duties adequately. After the Tet 
Offensive, this fact was recognized by President Thieu when he 
relieved the commanders of II and IV Corps, Major-Generals 
Vinh Loc and Nguyen Van Manh, respectively.70 Nonetheless, 
President Thieu1s shake-up of the senior command of the ARVN 
failed to address one all important problem: Thieu*s regime 
lacked stability.
Thus, the Tet Offensive clearly evinced the fundamental 
weakness of American strategy in Vietnam. As long as the 
Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia and the supply lines in the 
Laotian panhandle were exempt from American ground attack, 
Communist forces enjoyed the initiative and even the cities of 
South Vietnam were not secure from attack. By the end of 
February, 1968, the White House recognized that a military
69 Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War. (New York: Pantheon,
1985), p.310.
70 Shulimson, Tet. p. 144.
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stalemate existed in South Vietnam. As long as American 
ground forces were prohibited from entering Laos and Cambodia, 
the conflict could not be brought to an end.
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CHAPTER I I I :  WASHINGTON BEG IN S D EESC ALATIO N
Tet of 1968 was the single most important event of the 
Second Vietnam War. The ability of the North Vietnamese and 
Viet Cong to launch a massive, countrywide offensive clearly 
demonstrated that the American strategy for conducting the war 
in Vietnam had failed. Therefore, the Johnson Administration 
had to deal with an extremely serious political and military 
crisis in which major economic, political and military 
constraints greatly limited the decision-making power of the 
Administration. In other words, the United States was 
involved in an Asian land war with no end in sight. The war 
also had other important consequences: serious social
problems, an overextended and weak military that could not 
protect vital American interests, such as the oil fields of 
the Persian Gulf, and the worst financial crisis since 
October, 1929. Therefore, President Johnson concluded in late 
March of 1968 that the United States had to disengage itself 
from the conflict in South-East Asia.
To President Johnson and his new Secretary of Defence, 
Clark W. Clifford, the Vietnam War seemed to be hopelessly 
stalemated. The only way for the United States to "end" the 
war was by interdicting the North Vietnamese supply lines in 
the Laotian Panhandle and destroying the Communist base areas
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in Cambodia with American ground troops. On paper at least,
this approach was valid. The Viet Cong forces had been
decimated by the Tet Offensive and in most regions of South
Vietnam, Viet Cong military units would only play secondary,
rather unimportant roles, essentially in the Mekong Delta.
Thus, as noted by Philip Chinnery, Senior Lecturer at the
United States Air Force Academy:
Now was the time to abolish the prohibited zones (for the 
air campaign) around Hanoi and Haiphong and along the 
border with China. The major ports and harbors could 
have been mined to cut off outside support to the North 
[Democratic Republic of Vietnam] and a major air campaign 
without restrictions could have destroyed the war-making 
capability of North Vietnam.71
Chinnery*s analysis is not without merit. Clearly, the 
PAVN and especially the Viet Cong had suffered a devastating 
defeat, tactically. Even if the Communist casualties were 
inflated by American military intelligence, as argued by 
Gabriel Kolko,72 the main force units of the Viet Cong were 
left devastated, with a shattered urban infrastructure and, 
perhaps most seriously, a weakened rural infrastructure. The 
only effective Communist ground units left in South Vietnam 
were PAVN regiments. A full scale American offensive against 
the base areas In Cambodia and supply lines in the Laotian 
Panhandle could have been decisive.
Yet, Chinnery*s analysis is far too simplistic. Although
71 Philip Chinnery, Air War in Vietnam. (Novato, California:
Presidio Press, 1987), p.171.
72 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, p.310.
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sound on basic tactical premises, the analysis fails to take 
into account the wider strategic situation. American military 
initiatives were greatly restrained by the threat of Soviet or 
Chinese intervention in South-East Asia. Thus, the classical 
role of third-parties, as defined by Fred C. Ikle in Every War 
Must End, direct military intervention or even the threat of 
it, acted as an influence on the Johnson Administration.
In particular, the threat of Chinese intervention deeply 
alarmed President Johnson: he often spoke of the possibility 
of "another Korea" to his closest advisors.73 There seems to 
be no doubt that Lyndon Johnson sincerely believed that 
Chinese, and possibly even Soviet, intervention would result 
if he allowed his field commanders to escalate the war.
Senior American military men, particularly General 
Westmoreland, have condemned President Johnson's decision to 
limit the war.74 Yet, in retrospect, was Lyndon Johnson 
truly wrong? During this time period, 1965 to 1969, China was 
undergoing one of its most tumultuous periods of this century, 
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The Cultural 
Revolution was, in effect, a Chinese civil war in which 
factions of the communist Party contested with one another for 
supremacy. This period remains very controversial and it is 
not clear what individual or individuals were in control at 
any particular time. In his insightful account of the
73 Karnow, Vietnam, p.239.
74 Ibid. p.39.
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People's Republic of China, The New Emperors: China in the Era 
of Mao and Deng. Harrison Salisbury presents a compelling 
thesis: one of the Cultural Revolution's central objectives 
during this time period was to establish Mao's successor.75 
Thus, the Gang of Four was attempting to promote Yao Yenyuan 
as Mao's successor, while the Minister of Defence, Marshal Lin 
Biao, and Mao's chief secretary, Chen Boda, were enhancing 
their prospects.
Therefore, any ground incursions by American forces into 
Cambodia, Laos, or southern North Vietnam after the tactical 
victory of Tet might have resulted in Chinese intervention. 
Despite the fact that Mao probably did not want an extension 
of the war, there was the possibility that he could have lost 
control of the situation. Thus, if the American XXIV 
Provisional Corps, under Lieutenant-General William B. Rosson, 
(USA), entered the Laotian Panhandle to sever the Ho Chi Minh 
Trail in March of 1968, the Red Guards might have taken 
matters into their own hands. In addition, such a situation 
would certainly have been manipulated by the Gang of Four, 
Chen Boda, and Marshal Lin Biao for their own political 
agendas. Thus, the United States had to be extremely cautious 
regarding the role of China in South-East Asia.
The Soviet Union was much less of a threat, but 
nonetheless it was an important player. In the first months 
of 1968, the Soviet Pacific Fleet was on large-scale exercises
75 Salisbury, The New Emperors, p.289-335.
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in and north of the Sea of Japan with the Democratic Republic 
of Korea.76 Although these naval exercises had probably been 
planned for months, judging by the logistical effort required 
to sustain them, the movements of the Soviet Pacific Fleet 
were a cause of concern to the Pentagon. If the Soviets had 
ever actually decided to strike at Japan or South Korea, there 
was no effective riposte the United States could have made 
apart from the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
The threat of Chinese or Soviet intervention in South- 
East Asia is closely related to another factor: the general 
weakness of American military power in the world. Since the 
Congress had passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in August of 
1964, the United States had been fighting an undeclared war in 
South-East Asia. However, the Johnson Administration had not 
taken the obvious action required to sustain the military 
build-up in Vietnam as well as maintain troop strength in 
other strategic regions of the world, notably Western Europe 
and North-East Asia: activation of the reserves. In order to 
bring troop strength up to 582,000 personnel by March of 1968, 
the Pentagon was forced "to strip" personnel away from the 7th 
Army in West Germany, the 8th Army in South Korea, and the 
vital reserves stationed in the United States. By 1968, the 
7th and 8th armies existed on paper only. In addition, in the 
event of a crisis, the United States Army only possessed a
76 Ian Beckett, The March of Communism-1917 to 1984.
(London:Bison, 1984), p.154.
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single combat-ready division that could be deployed 
immediately— the 82nd Airborne.77
The fact that the United States military had reached 
"imperial overstretch" was demonstrated by events on the 
Korean Peninsula in January of 1968. On January 23, 1968, 
North Korean commando units seized the American intelligence- 
gathering ship, USS Pueblo, in international waters.78 This 
incident not only humiliated the Johnson Administration, but 
it demonstrated that the United States was incapable of 
decisive military action against North Korea. To complicate 
matters even more, the openly hostile action by North Korea 
was accompanied by a massive military build-up between 
Pyongyang and the cease-fire line of 1953. Throughout late 
January, heavy skirmishing took place between the Republic of 
Korea's Army and the North Korean People's Army.79 As South 
Korean President Park Chung-Hee placed his military forces on 
a war footing, American military weakness became painfully 
clear by two facts. The first was the decision by the South 
Korean President to consider withdrawing the large South 
Korean contingent in South Vietnam (almost 49,500 men—
77 Shelby L.Stanton, The Rise and Fall of An American Armv.
(Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1987), p.7.
78 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, p.313.
79 General Richard G. Stillwell, (USA-Retired), "Introduction"
to The Modern US War Machine, edited by Ray Bonds,
(New York:Arco, 1987), p.15
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organized into two infantry divisions and a marine 
brigade) .80 Second, in the event of a war on the Korean 
peninsula, the United States would have been virtually 
powerless to influence the fighting on the ground. The two 
American divisions stationed in South Korea, the 2nd 
Mechanized and the 7th Infantry, were barely at 4 0 percent 
strength.81 In addition, there were no available reserves to 
commit to South Korea in the event of a conflict.
If the situation in South Korea was alarming to the 
Administration and the Pentagon, then the developing crisis 
over Berlin was even more so. For several months, the Four 
Power Talks had been deadlocked over such simple issues as 
West German postal delivery to West Berlin. In early 
December, the Soviet Union adopted a much more intransigent 
position. The new hard-line negotiating strategy was followed 
by a build-up of the forward-deployed units of the Red 
Army.82 As elite Soviet units were moved closer to Berlin, 
Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal Andrei Grechko began to make 
extremely bellicose statements.83
For the United States, a new Berlin crisis could not have 
come at a worse time. Not since 1948 had the American
00 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, p.313.
81 Stillwell, "Introduction" to The US War Machine, p.15
82 Beckett, The March of Communism, p.161.
83 Karen Dawisha, Eastern Europe. Gorbachev, and Reform: The
Great Challenge. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), p.295.
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military presence in Western Europe been so weak. In a top- 
secret memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General J.L. 
Polk,(USA), commanding officer of the 7th Army, declared that 
he did not have a single division fit for combat.84 If the 
forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organization were to move against 
West Berlin, the United States European Command could take no 
effective action apart from the tactical use of nuclear 
weapons.
Therefore, by the winter of 1968, the American military 
was stretched dangerously thin. The war in Vietnam had 
consumed virtually every American ground unit which was 
available. As a result, the United States was left in an 
extremely tenuous position, strategically. Indeed, General 
Bruce R. Palmer, Jr.,(USA), who served as Vice Chief of Staff 
of the United States Army from 1968 to 1973, has written that 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff were primarily concerned with this 
strategic vulnerability, not the war in Vietnam itself , during 
February and March of 1968.85
Thus, in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive, President 
Johnson and his senior advisors had to face some very harsh 
realities. Although the American and South Vietnamese forces 
had won decisive victories, any attempt to exploit this 
tactical success, by escalating the conflict, risked Chinese
84 Stanton, The Rise and Fall of An American Army, p.7.
85 General Bruce R.Palmer, Jr., (USA-Retired), The 25 Year
War; America^ Military Role in Vietnam. (Lexington, 
Kentucky; University of Kentucky Press, 1989), p.187.
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and/or Soviet intervention. If either of the Communist giants 
was to intervene in the conflict, American strategic interests 
elsewhere in the world would be in great peril.
The vulnerability of American strategic interests was 
recognized by the Pentagon, however. General Earle G. 
Wheeler,(USA), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (1964- 
1970) , realized that the reserves had to be activated to allow 
the United States to honour its other commitments. He 
prevailed upon General Westmoreland to make a dramatic request 
for an additional 206,000 troops.86 Of this number, however, 
only a fraction were meant for deployment to Vietnam. The 
purpose of this troop call-up was meant to strengthen American 
forces in South Korea and West Germany. President Johnson 
must have been surprised by the dramatic request from General 
Westmoreland. If the reserves were activated, the social 
fabric of the country would be further strained, while the 
resulting inflationary pressures might lead to the collapse of 
the dollar on world markets. Yet, if the request was 
rejected, would the American position in Vietnam, or 
elsewhere, become strategically untenable? To study these 
vital questions, President Johnson ordered a full-scale review 
of Vietnam policy to be conducted by a special committee, 
chaired by incoming Secretary of Defence Clark Clifford.87
86 Karnow, Vietnam, p.529.
87 Melvin Small, Johnson. Nixon, and the Doves. (Camden, New
Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1988), p.136.
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Clark Clifford was a natural choice to replace McNamara 
at the Pentagon and to conduct the fundamental review of the 
Administration's policy in Vietnam. A respected Washington 
attorney, Clifford had strong lobbying influence in Congress. 
He also had close connections with the captains of industry, 
including the giant defence contractors. In addition, 
Clifford was a close personal friend of Lyndon Johnson's, and 
was one of the President's three closest confidants along with 
Abe Fortas and Secretary of State Dean Rusk.88 The President 
undoubtedly expected his old friend to be a very vigorous war 
manager. Indeed, Secretary Rusk had described Mr. Clifford as 
"one of the biggest hawks in Washington.1,89
The special committee, that included Clifford, Rusk, 
National Security Advisor Walt W. Rostow, Assistant Secretary 
of State Paul Warnke, General Wheeler, retired Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor, Secretary of 
the Treasury Henry Fowler, and outgoing Secretary of Defence, 
Robert McNamara, began its deliberations in the last week of 
February.90 Within a week, the committee, especially its 
chairman, became deeply pessimistic about the American role in 
Vietnam. In the last week of March, Secretary Clifford would 
shock the President by advising him to reject Westmoreland's 
troop request and to move towards deescalation.
88 Ibid. p.141.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid. p.136.
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As a whole, the committee's conclusions were shaped by 
the strategic situation facing the United States, globally, 
and the perilous state of the American economy. The first 
factor has been fully analyzed and its relevance is quite 
obvious. The second factor, however, was equally important to 
the members of the committee. In the literature, it has not 
gained the attention it deserves.
By February of 1968, the United States was facing the 
"dollar geld crisis." This financial crisis was a result of 
the American dollar being pegged to the gold standard, and all 
other major currencies, in turn, being pegged to the American 
dollar (the Bretton Woods System of 1944). Since the summer 
of 1965, however, the very stability of the American dollar 
had been shaken by what economists have called the "double 
whammy"— the war in Vietnam and the social programs of the 
Great Society. The resulting inflationary pressures had been 
exacerbated by the refusal of the Administration to raise 
taxes. By 1968, the United States was running dangerously 
large current account deficits.
A financial crisis emerged at the end of February when 
Senator Jacob Javits of New York called for an end to the gold 
pool. In a panic, almost $118 million was withdrawn from the 
pool in only two days.91 By March 4, Treasury Secretary 
Henry Fowler warned the President that the gold rush and 
flight from the dollar were serious and could worsen quickly,
91 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, p.314.
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with a gold embargo leading to "exchange rate wars and trading 
blocs with harmful political as well as economic effects."92 
Amazingly, for the next few weeks, the war in Vietnam was not 
the top priority for the President. Instead, as noted by one 
of Johnson's biographers, Doris Kearns: " The specter of 1929 
haunted him daily. He worried that if the economy collapsed, 
history would subject Lyndon Johnson to endless abuse."93
The monetary crisis would worsen. On March 11, banks 
rushed the gold pool and once it suspended operations on March 
14, almost $1 billion had been withdrawn. Treasury economists 
calculated that once operations were started up again, 
another $1 billion in gold would be withdrawn on the first 
day.94 Lyndon Johnson and Henry Fowler were only too 
painfully aware of the consequences of such a depletion of the 
gold reserves. President Johnson wrote to British Prime 
Minister Harold Wilson that "these financial disorders— if not 
promptly and firmly overcome— can profoundly damage the 
political delations between Europe and America and set in 
motion forces like those which disintegrated the Western world 
between 1529 and 1933."95
Although the fact that the Tet Offensive occurred just a 
month before the "dollar-gold crisis" was only a coincidence,
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
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it was highly symbolic. The symbolism of the situation could
not have been lost to the members of the committee studying
Westmoreland's troop request, particularly Robert McNamara, a
former President of the Ford Motor Company and future
President of the World Bank, Secretary of the Treasury Fowler,
and above all, the Secretary of Defence. Mr. Clifford had
very close ties to the world of big business. He was only too
aware how seriously the captains of industry viewed the strain
on the economy from the war in Vietnam.
The "dollar-gold crisis" was one of the determining
factors prompting the Johnson Administration to adopt a policy
of deescalation in Vietnam. Yet, strangely, the financial
crisis that was a leading factor in Washington's decision to
deescalate the war and to seek to enter into peace talks with
Hanoi has been neglected by the literature. The only work
found from the literature surveyed which analyzed the economic
crisis in any great detail was Gabriel Kolko's Anatomy of a
War. Kolko considers the "dollar-gold crisis" of March, 1968,
to have been the single greatest influence on the President's
dramatic announcement of March 31, 1968. After his extensive
research, Kolko concluded that :
[I]t was the gold and dollar crisis that created 
the most sustained and irresistible pressures on 
Washington...The gold and dollar crisis colored all 
of Washington's thoughts on responses to the 
precarious military situation in South Vietnam.96
However, the exact thoughts and attitudes of the decision­
96 Ibid. p.313.
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makers in Washington on the effects of the fiscal and monetary 
crisis to the situation in Vietnam have not been 
comprehensively researched. This area remains one of further 
potential research.
Although the members of Clifford's special committee were 
clearly trying to focus primarily on strategic and economic 
questions regarding the possibility of escalation in Vietnam, 
there is no doubt that they were at least aware of the anti­
war sentiment in the country. Indeed, the National Security 
Adviser, Walt Rostow, who was probably the most "hawkish" 
individual on the committee, recognized the importance of 
popular opinion, when on February 12, he told the President: 
The North Vietnamese audacity "shook U.S. public opinion."97 
Thus, it is obvious that the members of the committee did not 
make their deliberations in some sort of vacuum, unconscious 
of the lack of support for the war.
The powerful chairman of the committee, who would move 
the Johnson Administration away from escalation more than any 
other individual, was especially concerned about the decline 
in elite support for the war. Ever since joining the 
Administration, Clark Clifford had been observing the 
attitudes of corporate leaders towards the war. What he heard 
from his colleagues must have alarmed him. The monetary 
crisis of March of 1968 had badly frightened American bankers 
and industrialists. These individuals were convinced that
97 Small, Johnson. Nixon, and the Doves, p.140.
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further escalation by the Administration could lead to a 
massive run on the dollar and the depleted gold reserves of 
the Treasury. If such an event were to occur, the 
consequences could be fatal for the America.! as well as the 
world economy. For Secretary Clifford, the attitudes of the 
business community seem to have played a critical role. He 
recognized that the foreign policy consensus which had existed 
since the Truman Administration had been fragmented when he 
stated:
What seems not to be understood is that major 
elements of the national constituency— the business 
community, the press, the churches, the 
professional groups, college presidents, students, 
and most of the intellectual community— have turned 
against this war.98
In the wake of the Tet Offensive, anti-war sentiment was 
an important influence on the Johnson Administration. The 
single greatest influence of the Tet Offensive was the 
political effect it had in the United States. North Vietnam's 
ability to launch a coordinated, countrywide offensive in the 
South convinced many Americans that the war could not be won. 
President Johnson, who had been portraying the ground war in 
South Vietnam far too optimistically, had his credibility 
shattered. On the eve of the Tet Offensive, Johnson's 
approval rating on his conduct of the war stood at 40 
percent.99 At the end of February, his approval rating had
98 As cited in Small, p. 130.
" Karnow, Vietnam, p.341.
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plummeted to 26 percent.100 Neither Lyndon Johnson's 
p.pularity with the American people nor his Presidency would 
ever recover from the Tet Offensive.
Two dramatic events would succeed in demonstrating to the 
President and his advisors that popular support for the war 
effort had collapsed. The first occurred on February 27, 
1968, with the "defection" of CBS news anchorman Walter 
Cronkite. Walter Cronkite was America's most respected and 
influential broadcast journalist. In what was the first 
"television war," Cronkite was as important as any opinion 
maker in American society. President Johnson respected Walter 
Cronkite and considered him to be "fair."101 Cronkite's 
ardent support of the Administration's Vietnam policy up to 
January 31, 1968, was considered crucial by Lyndon Johnson in 
maintaining middle class support.102
However, Walter Cronkite was badly shaken by the Tet 
Offensive. On national television on January 31, Cronkite, 
shocked by the images of heavy street fighting in Saigon, 
exclaimed: "Jesus Christ! I thought we were winning this 
war!"103 Cronkite, like most every other American, was 
utterly caught off-guard by the Communist Tet Offensive. He 
decided to spend two weeks in South Vietnam at the end of
100 Ibid.
101 Small, Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves, p. 138.
102 Karnow, Vietnam, p.340.
103 Ibid.
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February to survey the progress of the war for himself.
Cronkite returned to national primetime television on the
evening of February 27, with a rare editorial scheduled
regarding his recent trip to Vietnam.104 This editorial
would be one of the most important media events of 1968, a
fact symbolized by the President's request to his aides that
they tape the newscast for him. In his editorial, Cronkite
declared that the war was not going well and that the
Administration's policy in Vietnam had clearly failed.105
Watching the taped newscast the next day, President Johnson
stated: "I have lost middle America.'*106
There can be little doubt that Walter Cronkite's
editorial was a significant "turning point" in the popular
attitudes towards the war. Up to Tet of 1968, Walter Cronkite
had been a very loyal supporter of the President and of the
war against "Communist aggression." Cronkite was able to
influence tens of millions of Americans in a much more direct
way than the editors of The New York Times or The Washington
Post. The impact of Cronkite's dramatic editorial has been
best observed by Dr. Melvin Small:
...[I]f Cronkite, a moderate and patriot, was 
turning on his policies, then he [Lyndon Johnson] 
must be losing millions of like-minded Americans as 
well. Johnson, who had "enormous respect" for 
Cronkite, always had considered him "fair." Now
104 Small, Johnson. Nixon, and the Doves, p. 138.
105 Ibid.
106 Karnow, Vietnam, p.342.
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this fair-minded opinion leader opposed him in what 
was a "turning point" of the period.107
Clearly, both the President and his Administration were badly
shaken by Cronkite's dramatic change of views.
The second major event which convincingly evinced the
strong anti-war sentiment in the country was the Democratic
primary in New Hampshire on March 12. As expected, Lyndon
Johnson won the primary, but it was a "Pyrrhic" victory.
President Johnson had faced an extremely strong, and utterly
unexpected, challenge from an obscure senator, Gene
McCarthy.108 McCarthy's solid performance in the primary— 42
percent of the registered delegates— clearly revealed
substantial discontent within the Democratic Party towards the
Administration and strong anti-war sentiment. The President
and his advisors were deeply alarmed by McCarthy's strong
showing.
On March 16, a far more dangerous threat emerged against 
the President politically: Robert F. Kennedy announced his 
decision to seek his Party's nomination for the Presidency. 
Robert Kennedy was the only Democrat that President Johnson 
feared as a political foe. If any Democrat could unseat an 
incumbent Democratic President, it was Robert Kennedy. 
Kennedy enjoyed an excellent reputation, a charismatic 
personality and great family wealth. He was truly a
107 Small, Johnson. Nixon, and the Doves, p. 138.
108 Ibid. ; ^
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formidable opponent, as recognized by President Johnson:
And then the final straw. The thing I feared from 
the first day of my Presidency was actually coming 
true. Robert Kennedy had openly announced his 
intention to reclaim the throne.109
Thus, Lyndon Johnson must have felt very beleaguered when 
Clifford’s special committee presented its conclusions at the 
end of March. The President must have been rather surprised 
that such a hawkish Secretary of Defence would recommend 
deescalation. To resolve any doubts that he may have held 
about the committee’s conclusions and recommendations, the 
Secretary of Defence advised the President to convene the 
State Department’s Senior Advisory Group on Vietnam— the Wise 
Men.
The Senior Advisory Group on Vietnam was literally a 
collection of America's most prominent public servants, 
military, political, and economic. Under the chairmanship of 
former Secretary of State Dean Acheson (1949-1953), the group 
included George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Douglas Dillon, Cyrus 
Vance, Arthur Dean, John McCloy, General of the Array Omar 
Bradley, General Matthew Ridgway, General Maxwell Taylor, 
Robert Murphy, Henry Cabot Lodge, Abe Fortas, and Arthur 
Goldberg.110 In their luncheon with the President on March 
26, the Wise Men argued that the country could not afford to
109 Kolko, Ariatomv of a War, p.317.
110 Karnow, Vietnam, p.474.
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prosecute the war indefinitely.111 Two themes dominated the
arguments of the Wise Men: divisions in American society and
the general erosion of support for the war. The conclusions,
presented by Chairman Acheson, supported Secretary Clifford's
recommendation of deescalation. Yet, for President Johnson
and his more hawkish advisors, the conclusions of the Wise Men
were anticlimactic. As noted by Melvin Small:
Clifford portrayed the Wise Men as the 
representatives and interpreters of the national 
"jury"— on Vietnam policy, the media, and the 
public. The verdict was in, and this time the Wise 
Men could not ignore it. Johnson finally accepted 
the verdict at the eleventh hour, a turnabout that 
surprised even Clifford.112
The months of February and March, 1968, for Lyndon 
Johnson, were as arduous as any period in this century. At 
the end of March, the Johnson Administration realized that its 
policies in Vietnam no longer had any substantial support. 
The course of action adopted by the President was to begin 
deescalation of the conflict. This decision was announced to 
the American people during a national television address on 
March 31 in which the President also declared that he would 
not seek reelection.
This chapter has analyzed Washington's response to the 
Communist Tet Offensive and the factors that led to the 
dramatic policy shift of the United States. , Thus, this 
chapter has addressed the first fundamental question raised in
111 Small, Johnson. Nixon, and the Doves, p. 147.
112 Ibid.
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the introduction: What were the factors that led the two
parties to enter into the Paris Peace Talks in 1968, and 
subsequently, to conclude them in 1973. The three catalysts 
identified in the introduction- military reversal/stalemate, 
the threat of domestic instability, and the international 
balance of power- all acted as influences on the Johnson 
Administration, leading to the March 31 announcement to begin 
a partial bombing halt over North Vietnam and to seek to enter 
into peace talks with Hanoi. None of the catalysts was truly 
dominant in the Johnson Administration's drastic policy shift. 
Instead, the catalysts must be understood to be interacting 
with one another.
Shortly after President Johnson's offer to initiate peace 
talks, the North Vietnamese foreign ministry, through its 
delegation at the United Nations (UN) in New York, replied 
that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was prepared to 
enter into such talks. On May 13, the prenegotiating stage of 
the Paris Peace Talks would commence with the American 
delegation led by Averell W. Harriman and the North Vietnamese 
delegation headed by Xuan Thuy. This stage of the Paris Peace 
Talks would be particularly arduous, ending only on November 
1.
To understand the motives that led Hanoi to enter into 
the Paris Peace Talks, it is first necessary to comprehend the 
nature of the Tet Offensive. The Tet Offensive was designed 
not only to win a decisive military victory, but also to end
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a political stalemate in the United States and, to a lesser 
extent, South Vietnam.113 The Johnson Administration had to 
be forced to confront the limitations of American political, 
economic, and military power in Vietnam. As noted by Gabriel 
Kolko:
It would shock the United States out of its 
complacency. The Party considered this the key to 
the future of the entire conflict, for without an 
unlimited American commitment, the Party could 
expect victory in the not-too-distant future.114
Thus, entry into negotiations would be a continuation of the
conflict, forcing the United States to make concessions that
would ultimately benefit the Revolution.
Yet, Hanoi was also forced to enter into negotiations for
more immediate reasons. These reasons correspond to the first
and second catalysts identified in the introduction. Both
Party and military leaders had been utterly shocked by the
heavy casualties incurred in the South. Even Gabriel Kolko,
a harsh critic of American policy in Vietnam, notes that
Communist casualties were considered to have been ’’higher than
many Senior Party leaders thought tolerable."115
Particularly alarming to the leaders in Hanoi must have been
the decimation of the ranks of the highly motivated and
trained cadres, especially in the cities. Therefore, both
Party and military leaders realized that a "breathing space"
113 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, p.304.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid. p.310.
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was needed to recover from the heavy casualties incurred. 
Indeed, the seriousness of the Communist military situation in 
1968 would later be revealed by two facts: Viet Cong main
force units would never again play a decisive military role, 
and, even in 1975, the Party's presence in the cities of South 
Vietnam was at best marginal.
The influence of the second catalyst discussed in the 
introduction— domestic instability or the threat of it— was 
also a consideration for Hanoi. By April of 1968, Hanoi had 
been at war with the United States for nearly four years. The 
American strategic bombing campaign, Operation Rolling 
Thunder, had succeeded in destroying the infrastructure of the 
DRV. Divisions would emerge within the Politburo over the best 
way to conduct the war.
A faction of the Politburo, led by senior Party theorist 
Truong Chinh, argued that the time had come to focus on 
"socialist reconstruction" of the North.116 At the time, 
North Vietnam was ranked as one of the poorest countries in 
the world by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).117 The 
"moderates" within the Politburo, Truong Chinh and Pham Hung, 
were able to forge a consensus among their colleagues, 
particularly the "neutral " faction, which comprised the 
President of the Democratic Republic, Ho Chi Minh, the 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Pham Van Dong, and the
116 Doyle, Lipsman, and Maitland, The North, p. 164.
117 Lanning and Cragg, Inside the VC and the NVA. p.331.
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Foreign Minister, Nguyen Duy Trinh, that entry into the Paris 
Peace Talks, in return for a complete bombing halt, would 
benefit the Revolution.118 Hanoi would be given valuable 
time to replenish its manpower reserves in the South, 
strengthen its supply lines in eastern Cambodia and the 
Laotian Panhandle, and, no less important, divert a fraction 
of Chinese and Soviet aid to economic development programs. 
At the same time, drawn-out negotiations in Paris would give 
the United States the opportunity to begin troop reductions. 
Because of the pressures of American public opinion, Hanoi 
could reasonably expect Johnson's successor to be essentially 
forced to reduce American troop strength.
Thus, the analytical framework presented in the 
introduction explains Hanoi1s decision to accept the American 
offer to open peace talks. The heavy losses incurred during 
Tet and the weak state of the economy both called for reduced 
military activity in the South, and above all, an end to 
Operation Rolling Thunder. Clearly, the "moderate" faction of 
the Politburo succeeded in, at least tempering the hawkish 
views of Lao Dong Party First Secretary Le Duan and his 
cohorts, Le Due Tho and Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap. 
After Tet, a consensus had been established in the North 
Vietnamese Politburo that entry into peace negotiations, in 
return for a complete bombing halt, would be beneficial to 
Hanoi's long term objectives. Yet at this stage, the decision
118 Ibid.
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to enter into the Paris Peace Talks rested with the Johnson 
Administration. The rapid reply given by the North Vietnamese 
to Johnson's offer to initiate peace negotiations indicates 
that the Politburo had decided upon this course several months 
prior to April of 1968. Thus, impetus to the pre-negotiating 
stage was provided by the Johnson Administration's full-scale 
review of its policy in Vietnam.
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PART III: INTERLUDE
CHAPTER IV: STALEMATE BOTH POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY
1968-70
The most notable characteristic of the Paris Peace Talks, 
which convened on November 1, 1968, was their duration. For 
almost fifty-one months, the delegations from the United 
States, the Republic of Vietnam, the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam (DRV), and the National Liberation Front, engaged in 
often futile negotiations, focusing an inordinate amount of 
time on pedantic points. Indeed, it can be argued that the 
only substantial progress in the Paris Peace Talks was made 
after October 8, 1972. Nonetheless, during this time, the 
catalysts identified in the introduction were influencing the 
two principal players in the negotiations, the United States 
and the DRV, gradually moving thrm towards a resolution of the 
conflict. The four historical --snapshots" isolated between 
1968 and 1973 are especially important as the intransigent 
position of Hanoi was gradually altered. Between two of these 
snapshots. President Johnson's dramatic announcement on March 
31, 1968, that the United States was imposing a partial
bombing halt over the DRV, and the incursions into Cambodia 
and Laos, in April-June of 1970 and February-March of 1971, 
respectively to sever North Vietnamese supply lines, there was 
a long period of perceived stalemate, both politically and
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militarily.
However, during the time period under consideration, 
March 31, 1968, to April 20, 1970, events in Washington,
Saigon, Hanoi, and Paris, were fluid, not static. Important 
changes were influencing the relative balance of forces in 
Vietnam, and consequently, the peace process. Although none 
of these events was as dramatic as the "historical snapshots," 
nevertheless, the catalysts were clearly influencing the major 
actors in the Paris Peace Talks.
The purpose of this chapter is to act as a "bridge" 
between chapters three and five. By briefly explaining, and 
then analyzing, the major events of this period, notably the 
Presidential election of 1968, the policy of the Nixon 
Administration towards the war in Vietnam, and, perhaps one of 
the most controversial episodes of the war, the secret 
bombings of Cambodia, this chapter will survey the influence 
of the catalysts on Washington and Hanoi. Although there was 
no dramatic movement towards a resolution of the conflict, 
these catalysts were, nonetheless, having an extremely 
important influence on Hanoi and Washington.
Senior American military men, such as Admiral Thomas H. 
Moorer,(USN), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff(1970- 
1974), have charged that Johnson had no clear war aims in 
Vietnam. In the literature, there is a consensus to support 
this view: American war aims as formulated by Lyndon Johnson 
were rather nebulous. As noted by David Halberstam, when 
General Matthew B. Ridgway asked the Vice-President what
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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General Westmoreland's instructions were, concerning war aims, 
Vice-President Humphrey merely stated: "That's a good
question.1,119 It is crucial, however, to understand that 
President Johnson never expected the war to last longer than 
1965: Operation Rolling Thunder was intended to bring Hanoi
to the bargaining table. Lyndon Johnson's only vague 
guideline in Vietnam was to control Communism: he was
committed to assisting the South Vietnamese to "win their 
contest against the externally directed and supported 
communist conspiracy."120
For five months, after March 1968, Washington and Hanoi 
had conducted talks to begin peace talks. Hanoi had refused 
to agree to peace talks until a complete bombing halt was 
announced, while Washington had maintained that peace talks 
had to precede the bombing halt. The American negotiators, 
Averell W. Harriman and Cyrus Vance, had put forward four 
critical conditions which would allow a complete bombing halt:
1) The commencement of the peace talks, including 
representatives of South Vietnam, a few days after the 
bombing halt;
2) An end to all North Vietnamese military activity in the 
Demilitarized Zone?
3) An end to large-scale attacks and the firing of rockets 
on the cities of South Vietnam, and
4) Unarmed American reconnaissance flights must be allowed 
over North Vietnam.121
Hanoi would utterly refuse to agree to these conditions.
119 Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, p.270.
■I20 Karnow, Vietnam, p.351
121 Palmer, The 25 Year War, p.92.
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Nonetheless, on November 1, 1968, President Johnson
announced a complete bombing halt over North Vietnam and the 
start of Paris Peace Talks. There is substantial reason to 
think that Johnson's action was a brazen political move. By 
announcing the start of the Paris Peace Talks, Johnson 
drastically improved the chances of the Democratic candidate, 
Hubert Humphrey, of being elected President. The last minute 
concessions of the United States, in allowing the restrictions 
to become "informal understandings," could have been made any 
time during the preceding months. The only practical result 
of President Johnson's speech of November 1, 1968, was to make 
a "cliff-hanger out of the Presidential election," as argued 
by Richard Nixon.122
The Paris Peace Talks in Johnson's last months in the 
Oval Office, from November, 1968, to January, 1969, failed to 
produce a truly substantive negotiating session. The American 
and North Vietnamese delegations, headed by Averell W. 
Harriman and Xuan Thuy respectively, reached a bizarre impasse 
which would last for ten weeks over the shape of the tables at 
the negotiating sessions-123 This strange obstacle concerned 
the status of the National Liberation Front at the 
negotiations. Hanoi demanded that the representatives from
I
I
the National Liberation Front be granted the status of a 
separate negotiating delegation. Washington and Saigon
122 Nixon, No More Vietnams. p.71.
123 Ibid. p.73.
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countered that the National Liberation Front was not 
autonomous from the DRV, so its delegates should be included 
with the official negotiating team from Hanoi. Only when the 
parties agreed to oval shaped tables was the impasse 
overcome. The first episode of the Paris Peace Talks is very 
relevant to this study: the North Vietnamese tactic of
delaying the Talks along strange procedural lines was clearly 
revealed.
When Richard Nixon was sworn in as the President of the 
United States, there were nearly 543,000 American servicemen 
in South Vietnam.124 The Paris Peace Talks had not produced 
a single substantive negotiating session in nearly three 
months. Such was the magnitude of the foreign policy disaster 
Nixon had to deal with from previous Administrations. Yet, as 
correctly noted by Henry Kissinger, critics of the Nixon 
Administration would largely focus on the current 
Administration1s policies, while failing to realize that it 
was the Johnson Administration which had committed the United 
States to a land war in Asia.
Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger had much more tangible 
war aims than Lyndon Johnson. The United States had, above 
all, to extricate itself from the morass in Vietnam. Vietnam 
had sapped American strength and initiative. Critical issues, 
such as Sino-American relations, had been atrophied by the 
Vietnam commitment. The United States had to disengage from
124 Ibid. p.94.
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this quagmire. Yet, Nixon and Kissinger were committed to the 
survival of South Vietnam. If South Vietnam were betrayed, 
the Americans would lose a great deal of credibility and 
prestige. The lives of 40,000 servicemen would have been lost 
in vain.
The Nixon Administration had to establish a strong
negotiating position, literally, from scratch. Despite the
fact that it was the Johnson Administration which had first
initiated the Peace Talks, there was no comprehensive American
bargaining position when Nixon took office. The only extant
bargaining position which existed was the Manila Formula of
October 24, 1966, which stated that :[A]llied forces... shall 
be withdrawn, after close consultation, as the other side 
withdraws its forces to the north, ceases infiltration, and 
the level of violence thus subsides. These forces will be 
withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months 
after the above conditions have been fulfilled.125
In such a complicated negotiating forum as the Paris 
Peace Talks, it is not surprising that it took almost a year 
for a firm American position to be established. The basic 
American strategy was to force Hanoi to compromise at the 
bargaining table by making the continuation of its war effort 
prohibitive. To accomplish this objective, Kissinger would 
adopt the "two track" negotiating strategy, which would 
attempt to separate political issues from military ones. Yet, 
Kissinger had to first establish a comprehensive negotiating 
position before substantive talks could begin.
The first major American initiative was the President's
125 Ibid. p.91.
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nationally televised address of May 14, 1969. Nixon proposed 
an eight-point program to guide the American delegation in 
Paris, now headed by Henry Cabot Lodge. This new policy 
called for mutual withdrawals from South Vietnam by the United 
States and North Vietnam, participation by the National 
Liberation Front in South Vietnam*s political process, free 
elections under international supervision, and an 
internationally supervised cease-fire.126 For the first time 
ever, a coherent American negotiating position had been put 
forward. Yet, the North Vietnamese categorically rejected it.
The Administration’s attention soon turned to unilateral 
American troop withdrawals. Nixon had entered office with a 
commitment to a "secret plan" for ending the war. For 
domestic political purposes, Nixon was virtually required to 
continue the deescalation of the American war effort and to 
announce even token troop withdrawals. The Administration 
hoped (futilely) that these troop withdrawals would increase 
public support for the troops that remained.127 In addition, 
the ARVN would be expected to carry a greater burden of the 
war effort, thus reducing American casualties.
Domestic political pressures would be the genesis of a 
new American strategy: Vietnamization. By providing advanced 
training and logistical support, the United States hoped to 
establish an ARVN that was largely self-sufficient, such as
126 Samuel Lipsman and Edward Doyle, The north. (Boston: 
Little, Brown, and Company, 1983), p.98.
127 ibid.
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the military of South Korea, or even completely sufficient 
with its own resources, such as the Israeli Army. Strangely, 
the strongest advocate of Vietnamization was Secretary of 
Defence Melvin R. Laird. Exactly how such an intelligent man 
as Mr. Laird could become such a strong advocate of this 
policy when the commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, 
General Creighton W. Abrams,(USA) and the Commander-in-Chief 
of the United States Pacific Command, Admiral John S. 
McCain,(USN), were opposed to it, must remain a mystery. 
Laird was backed by Secretary of State William Rogers in 
support of Vietnamization while Henry Kissinger reluctantly 
agreed.128
As clearly expounded by Henry Kissinger, Vietnamization 
was meant to be a "public relations coup."129 Vietnamization 
was foremost a strategy influenced by domestic political 
pressures. Nixon wanted to be the President who would achieve 
a "peace with honour." Yet, Vietnamization would lead to 
serious consequences in the Paris Peace Talks and 
domestically.
The policy of Vietnamization would completely undermine 
the American position in Paris that there had to be mutual 
withdrawal. At the Midway Conference in June of 1969, Nixon 
had unilaterally announced the withdrawal of 25,000 American
128 Kissinger, White House Years, p.240.
129 Ibid.
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servicemen without any similar concession by Hanoi.130 Thus, 
there was no incentive for Hanoi to make concessions. The 
United States was withdrawing from Vietnam. Clearly, North 
Vietnamese Defence Minister General Vo Nguyen Giap's argument 
that the Americans lacked the willpower for a sustained land 
war was being confirmed.131
If the Administration calculated that a minor withdrawal 
of American troops would alleviate domestic political 
pressure, it was clearly incorrect. As Kissinger very much 
feared, the first troop withdrawal was merely a "salted 
peanut."132 The troop withdrawal announcements would gain 
their own momentum. Once one troop withdrawal was completed, 
the domestic pressure for further withdrawals would become 
unbearable. This fact was revealed by Nixon in September, 
when the original troop withdrawal of 25,000 men, augmented by 
an additional increment of 35,000 men, allowed the draft calls 
for that year to be cancelled.133 Meanwhile, the Pentagon 
was preparing plans for the withdrawal of an additional 
260,000 servicemen.
North Vietnam's War Aims
The ultimate objectives of the North Vietnamese war 
effort during this period have become very clear from events
130 Ibid. p.243.
131 John Morocco, Rain of Fire. {Boston: Little, Brown, and
Company, 1983), p.82.
132 Kissinger, White House Years, p.
133 Kissinger, White House Years, p.247.
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since 1975. The reunification of Vietnam was obviously the 
single most important objective of the Democratic Republic. 
However, equally important was the establishment of Vietnamese 
hegemony in Indochina. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 
1978 was clear proof of Hanoi's intentions. Hanoi's ultimate 
aim was the consolidation of a regional power bloc to contest 
its old nemesis, China.
Ho Chi Minh's entire life had been dedicated to 
Vietnamese nationalism. For sixteen years, Hanoi had waged a 
vicious war against the American-backed regime in Saigon to 
achieve these twin goals. The people of North Vietnam were 
forced to make great sacrifices for the reunification of their 
country, which by any perspective was a noble goal. Perhaps 
the most salient characteristic of the North Vietnamese war 
effort was the level of devastating casualties. In 1988, 
American scholar Stanley Karnow asked Senior General Giap the 
total casualties suffered by the Democratic Republic. Giap 
merely shrugged and stated: "We still don't know."134 Later, 
an aide to Senior General Giap would estimate total casualties 
of at least one million.135
Thus, the war effort had become critical to maintaining 
the legitimacy of the Lao Dong Party. If the leaders of the 
Democratic Republic were to accept a settlement in Paris, it 
was absolutely crucial that the great sacrifices of the
134 Michael Lee banning and Dan Cragg, Inside the VC and the
NVA. (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1992), p.21.
135 Ibid.
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Vietnamese people not seem to have been in vain. Therefore,
a "peace with honour" was just as important to the Central
Committee of the Party as it was to the Nixon Administration.
The dilemma facing the North Vietnamese leadership has been
neatly summarized by Mitchell:
The general rule seems to be that the higher the 
sacrifices involved, the more people will feel that 
some significant gains must be achieved in the 
final settlement to make up for all they endured.
The more prolonged the conflict, the more difficult 
it becomes for the leaders to accept anything short 
of a significant improvement on the pre-conflict 
situation as a final settlement.136
Thus, the senior leadership of the Central Committee
recognized that it could not be seen as "betraying the
Revolution" by the rank and file of the Lao Dong Party and,
above all, the People's Army of Vietnam(PAVN). This factor,
perhaps more than any other, largely explains why the Paris
Peace Talks dragged on from November, 1968 to January, 1973.
Therefore, the North Vietnamese negotiating strategy in Paris
had to aim towards these ultimate objectives.
Hanoi's Negotiating Strategy
Hanoi's military and negotiating strategies were thus
working very well. To Hanoi, the political struggle and the
military struggle were both a part of greater strategy. The
negotiating strategy adopted by Hanoi was foremost a form of
psychological warfare.
Hanoi had succeeded in committing Washington to ending
the strategic air campaign against North Vietnam, Operation
136 Mitchell, The Structure of International Conflict, p. 180.
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Rolling Thunder, in return for only agreeing to the start of 
the Paris Peace Talks. Washington had gained no concrete
concessions from Hanoi. The fact that intransigence would
characterize Hanoi's strategy was demonstrated by the impasse 
over the shape of the negotiating tables.
For Hanoi, the Paris Peace Talks would provide a 
propaganda forum. The North Vietnamese would put forward the 
mirage of their dedication to a negotiated settlement. Yet, 
the American media would always blame Richard Nixon for his 
iniquity and failure to conclude the Peace Talks, despite the 
fact that the United States was announcing troop withdrawals 
and offering unilateral concessions, without any reciprocity 
from North Vietnam.
The basic position of Hanoi in the Paris Peace Talks was 
expounded by Xuan Thuy in a secret meeting with Henry 
Kissinger on August 4, 1969. There could be no separation of 
the military and political issues.137 The military solution 
required the unconditional withdrawal of American troops. 
However, a military solution was meaningless without a 
political solution— the removal of President Nguyen Van 
Thieu(1967-1975) and Vice-President Nguyen Cao Ky(1967-1971) 
and the establishment of a coalition government dominated by 
the Communists.138 In other words, the war would not end and 
the American prisoners of war would be held captive until the
137 Ibid. p.316.
138 Ibid.
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Thieu government was removed.
In this context, Kissinger's "two track" negotiating 
strategy of separating the political and military issues would 
be meaningless if the North Vietnamese refused to compromise. 
The United States made major concessions, such as agreeing to 
a unilateral withdrawal, concerning a military solution, but 
North Vietnam refused to change its position. Hanoi's basic 
strategy rested on the concept of time.135 Anti-war 
sentiment would eventually force the United States to make 
these concessions. The United States was pulling out of South 
Vietnam. North Vietnam would only have to bide its time until 
there was no longer an American combat presence to support the 
ARVN. In a worst case scenario for the Americans, North 
Vietnam could overrun South Vietnam and still hold American 
prisoners-of-warI
In retrospect, North Vietnam's war aims were crystal 
clear to any observer. American war aims were very nebulous 
under President Johnson. Nixon would formulate much clearer 
war aims, but his strategy had a fundamental contradiction: 
the need to withdraw American ground forces because of 
domestic political pressure and the need to give 
Vietnamization time to work.
The Nixon Administration clearly faced a desperate
I
situation in Vietnam upon its inauguration: the Paris Peace 
Talks had failed to provide a single substantive negotiating
139 Lipsman and Doyle, Fighting for Time, p.59.
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session, American casualties were totalling 250 servicemen a 
week, and the nation was seriously divided. Yet, Richard 
Nixon was determined to avoid a disgraceful withdrawal from 
South Vietnam. The President was very skeptical about the 
utility of the Paris Peace Talks.140 He believed that Hanoi 
would only make significant concessions if unbearable military 
pressure was brought to bear. To this end, Nixon in March of 
19 69 ordered a major escalation in the strategic air campaign 
against Hanoi's lines of communications in eastern Cambodia. 
The President's dramatic escalation of the war was a result of 
two factors: North Vietnamese intransigence in Paris arid the 
fundamental contradiction between Vietnamization and American 
domestic priorities.
When Nixon took office, he was determined to rejuvenate 
the Paris Peace Talks. The delaying tactics used by North 
Vietnam in Paris were complicated by a new factor: a major 
People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) buildup was underway in the 
Cambodian sanctuaries.141 The President was convinced that 
bold action against this buildup would be an effective 
American initiative: "I think a very definite change of policy 
toward Cambodia probably should be one of the first orders of 
business when we get in."142 The North Vietnamese Politburo 
had to understand that the United States wanted peace, but
140 Ibid.
141 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 113.
142 Ibid.
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not a peace without honour. An effective military operation 
would accomplish this goal much quicker than any other 
expedient.
Nixon and Kissinger have been much maligned for the air 
strikes in Cambodia, known as Operation Menu. Yet Operation 
Menu was the Nixon Administrations reaction to an escalation 
in the war by North Vietnam. On February 23, 3 969, the PAVN 
launched a countrywide offensive. American casualties in the 
first week of the offensive totalled 4 53 servicemen; South 
Vietnamese casualties were nearly the equivalent of an
airborne battalion.143 President Nixon was infuriated; the 
North Vietnamese had refused to bargain in good faith for 
nearly five months, while the United States had deferred 
military action against the Cambodian sanctuaries.
The Mini-Tet Offensive of 1969 was clearly planned well 
in advance of Nixon's Inauguration: the PAVN needed time to 
prepare such a multi-divisional operation. Two of the 
"understandings" that had been previously established had been 
violated by Hanoi. This action was certainly designed to test 
the new President’s reaction to such a crisis. Yet Hanoi had 
cynically violated the "understandings" without any American 
provocation. Such an action could only be met by one 
response; a devastating military campaign. with Hanoi, 
diplomacy always had to be backed by military strength, as 
France had learned in 1954.
143 David Fulghum and Terence Maitland, South Vietnam on Trial.
(Boston; Little, Brown, and Company, 1983), p.17.
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Nixon's decision to retaliate with air strikes in the 
Cambodian sanctuaries was concluded on February 23.144 
However, the pressures of domestic politics and the fact that
I
the President was on an official European state visit delayed 
the response by nearly a month. Nevertheless, the strategy 
which would be used most effectively in 1972 was being 
developed by 1969: defeat North Vietnamese aggression and
I 1
allow military reverses to force concessions. At this time, 
Hanoi had chosen the battlefield over diplomacy. Battlefield 
results, not diplomacy, would determine the Paris Peace Talks. 
If Nixon had failed to reply firmly, he would have appeared as 
a craven to Hanoi.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle 
G. Wheeler,(USA), (1964-70), was alerted to prepare the
contingency plans regarding Cambodia and General Abrams was 
ordered to select targets. The planning for Operation 
Breakfast took place at the White House in great secrecy 
during a working breakfast meeting that included only the 
President, the National Security Advisor, the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs, the Air Force Chief of Staff, General John R. 
McConnel, (USAF) , the Assistant Chief of Staff of the Air Force 
for Operations, Lieutenant General John W. Vogt,(USAF), the 
Secretary of Defence, Melvin R. Laird, and the Secretary of 
State, William P. Rogers.145 Conspicuous by their absence
144 Kissinger, White House Years, p.475.
145 Ibid.
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from this meeting were Vice-President Spiro Agnew, Air Force 
Vice-Chief of Staff, General John D. Ryan, (USAF), and the 
Commanding General, Pacific Air Forces, General Joseph 
Nazzoro, (USAF). The secrecy which characterized, and 
ultimately destroyed the Nixon White House was clearly 
demonstrated.
The air strike against Base Area 353 (north of the main 
positions of the American 1st Infantry Division) was a 
success. General Abrams was gratified by the results and 
requested further air strikes against a range of Base Areas. 
Nixon, however, originally intended Operation Breakfast to be 
Ma one-time only affair.” He would be provoked into ordering 
a series of air strikes, Operation Menu, by a North Korean 
action. On April 14, North Korean MiGs shot down an unarmed 
American reconnaissance plane over the Sea of Japan.1A&
Nixon was irate and possibly ready to allow Task Force 77 
of the United States Seventh Fleet to retaliate against North 
Korea. However, the President's advisors talked him out of 
this step. Instead, Nixon ordered a resumption of the secret 
bombings of the Cambodian sanctuaries. This action was not 
aimed at Hanoi or Pyongyang, but rather Moscow. The United 
States was determined to show the Communist giant that any 
hostile actions by itself or its allies would be met with 
American military force.
Operation Menu clearly had an important effect on the
■/
W6 Nixon, No More Vietnams. p.117.
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Paris Peace Talks. The Nixon Administration had repeatedly 
requested secret meetings with the North Vietnamese in Paris 
for almost three months. Hanoi, however, had steadfastly 
opposed this initiative for reasons that are unclear. Yet,on 
March 22, Hanoi would accept Ambassador Lodge's proposal for 
a secret meeting, seventy-two hours after it was proposed.147 
The rapid acquiescence on March 22 to the American proposal 
can perhaps be explained by the North Vietnamese desire to 
relieve the pressure on the Cambodian Sanctuaries.
Another important effect of Operation Menu was that it 
aided Vietnamization. Although the success of aerial 
interdiction in the Vietnam War remains controversial there 
can be no doubt that repeated B-52 strikes prevented the PAVN 
from massing its forces. The threat posed by the B-52 strikes 
was obviously recognized by the military commander of the 
Central Office for South Vietnam(COSVN), Lieutenant-General 
Tran Van Tra. Thus, Operation Menu, would have acted as a 
powerful deterrent to any large-scale PAVN/VC attacks in and 
around Saigon.
The North Vietnamese Politburo's actions support this 
assessment. In July of 1969, Resolution 14 was issued and it 
called for the cadres to break up the main force units and 
transform the companies into Sapper units.148 A change in 
North Vietnamese tactics was clearly underway as reflected by
147 Lipsman and Doyle, Fighting for Time, p.78.
148 Nixon, No More Vietnams. p. 119.
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MACV records: in the second half of 1969, battalion-size
attacks dropped from 29 to 5 and smaller conventional attacks 
dropped from 2,185 to 1,620. In 1970 and 1971, there were 
only 15 PAVN or VC battalion-size attacks.149 The North 
Vietnamese had shifted away from the "big unit" war of 1967 
and 1968.
For the North Vietnamese, this strategy was logical. The 
Americans were withdrawing from Vietnam and it was only a 
matter of time before the PAVN faced only the ARVN. Instead 
of massing their forces inside the Cambodian sanctuaries, 
where Operation Menu would have decimated them, the North 
Vietnamese bided their time by strengthening their units and 
improving the lines of communication.
If Operation Menu had failed to prevent the PAVN from 
massing its forces, Vietnamization itself may have been 
endangered. The decline in large unit enemy attacks allowed 
the Americans to deescalate while their forces were not 
engaged in heavy combat. Therefore, American casualties were 
kept low and the ARVN was given time to modernize and improve 
its force structure.
However, the secret bombings of Cambodia may have been 
directed towards another target: China. To understand this 
aspect, it is first necessary to review the international 
balance of power. During this time period, the balance was 
gradually altering. The changes in the balance resulted from
149 Ibid.
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three inter-related developments: an expansionist Soviet
defence and foreign policy, the Sino-Soviet schism, and the 
stabilization of the Chinese domestic situation after April of 
1969- All of these changes in the balance of power shattered 
the belief held in Washington since 1949 that a "Moscow- 
Beijing Axis" existed, which threatened vital Western 
interests in Asia- The changes in the international balance 
of power would lead to one of Nixon’s greatest 
accomplishments: the rapprochement with China.
Since 1962, particularly after the downfall of Nikita 
Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Onion, in 1964, the Soviet Union had been engaged in a 
large scale military build-up. Sometime in either 1968 or 
1969, the Strategic Rocket Forces of the Red Army achieved 
nuclear parity with the United States, an objective of the 
Soviet General Staff since the late 1940s.150 The leadership 
in the Kremlin, along with a new generation of military men, 
led by the Defence Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko and the 
Chief of Staff of the Red Army, Marshal Matvey Zakharov, now 
adopted a much more aggressive foreign policy to complement 
the new found nuclear security.
Both the willingness and the ability of the Soviet Union 
to intervene decisively in regions of great strategic 
importance were demonstrated on August 21, 1968. On this
date, the Red Army conducted a multi-divisional invasion of
150 Beckett, The March of Communism, p.76.
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Czechoslovakia to remove tne reform-minded General Secretary 
of the Czech Communist Party, Alexander Dub'cek.151 The 
Kremlin justified its brutal action, which shocked both the 
West and China, by its enunciation of a new security formula, 
the Brezhnev Doctrine. By this doctrine, the Kremlin declared 
that it had both the duty and right to intervene in the
internal affairs of fellow socialist states where socialism 
was threatened. As stated by Marshal Nie Rongzhen, China's 
last surviving Marshal, the senior leadership of both the 
Chinese Communist Party(CCP) and the People's Liberation Army 
(PLA) interpreted the Brezhnev Doctrine as directed towards 
China.152
Clearly, the Brezhnev Doctrine was an important stage in
the Sino-Soviet schism. By 1968, it was obvious to most
scholars and China observers that fundamental ideological and 
national interests separated Beijing and Moscow. If there 
ever had been a "Moscow-Beijing Axis," it had been shattered 
by Khrushchev's decisions to refuse to provide nuclear
technology to the PLA in 1958 and to recall Soviet economic 
advisors from China in I960.153 Khrushchev and the senior 
ideologues in the CPSU were deeply alarmed by the radicalism 
of Mao as clearly demonstrated by The Great Leap Forward. For 
his part, Mao believed that Khrushchev and his colleagues had
151 Dawisha, Eastern Europe. Gorbachev, and Reform, p. 162.
152 Salisbury, The New Emperors, p.273.
153 Ibid.
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betrayed the revolution of Lenin and Stalin.
Sino-Soviet relations would actually worsen after 1964, 
when Leonid Brezhnev assumed the position of General Secretary 
of the CPSU. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution deeply 
alarmed Brezhnev and the Party's senior theorists, Yegor K. 
Ligachev and Nikolai Tikhonov.154 However, Sino-Soviet 
relations would not worsen to the point of open warfare until 
the winter of 1969. In the first months of 1969, the PLA 
would detonate its first atomic device. The fact that the 
Chinese now had a nuclear capability deeply concerned the 
senior leadership of both the CPSU and the Red Army. A basic 
tenet of Soviet defence policy since 1945 had been to prevent 
instability on the country's borders. The tumultuous events 
in China were obviously considered a direct threat to Soviet 
national security by the Kremlin
In March of 1969, savage fighting erupted along the 
Ussuri and Amur rivers between corps-sized units of the Red 
Army and the PLA.155 The Soviet General Staff reacted 
quickly to the perceived Chinese aggression by heavily 
reinforcing its forces in Siberia and the Far East. By the 
end of 1969, the Red Army had forty divisions stationed in the 
region.156 The severity of the Sino-Soviet conflict was 
revealed in the summer of 1969 when the Kremlin, through
154 Beckett, The March of Communism, p. 182.
155 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 176.
156 Ibid.
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diplomatic back-channels broached to Washington the 
possibility of a Soviet pre-emptive nuclear strike on Chinese 
nuclear facilities in the deserts of Xianjiang.157
It was highly symbolic that a month after the first 
clashes took place on the Amur and Ussuri rivers, the Ninth 
Party Congress was held in Beijing. The mere fact that the 
Congress was even held, in the midst of the turmoil of The 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, was a major victory for 
the Party bureaucrats, most notably Zhou Enlai, and the senior 
leadership of the PLA against the radical Maoists. By 
declaring Marshal Lin Biao, Minister of Defence, to be 
Chairman Mao's "heir apparent," the Congress evinced to the 
world that the worst excesses of The Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution were now history.158 No less important, 
the Congress also presented a united front, which was 
especially crucial considering the fact that China and the 
Soviet Union were on the brink of war.
By the summer of 1968, Mao had probably recognized the 
need to restore stability to China in the wake of The Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in August of 1968 had greatly worried Mao. He 
obviously concluded that China's domestic turmoil had to be 
brought to an end to allow the country to deal with the 
nuclear threat from Moscow, both diplomatically and
157 Ibid.
158 Alan P.L.Liu, How China Is Governed. (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice Kail, 1984), p.50.
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militarily. This decision by Mao would eventually lead to the 
rapprochement with the United States.
The clashes along the Ussuri River marked a watershed in 
Sino-American relations since the Korean war. Mao Zedong at 
this time must have realized that China needed the United 
States to act as a counterweight to the Soviet menace. Yet, 
the United States was only of value if it were strong. To 
Mao, the air strikes in Cambodia must have represented the 
actions of a strong nation willing to use its military power.
Nineteen sixty-nine would mark the beginning of the Sino- 
American detente that would culminate in Nixon's state visit 
to Beijing in February of 1972. The importance of Sino- 
American detente must not be underestimated with respect to 
Nixon's policy in Vietnam. China represented North Vietnam's 
great Achilles Heel: logistics. Although it is true that only 
12.5 percent of Hanoi's war material came by the two railways 
and eight roads from China, the remaining 87.5 percent came 
through a single port. Haiphong.159 Haiphong could easily be 
shut down by mining its approaches; in such a situation, Hanoi 
would be completely dependent on Beijing's willingness to keep 
the land routes open. If Beijing were to close the land 
routes, Hanoi would be left isolated on the battlefield. The 
United States would now seek to improve Sino-American 
relations for this eventuality.
The secret bombings of Cambodia remain one of the most
159 Kissinger, White House Years, p.507.
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controversial episodes of the Nixon Presidency. Domestic 
politics was the determining factor in this secrecy: Nixon was 
rather fearful of the anti-war backlash that would result if 
it was learned that the United States were attacking targets 
in Cambodia. In fact, Operation Menu would be the first step 
towards Watergate: in May of 1969, Federal Bureau of
Investigation(FBI) Director J. Edgar Hoover would make use of 
phone taps on government officials to discover who was leaking 
critical information to the press.
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide a survey 
of events that influenced the Paris Peace Accords between two 
of the historical snapshots, the decision of President Johnson 
to begin deescalation of the war, announced on March 31, 1968, 
and the military incursions into Cambodia and Laos between 
April, 1970, and February, 1971. During this period, the 
Nixon Administration had made considerable concessions to the 
North Vietnamese, such as implementing unilateral troop 
withdrawals. However, the Politburo in Hanoi had refused to 
grant a single concession in return. Thus, despite a 
reasonable offer by the Nixon Administration to end the war, 
presented by the President on national television on May 14, 
1969, the Politburo in Hanoi categorically rejected any 
American initiative to conclude the Paris Peace Talks. 
Therefore, events lend substance to the first hypothesis put 
forward in the introduction: the Paris Peace Talks would only 
be concluded after a fundamental shift in the position of the 
North Vietnamese Politburo.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
94 ,
This chapter has also related the role of the three 
catalysts in influencing the two principal parties in the 
Paris Peace Talks. The Nixon Administration v/as obviously 
under great domestic pressure to bring the war to an end. 
Strong anti-war sentiment in the country, particularly in the 
Congress and in the business community, forced the Nixon 
Administration to continue the policy of deescalation 
initiated by its predecessor. Therefore, in this context, the 
troop withdrawals, which were announced by President Nixon in 
July of 1969, and the concomitant policy of Vietnamization, 
were driven by domestic political considerations, not military 
necessity. Thus, the second hypothesis raised in the first 
chapter, that strong anti-war sentiment would force the Nixon 
Administration to conclude the Paris Peace Talks, has also 
been addressed.
Therefore, Hanoi's hard-line negotiating stance was very 
logical. As long as the Nixon Administration was driven to 
implement troop withdrawals because of strong anti-war 
sentiment, regardless of actions by North Vietnam, Hanoi had 
no incentive to reciprocate American concessions. However, the 
logic behind the North Vietnamese negotiating intransigence 
was very obvious to Richard Nixon, who probably had a better 
understanding of the dynamics of international relations than 
any other American president of this century. If North Vietnam 
was ever going to negotiate in "good faith," which to the 
Nixon Administration meant dropping unreasonable demands, such 
as the removal of the President of South Vietnam, Nguyen Van
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Thieu, Hanoi would have to be coerced into doing so. Despite 
the complexities of the American domestic situation, Nixon did 
possess two "trump cards" to use against North Vietnam: Great 
Power diplomacy and strategic air power.
As briefly analyzed in this chapter, the international 
balance of power was in its greatest period of flux since the 
end of the Korean War. The Sino-Soviet schism presented the 
Nixon Administration with one of the greatest diplomatic 
opportunities since 1953. President Nixon and National 
Security Adviser Kissinger understood this opportunity better 
than most other politicians in the United States. However, 
attempts to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough of this 
magnitude would by their very nature be long term. In the 
short term, Nixon had to try to buy time for Vietnamization, 
while at the same time implementing large scale troop 
withdrawals. In addition, some sort of leverage had to be 
gained against Hanoi to try to force its leaders to modify a 
very hard-line negotiating position. Nixon resorted to the use 
of strategic air power against the PAVN base areas in 
Cambodia. The exact military results of Operation Menu remain 
controversial to this day, but the airstrikes clearly were 
straining the North Vietnamese supply lines in Cambodia, to 
some extent, and preventing COSVN from massing its regiments 
for large scale attacks in the Saigon region. Thus, the 
airstrikes were of some military value.
Therefore in this chapter, the basic strategy used by the 
Nixon Administration to force Hanoi to accept reasonable terms
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in Paris begins to take shape. A combination of military 
pressure and Great Power diplomacy would be used to isolate 
North Vietnam and force its leaders to modify their hardline 
position in the Paris Peace Talks. Thus, there is evidence to 
support the two hypotheses being tested in the thesis: that
a fundamental shift in the negotiating position of Hanoi 
allowed the Paris Peace Accords to be concluded and that 
strong anti-war pressure in the United States forced the Nixon 
Administration to conclude the Paris Peace Accords.
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PART IV: HANOI DETERMINES TO ROLL THE DICE 
CHAPTER V: THE NORTH RESPONDS TO AMERICAN ESCALATION OF THE
CONFLICT
Upon the anniversary of Richard Nixon's first year in 
office, the Administration could look back on its Vietnam 
policy with pride. A strong American negotiating position had 
been established at the Paris Peace Talks, while 
Vietnamization was being implemented. Troop withdrawals had 
already been conducted and American casualties had been 
lowered. Yet, Vietnam was also most frustrating for the 
President. The Paris Peace Talks were hopelessly deadlocked. 
Unilateral American concessions had failed to alleviate the 
situation. Only the battlefield situation in Cambodia in 1970 
and in Laos in 1971 would apparently alter Hanoi's bargaining 
position, not diplomacy. However, the incursions into 
Cambodia and to a lesser degree, Laos, would also have 
critical domestic repercusions for the Nixon Administration.
The critical impasse at the Paris Peace Talks was 
symbolized by the resignation of the American Ambassador Henry 
Cabot Lodge, in November, 1969: Nixon would not name a
replacement until June of 1970. Yet, a major initiative would
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9 8 .
be announced by Nixon in April of 1970, that could have 
provided the impetus for a settlement if not for the North 
Vietnamese refusal to adopt the "two-track negotiating" 
strategy. This initiative would result from American domestic 
politics, not as a particular strategy for conducting the 
Paris Peace Talks.
On December 15, 1969, the President had announced a
second troop withdrawal- 50,000 servicemen over a period of 
four months.160 The North Vietnamese refused to grant a 
single concession in return. In secret meetings with Henry 
Kissinger, on March 16 and April 4, the North Vietnamese 
"Special Advisor" Le Due Tho categorically rejected an 
American offer of mutual withdrawal with all American forces 
to be removed over a period of sixteen months after the cease­
fire was signed.161 The next troop withdrawal of 150,000 
servicemen, announced on April 20, which would be conducted 
over a period of twelve months, was forced on Nixon by 
domestic political considerations. Hanoi had no reason to 
bargain in good faith: the Americans had withdrawn 115,000 
servicemen, and announced the withdrawal of 150,000 more, 
without a single North Vietnamese concession! North Vietnam 
was receiving at the negotiating table what it had been unable 
to achieve on the battlefield between 1965 and 1968.
Yet, the American position was far from hopeless.
160 Palmer, The 25 Year War. 102.
161 Karnow, Vietnam, p.672.
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Because the April 20 troop withdrawal announcement was 
scheduled over a period of twelve months, the Pentagon could 
manage the withdrawal so that highly flexible and versatile 
units, such as the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and the 
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), would remain in the 
country the longest. Therefore, the United States maintained 
the ability to seize the initiative. Nixon would do exactly 
this in Cambodia in 1970.
On March 18, the ruler of Cambodia, Prince Norodom
✓
Sihanouk, was overthrown m  a coup d'etat launched by Lon Nol, 
his Prime Minister and Minister of War.162 The principal 
reasons for Sihanouk's downfall, in the opinion of Henry 
Kissinger, were his disastrous economic policy and his 
inability to evict North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces from 
Cambodian soil.163 Although Kissinger's assessment of events 
is obviously biased, nonetheless, his arguments are basically 
sound. Lon Nol now adopted a harsh anti-Communist stance: the 
port of Sihanoukville was closed to the North Vietnamese and 
the North Vietnamese were ordered out of the country. The 
Politburo in Hanoi now reacted savagely to this threat to its 
lines of communications in southern South Vietnam: the North 
Vietnamese 1st and 7th divisions and the Viet Cong 5th and 9th 
divisions attacked westward out of the Cambodian sanctuaries 
towards Phnom Penh. By April 14, the eastern provinces of
162 Kissinger, White House Years, p.976.
163 Ibid.
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Cambodia were firmly under Communist control and a siege of 
Phnom Penh was only a matter of time. This situation 
threatened the American position in South Vietnam as noted by 
Richard Nixon: "...we would have been signing a death warrant
but for South Vietnam as well. A communist dominated Cambodia 
would have placed South Vietnam in an untenable military 
situation...1,164
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were ordered to prepare 
contingency plans for a massive American-South Vietnamese 
attack into the Cambodian sanctuaries to disrupt the enemy 
lines-of-communications. On April 26, the President approved 
Operation Toan Thang 43/Rockcrusher.165 The Communist 
sanctuaries were concentrated in two areas: the Parrot’s Beak 
and the Fishhook, west and northwest of Saigon respectively. 
A South Vietnamese task force, under the command of Lieutenant 
General Do Cao Tri, commanding general of the Army of the 
Republic of Vietnam(ARVN) III corps, would attack into the 
Parrot's Beak, while a joint Allied task force, including 
elements of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and the 11th 
Armored Cavalry Regiment, under the command of Brigader 
General Robert Shoemaker, would attack the Fishhook. D-day 
was set for April 30.166
On April 30, the President addressed the American people.
164 Nixon, No More Vietnams. p. 116.
165 Kissinger, White House Years, p.992.
166 Fulghum and Maitland, South Vietnam on Trial, p. 123.
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Explaining the desperate strategic situation in Cambodia, 
Nixon notified the nation of the Cambodian incursion. To 
placate domestic anti-war sentiment, the President declared 
that American ground forces would remain in-country for only 
sixty days and penetrate no further than twenty-one miles.167 
Despite such a show of restraint, anti-war protests soon shook 
the nation, particularly after the shooting of four students 
at Kent State University on May 4.
Militarily, the Cambodian incursion was a success. 
American and South Vietnamese forces captured enough 
individual weapons to equip 74 North Vietnamese infantry 
battalions and enough crew served weapons to equip 25 North 
Vietnamese battalions. More than a year’s supply of 
ammunition was captured-168 North Vietnamese and Viet 
Cong(VC) forces under the command of the Central Office for 
South Vietnam(COSVN) would never fully recover from this blow 
to their lines of communications. After 1970, the People's 
Army of Vietnam(PAVN) and VC forces would never again mount 
large-scale attacks (regimental size or larger) in the critical 
southwest approaches to Saigon or the Mekong Delta. This 
basic military fact supports the arguments of President Nixon 
and Dr.Kissinger that the Cambodian incursion was a great 
military success. As a direct result, Vietnamization was 
given critical time to be implemented.
167 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1018.
168 Ibid. p. 1019.
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However, the incursion into Cambodia remains 
controversial. To many Americans, the operation seemed 
hastily improvised. The military failed to locate and destroy 
the much celebrated COSVN. Nonetheless, the incursion did 
have beneficial results for the United States and South 
Vietnam, despite the fact that there were critical flaws in 
its planning, as pointed out by generals Bruce R. Palmer, 
Jr.,and Arthur S. Collins.169
Nixon and Kissinger now believed that the time had come 
to appoint a new ambassador to the Paris Peace Talks. It was 
hoped that Hanoi would be willing to negotiate seriously with 
the new Ambassador David K. Bruce after the show of American 
force. However, the Nixon Administration's position 
domestically, particularly in the Congress, was seriously 
weakened by the strong anti-war sentiment that engulfed the 
country as a result of the escalation of the conflict. The 
Congress, enraged by the decision to escalate the conflict, 
passed the Cooper-Church Amendment in December of 1970, which 
prohibited American ground forces from operating outside South 
Vietnam.170 The inability of the Nixon Administration to 
muster enough votes in Congress to defeat the bill was clear 
evidence that support for the President's policy in Vietnam 
was at best tenuous. President Nixon made a major unilateral 
concession in October by offering a "stand still" cease-fire,
169 Palmer, The 25 Year War, p. 171.
170 Ibid. p.521.
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which would allow North Vietnamese forces to remain in South 
Vietnam.171 As a direct result of the Cambodian incursion, 
the American negotiating position had been weakened 
politically, but the North Vietnamese position had been 
weakened militarily.
For the next six months, the Paris Peace Talks would 
proceed in a fitful manner. In August, Hanoi would agree to 
another round of secret talks. Because of the need to 
alleviate domestic pressure after Cambodia, Kissinger made a 
major concession to break the impasse: the American withdrawal 
after the war would be complete, with no residual combat 
forces remaining in South Vietnam.172 In response, the 
People's Revolutionary Goverment(PRG-a front organization used 
by the Lao Dong Party in South Vietnam) issued Madame Binh's 
Eight Points in September. The North Vietnamese proposal was 
unacceptable. It still required unconditional American 
withdrawal and the installation of a provisional coalition 
government in Saigon.173 The Paris Peace Talks were no 
closer to resolution in 1970 than 1968.
Even as the Paris Peace Talks were hopelessly stalemated, 
a clear sign of North Vietnamese intentions became evident: a 
major buildup of PAVN forces in the Laotian Panhandle. The 
North Vietnamese were clearly massing their forces for an
171 Nixon, No More Vietnams. p. 147.
172 Fulghum and Maitland, South Vietnam on Trial, p. 122.
173 Ibid.
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offensive in Military Regions 1 and 2 of South Vietnam in 
early 1972. If the North Vietnamese were truly committed to 
a settlement, why was there this massive buildup? This fact 
seems to suggest that Hanoi had rejected the Paris Peace 
Talks in favour of a military solution.
Furthermore, it was in Military Regions 1 and 2 (also 
called I and II Corps) that the ARVN was weakest. The South 
Vietnamese were stretched to the breaking point, especially in 
Military Region 2. There were simply not enough ARVN 
battalions to engage in combat with PAVN forces and to provide 
troops for pacification duty - the so-called "battalion 
deficit."174 Clearly, the strategic and tactical position of 
the ARVN would only continue to worsen as the enemy buildup 
continued into 1971. From the strategic viewpoint of 
Washington and Saigon, the only option was a pre-emptive South 
Vietnamese offensive into the Laotian Panhandle in early 1971.
By December of 1970, Nixon, Kissinger, Laird and the new 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas H. 
Moorer,(USN),(1970-1974) were committed to the concept of a 
South Vietnamese pre-emptive strike. General Abrams believed 
that a successful offensive could prevent a major enemy 
offensive for the "indefinite future". The plan that was 
worked out was very daring: the ARVN 1st Division would cross 
into Laos on February 8 and proceed half-way to the critical 
road junction of Tchepone; a South Vietnamese armoured column
174 Ibid.
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would link up at Tchepone with Airborne troops; the South 
Vietnamese would then withdraw southeastward.175 American 
troops, which were forbidden to enter Laos by Congress, would 
be responsible for support and logistics. On January 18, 
Nixon ordered General Abrams to prepare the operation with a 
D-date on February 8.
The operation, Lam Son 719, was a serious failure. 
Several factors would lead to this result: very poor planning, 
lack of initiative on the part of the ARVN commanders, and the 
absence of American advisors. However, the leading factor in 
Lam Son 719's failure was the South Vietnamese I Corps 
Commander, Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam. Lam was a 
powerful political ally of President Thieu and only held his 
command for this reason. Lam’s actions and behaviour during 
Lam Son 719 could only be described as incompetent. After 
reaching Tchepone, Lam would order his forces to retreat 
eastward, not southeastward through the PAVN’s base areas. 
Lam, in the first week of the operation, stopped giving orders 
to his troops for nearly two weeks, giving the PAVN the 
opportunity to regain the initiative. As a result of Lam’s 
stupor, the 3rd Brigade of the Airborne Division was wiped 
out, as were two Ranger Battalions, the 21st and 39th.176
However, Lam Son 719 was not the unmitigated disaster as 
often portrayed by many scholars, such as Gabriel Kolko and
175 Keith William Nolan, Into Laos: The Story of Dewev Canyon
II, (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1988), p.76.
176 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1282.
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Gareth Porter. With a few exceptions, the South Vietnamese, 
especially the Marines, fought with courage and tenacity. The 
great weakness was the incompetence of the senior officers, 
who retained their commands due to political loyalty to 
President Thieu. In addition, most South Vietnamese officers 
had difficulty calling supporting fire without their American 
advisors. Improved training would alleviate this problem. 
Lam Son 719 was thus a partial success: the PAVN would not 
launch its Nguyen hue Offensive until March 31, 1972, instead 
of early February, which indicated that the North Vietnamese 
had difficulty in massing their forces due to the damage 
inflicted on the vital lines of communications in Laos and 
Cambodia.
The incursion into Laos would lead to renewed activity at 
the Paris Peace Talks. Nixon and Kissinger put forward a 
major new proposal: a date would be decided upon for total 
American withdrawal; American withdrawal would be unilateral 
provided that all additional North Vietnamese infiltration was 
halted (clearly a major U.S. concession); a cease-fire in 
place would be established; both sides would agree to honour 
the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords, and the South Vietnamese 
would decide their political future on their own.177 This 
proposal would be the one that would be accepted by Hanoi in 
October of 1972. Kissinger put forward the proposal to Xuan
177 Ibid.
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Thuy in a secret meeting on May 11 in Paris.178 Xuar> Thuy, 
significantly, did not reject the new military proposal 
outright. Instead, the North Vietnamese requested an 
additional meeting to be held on June 26 with Special Advisor 
Le Due Tho in attendance.
Hanoi was possibly reassessing its strategy. 
Preparations were well underway for the Nguyen Hue Offensive, 
but there may have been divisions within the Politburo - 
Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap was now ill with Parkinson's 
Disease and the "hawks" were possibly losing ground, leading 
to a review of the new American proposal. Three meetings were 
held with Le Due Tho, on June 26, July 12, and July 26. The 
talks again stalemated over North Vietnamese demands to remove 
Thieu. Serious negotiations would not resume until the Nguyen 
Hue Offensive had been defeated in 1972.
The purpose of this chapter has been to study the 
military incursions into Cambodia in April of 1970 and Laos in 
February of 1971. President Nixon's bold decision to authorize 
the incursions, a clear escalation of the war which was 
certain to have negative domestic and international political 
repercusions, was prompted by two inter-related facts: the 
North Vietnamese continued to be intransigient in Paris and 
Vietnamization required time to ever have any hope for 
success. Nixon hoped, not without reason, that dramatic 
escalations of the war would apply pressure on Hanoi to
178 B.A. Johnson, "Giap's Giant Mistake," Vietnam. February, 
1992, p.65.
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bargain in "good faith," if only to relieve the military 
pressure against the lines of communications. Also, the 
President could expect that large-scale "spoiling operations," 
against the vital supply lines and base areas of the PAVN 
would seriously impede the ability of the North Vietnamese to 
launch major offensives against the ARVN , which was still in 
an important transition phase.
Therefore, the incursions into Cambodia and Laos were 
classical examples of the first catalyst identified in the 
introduction-military reversal/defeat. However, Lam Son 719 
in particular had an influence on the Politburo in Hanoi that 
the Nixon Administration clearly did not expect. Lam Son 719 
was clearly a serious failure for the ARVN and the American 
policy of Vietnamization in general. Thus, this military 
operation reinforced the perception in Hanoi that the ARVN was 
merely a puppet army without any intrinsic fighting capability 
of its own. The senior leadership of both the Lao Dong Party 
and the PAVN apparently became convinced by the end of March 
that the American policy of Vietnamization had failed 
disastrously. Therefore, the Politburo in Hanoi now decided 
to stake all its objectives on a single huge offensive. The 
Paris Peace Talks were now only to be used for propaganda, 
primarily. Instead, the Democratic Republic was seeking a 
decisive military solution to the Second Vietnam War in 1972. 
Thus, an analysis of the political ramifications of Lam Son 
719 in Hanoi also addresses the second question raised in the 
introduction- Why did the Paris Peace Talks drag on for so
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long?
The timing of the PAVN'S Nguyen Hue Offensive in 1972 was 
not accidental. Apart from the fact that the North Vietnamese 
would require almost a year to complete the logistical 
preparations for an offensive that would ultimately involve 
thirteen divisions on three separate fronts, 1972 was an 
American Presidential election year. Obviously, the North 
Vietnamese hoped to discredit President Nixon in 1972 in much 
the same way they had discredited President Johnson in 1968. 
The North Vietnamese expected domestic political 
considerations to greatly limit the response that would be 
taken by Nixon. Previous escalations of the war by President 
Nixon had resulted in a serious domestic anti-war backlash in 
the United States against the Administration's policies in 
Indochina, especially on the campuses and in the Congress. 
Hanoi could reasonably gamble that Nixon would not reescalate 
the war, despite an outright invasion of the South, because of 
concern about the anti-war vote in an election year. Thus, 
the two strategic escalations of the Second Vietnam War by the 
Nixon Administration up to 1971 clearly had serious domestic 
political repercusions for the United States-corresponding to 
the second catalyst identified in the introduction.
Thus, this chapter, by reference to two of the three 
catalysts, military reversal/stalemate and the threat of 
domestic instability, has provided evidence to support the 
first hypothesis-that a fundamental shift was required in the 
negotiating position of the DRV, and to a lesser extent, the
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second hypothesis that domestic anti-war sentiment would apply 
great pressure on the Nixon Administration to conclude the 
Paris Peace Talks. Hanoi, right up to the launching of the 
Nguyen Hue Offensive in March of 1972, had calculated that the 
war would be settled militarily, not diplomatically. The 
Politburo had determined in March of 1971 to present the Nixon 
Administration with a fait accompli in Vietnam. There could 
be no resolution of the Paris Peace Talks as long as Hanoi 
refused to modify its hard-line negotiating position in Paris 
and up to September of 1972, it was unwilling to do this 
because it believed that it possessed the military advantage. 
Only after the ARVN, with the support of tactical American 
airpower, had succeeded in halting the Nguyen Hue Offensive 
and the Americans had dramatically re-escalated the war, 
without any strong anti-war backlash in the United States nor 
any vigourous response from China or the Soviet Union, would 
the Politburo authorize Le Due Tho to fundamentally alter the 
Party’s negotiating position in Paris.
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PART V: SHOWDOWN BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND HANOI
CHAPTER VI: THE NGPYEN HUE OFFENSIVE
In the early morning hours of March 31, 1972, the
tranquillity and solitude of Easter Sunday were shattered by 
a devastating North Vietnamese artillery barrage in northern 
Quang Tri province against the fire support bases of the 3rd 
Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Division. This action 
was soon followed by a direct People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) 
invasion across the Demilitarized Zone(DMZ) involving three
J!
infantry divisions (the 304th, 308th, and 316th) and a brigade 
of tanks. The North Vietnamese had finally launched their 
long-awaited Easter Offensive, code-named Nguyen Hue by the 
PAVN General Staff. Hanoi had apparently rejected diplomacy 
in favour of a military solution to finally end the Paris 
Peace Talks, an assessment supported by events on May 2, when 
the Special Advisor to the North Vietnamese negotiating 
delegation, Le Due Tho, categorically rejected a peace offer 
put forward by American National Security Advisor Henry 
Kissinger in a secret meeting. Yet, barely five months later,
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Le Due Tho would put forward a new North Vietnamese 
negotiating position, the "Nine Points," which was almost 
identical to the American offer of May 2. This chapter will 
attempt to rationalize the dramatic North Vietnamese "volte 
face" between May 2 and October 8, 1972. This vital issue 
will be addressed by reference to the three catalysts 
identified in the introduction with special emphasis on the 
first one, military reversal reversal/stalemate. The Nguyen 
Hue Offensive will be studied in its entirety, from its 
origins, to its planning, and its outcome. By reference to 
the Nguyen Hue Offensive, the first hypothesis raised in the 
introduction will be addressed: the Paris Peace Talks could 
only have been concluded once the Politburo in Hanoi altered 
its hard-line negotiating position. In addition, this chapter 
will further address the first three questions raised in the 
initial chapter: What were the factors that led the respective 
parties to conclude the Paris Peace Accords?; Why did the 
Paris Peace Talks drag on for so long?, and finally, why did 
Hanoi accept a peace settlement that was not completely in its 
interests?
As discussed in a previous chapter, the PAVN had been 
massing its forces in the Laotian Panhandle and the Central 
Highlands since late in the autumn of 1970. The North 
Vietnamese were clearly preparing for a multi-front offensive 
in the wet season of 1972. This offensive was to be the 
culmination of the negotiating and military strategy adopted 
by Hanoi. Thus, one explanation of why the Paris Peace Talks
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dragged on for so long is presented by the basic strategy 
underlying the Nguyen Hue Offensive: Hanoi had been biding its 
time since November of 1968, rebuilding its military after the 
heavy casualties sustained in Tet of that year and preparing 
for the eventual showdown with the ARVN.
For the Politburo in Hanoi, a peace settlement would
only come through decisive military victory. Gareth Porter
has observed:
The spring offensive of 1972, like the Tet 
Offensive of 1968, was aimed at breaking a 
stalemate and moving the conflict to a new stage.
The Lao Dong Party leaders were determined to force 
the United States to accept what it had been 
resisting for more than three years: the end of
its client regime's claim to exclusive sovereignty 
over South Vietnam. The reduction of the Saigon 
regime to a status equal to that of its opponents 
would provide an acceptable basis for ending the 
war. Along with the complete withdrawal of U.S. 
military personnel from South Vietnam, it would 
shift the balance of forces sharply in favour of 
the revolution.179
If Porter's observation is indeed correct, the stalemate that
lasted from November 1968 tc October 1972 was a direct result
of Hanoi's negotiating strategy. Hanoi was prepared to gamble
everything on a single huge offensive.
Therefore in this context, the Paris Peace Talks were
foremost a form of psychological warfare for Hanoi.180 Since
1969, the Peace Talks had been very fruitful for the hardened
revolutionaries in Hanoi: the United States had unilaterally
179 Gareth Porter, A Peace Denied. (Bloomington, Indiana: 
Indiana State Press, 1975), p.102.
180 Fulghum and Maitland, South Vietnam on Trial, p. 123.
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halted the bombing of the North, withdrawn nearly 450,000 
servicemen (by May of 1972) from South Vietnam, and agreed to 
a cease-fire in place. In return, Hanoi had not been 
compelled to make a single substantive concession. Yet, the 
anti-war movement in the United States would place the blame 
for this deadlock on President Nixon. The dynamics of 
domestic politics would further reduce the American position 
in the Peace Talks. Nixon's hopes for reelection would be 
endangered by his inability to end the war. With the 
Presidential election due in little more than seven months, 
Hanoi launched its Nguyen Hue Offensive. The North Vietnamese 
clearly hoped to discredit President Nixon as they had 
President Johnson in 1968.
Yet, the Politburo's decision was also forced on it by a 
sense of urgency. By late 1971, Hanoi was feeling very
isolated from the Soviet Union, and especially China because 
of the summit announcements of the summer. In July of that 
year, Dr. Kissinger's dramatic visit to Beijing had been 
announced and both governments agreed to a summit between 
President Nixon and the Chairman of the Chinese Communist 
Party(CCP) Mao Zedong in February of 1972. Shortly after the 
secret visit to Beijing by Dr. Kissinger had been made public, 
the United States and the Soviet Union announced a summit to 
be held in May of 1972 between the President and the General- 
Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), 
Leonid Brezhnev. Hanoi now recognized that both of its
Socialist allies placed the greatest national importance on
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improving relations with the United States. The war in 
Indochina could easily lose the support of the Soviets and 
Chinese if these two powers determined that their interests 
were being imperiled. As noted by Melvin Small: " The North 
Vietnamese, as well as the Left in the United states, 
discovered that Nixon's detente and intricate China card 
diplomacy were more important to Moscow than its beleagured 
socialist ally."181 Thus, North Vietnam had to strike while 
its lines of communication remained open to the Soviet Union 
and China. In his memoirs, Richard Nixon considers the 
summits vital to eventually concluding the Paris Peace 
Accords:
Our diplomacy with Moscow and Peking had 
turned the tables on Hanoi. It had been 
an article of faith within the Kennedy 
and Johnson administrations that making a 
decisive military move against North 
Vietnam risked the intervention of China 
and the Soviet Union. That now changed:
Hanoi was fearful that its allies might 
use their leverage to intervene on the 
side of its enemy.182
Richard Nixon had come into office with a rapprochement 
with China one of his major foreign policy goals. Although a 
rapprochement with China was vital for economic and 
geostrategic reasons alone, as discussed in a previous 
chapter, China was one of the keys to ending the war in 
Vietnam because of its logistical importance to the North 
Vietnamese war effort. The dramatic meeting between Mao
181 Small, Johnson. Nixon, and the Doves, p.222.
182 Nixon, No More Vietnams. p. 123. -
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Zedong and Richard Nixon in February of 1972 was a devastating 
psychological blow for Hanoi.
The road to Beijing had been a long and arduous one. 
Nonetheless, by 1969, Mao clearly understood that his country 
needed an improved relationship with the United States 
because of the Soviet threat. Nixon and Kissinger had 
successfully used a "secret" channel - the office of the 
President of Pakistan, Yahya Khan. A gradual process of 
improving links between the United States and China climaxed 
with Kissinger's secret trip to China in July of 1971. Both 
the Americans and Chinese had a common desire to end the war 
in Vietnam. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was very close to 
concluding a grain deal and a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty 
with Washington: these concerns were far more important to the 
Kremlin than the war in Vietnam. Hanoi's isolation was 
dramatically demonstrated in May of 1972: after Haiphong was
mined, neither Moscow nor Beijng offered North Vietnam any 
assistance in clearing the mines.
The two men principally involved with the planning of the 
Easter Offensive were Le Duan, First Secretary of the North 
Vietnamese Lao Dong Party, and Senior General Van Tien Dung, 
Chief of Staff of the PAVN. Apparently, the Politburo was 
persuaded by Le Duan to order the Nguyen Hue Offensive of 1972 
in March, 1971.183 The Nguyen Hue Offensive was described as
183 Palmer, The 25 Year War, p. 120.
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a campaign that "might last a year" and "decide the war."184 
Yet, in top secret PAVN documents captured by the Americans, 
senior officers were warning that "If this attack were not 
successful, it would be ... years before we could launch 
another big offensive."185 The Paris Peace Talks would now 
be determined by the success or failure of the Nguyen Hue 
Offensive formulated by Senior General Dung.
The North Vietnamese build-up in the fall of 1971 did not 
go unnoticed. As noted by Henry Kissinger, the United States 
was fully expecting a major PAVN offensive in the upcoming 
Presidential election year.186 By the second half of 1971, 
Hanoi’s public statements and military preparations had turned 
ominous. The White House, the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), and the Pentagon had to analyze the often 
conflicting field reports to determine where and when the 
North Vietnamese offensive would be launched.
The American response to the North Vietnamese offensive 
would be seriously impeded by a crucial disagreement between 
the military and the CIA. General Creighton W. Abrams, 
Commander-in-Chief of United States Military Assistance 
Command Vietnam(June 20,1968-June 20,1972), after studying 
reconnaissance reports, informed the White House on January 4, 
1972 that an offensive was imminent, most likely in the
184 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1108.
185 Ibid. p. 1115.
186 Fulghum and Maitland, South Vietnam on Trial, p. 152.
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Central Highlands at the end of February.187 In another 
cable on January 20, Abrams declared that the enemy would 
attempt "to face us with the most difficult situation of which 
he was capable.1,183 Abrams was allowed to step up air 
activity in the South, but a resumption of the air war against 
North Vietnam was prohibited.189 However, the American 
response to the Nguyen Hue Offensive would be initially 
restricted because of fundamentally differing views held by 
the Director of the CIA, Richard Helms.
In his memoirs, Henry Kissinger emphasized categorically 
that the United States was strengthening its forces in South 
Vietnam. Yet, the American build-up was very slow: on the eve 
of the offensive, there were only three squadrons of F-4 
fighter bombers and a single squadron of A-37 attack aircraft 
in South Vietnam to reinforce the South Vietnamese Air 
Force(RVNAF), along with two aircraft carriers, USS Hancock 
and USS Midway, in the South China Sea.190 These deployments 
reflect serious apprehension over the exact nature of the 
upcoming offensive within the councils of the American 
government.
There was no question that a major North Vietnamese 
offensive would be launched in the late winter-early spring of
187 Palmer, The 25 Year War, p. 120.
188 Ibid.
189 Fulghum and Maitland, South Vietnam on Trial. 152.
190 Chinnery, Air War in Vietnam, p. 194.
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1972. But, where would the North Vietnamese strike? Would
the offensive be launched on multiple fronts and would it
involve corps-sized operations? Classified CIA reports would
cause serious consternation in Washington and Saigon.
In the winter of 1971-72, CIA headquarters at Langley,
Virginia had to analyze voluminous amounts of data.
Intelligence had clearly pinpointed the 1st and 7th PAVN
divisions and the 5th and 9th Viet Cong (VC) divisions
reassembling in the Cambodian Sanctuaries, In addition, troop
movements along the Ho Chi Minh Trail were very similar to
those that had preceded the offensives of 1965 and 1968.191
The North Vietnamese were clearly massing their forces, but to
what ultimate strategic design? The CIA was unable to form a
consensus and it failed to provide any warning of a major
offensive as noted by a leading CIA analyst, George Allen:
We thought there would be another one (in 
addition to an attack in the Central 
Highlands) of some size in [MRI] - out of 
Laos probably... but [the CIA wasn't] 
expecting it to involve any significant 
quantities of heavy artillery and 
armour.192
Shortly before the invasion, the CIA sent the President a 
classified memorandum stating that the long-awaited 
countrywide offensive using combined arms would not be 
launched in 1972, at least on the scale predicted by American 
military intelligence.
•>
191 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1304.
192 Fulghum and Maitland, South Vietnam on Trial, p. 154.
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The Pentagon's assessment of North Vietnamese intentions 
was the direct opposite of that of the CIA. Both General 
Abrams and Admiral John S. McCain, Commander-in-Chief United 
States Pacific Command, were convinced that the North 
Vietnamese were preparing for an all out offensive in Military 
Regions 1 and 2. The military's entreaties to Washington did 
not go completely unheeded: when the Nguyen Hue Offensive was 
launched, the 3rd Strategic Air Division on Guam had been 
reinforced and Saigon had moved two Marine brigades from the 
strategic reserve to Military Region 1. The limited nature of 
American air resources in South East Asia on the eve of the 
offensive indicate that the dispute between the CIA and 
military had serious ramifications, however. Yet, the 
inference made by writers such as Gabriel Kolko193 that 
American military intelligence failed to anticipate the Nguyen 
Hue Offensive is obviously fallacious.
Therefore, the North Vietnamese offensive caught the 
Americans not completely militarily-prepared to support South 
Vietnam in resisting the onslaught. Senior General Dung's 
decision to launch a World War Two type blitzkrieg across the 
DMZ took the South Vietnamese Military Region I commander, 
Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam, and General Abrams by 
surprise. The American and South Vietnamese militaries had 
expected North Vietnam to respect the DMZ out of fear of 
outraging American and world opinion by a blatant violation of
193 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, p.423.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
121 .
international law.194 The weak ARVN 3rd Division, with two 
of its regiments, the 56th and 57th, composed entirely of 
former deserters and criminals, immediately buckled and lost 
all of its firebases north of Quang Tri. Quang Tri and Hue 
appeared certain to fall by early April.
By April 2, the Nixon Administration was fully aware of 
the extent of the enemy offensive.195 With disaster facing 
the South Vietnamese, Nixon authorized the resumption of air 
strikes against targets in North Vietnam -south of the 18th 
Parallel - Operation Linebacker I. The offensive could have 
hardly come at a worse time for Nixon who was in the midst of 
a reelection campaign- Nixon would risk his political career 
to defeat the North Vietnamese offensive.
The White House was also engaged on the diplomatic front 
with Hanoi. A secret meeting was scheduled for May 2 between 
Kissinger and Le Due Tho.196 Nixon hoped that his forceful 
military response and active diplomacy with Beijing and Moscow 
would convince Hanoi that there had to be a negotiated 
settlement to end the war. Kissinger made the final American 
peace proposal of the war: a cease-fire in place, unilateral 
withdrawal of American ground units, and the release of 
Prisoners-of-War(POWs). However, Washington refused to budge 
on a central issue: President Thieu would not be forced from
194 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1313.
195 Ibid.
196 Ibid. p. 1308.
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office and replaced by a communist dominated coalition 
government. At the secret meeting, Le Due Tho acted in a 
very dogmatic manner as if the war was already won. The 
American proposal was rejected outright. North Vietnam's
refusal to bargain was a direct result of military success - 
on April 5, the North Vietnamese launched an offensive in 
Military Region 3, near An Loc threatening Saigon, while on 
April 12, a third offensive threatened Kontum in the Central 
Highlands.197 Nixon had to counter this North Vietnamese 
aggression.
After the failure of the secret meeting between Kissinger 
and Le Due Tho, Nixon had to resort to some dramatic military 
action. The action favoured by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was 
the mining of Haiphong. This step would succeed in severing 
Hanoi's lines of communication and isolating it. Yet, if 
Nixon took this drastic step, Moscow might respond by 
cancelling the planned summit for May. Nixon's political 
career was now at stake. On May 6, President Nixon authorized 
the Pentagon to execute the mining of Haiphong Harbour on May 
8. Nixon had clearly decided upon a strategic escalation to 
come to the aid of beleagured South Vietnam. If the General- 
Secretary of the CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev, had cancelled the May 
summit, Nixon's bid for reelection in November would have been 
imperiled, giving impetus to the anti-war movement in the 
United States. On May 8, President Nixon addressed the
197 Ibid.
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American people in a live television broadcast. He explained 
why he had decided upon such a dramatic escalation of the war. 
The secret meeting between Kissinger and Le Due Tho on May 2 
was revealed and Nixon declared that the peace proposal that 
had been put forward remained on the table. Nonetheless, the 
future of the Paris Peace Talks would now be determined by 
battlefield results: Hanoi had embarked on a huge military 
gamble to try to obtain what it could not at the negotiating 
table.
Le Due Tho had rejected the American proposal of May 2, 
1972 at a time when North Vietnamese fortunes on the 
battlefield had reached their zenith. Quang Tri City had 
fallen on April 29 and the ARVN's defensive line along the My 
Chanh River was at best tenuous.198 The ancient imperial 
capital of Hue appeared doomed and the new PAVN's offensives 
in Military Regions 2 and 3 were initially very successful. 
Hanoi now consolidated its forces for the final onslaught. By 
the middle of June, however, American intelligence was 
pointing to a new development: the PAVN offensive had stalled. 
North Vietnam's great gamble had failed and 13 under-strength, 
war-weary divisions were now tied down in the South.
In retrospect, the Nguyen Hue Offensive had one critical 
flaw that undermined its potential for success: the three
separate offensives were not coordinated. Therefore, Military 
Assistance Command Vietnam(MACV-under the command of General
198 Dale Andrade, " Quang Tri Disaster," Vietnam, edited by 
Colonel H.G.Summers, (USA-Retired), April, 1994, p.35.
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Frederick C.Weyand, (USA) , after June 20) could concentrate its 
air assets and the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff its 
reserves (composed of only two brigades of the Airborne 
Division and a single Marine brigade) against individual 
offensives that were isolated on the battlefield.
If the PAVN been been able to coordinate the different 
offensives, the ARVN would have been hard pressed to reinforce 
three fronts simultaneously. In addition, American air power 
was seriously understrength in the first few weeks of the 
Nguyen Hue Offensive and was quite possibly inadequate to halt 
the offensive alone in the absence of strong ARVN reserves. 
The prior incursions into Cambodia and Laos by the South 
Vietnamese and the Americans were now resulting in strategic 
gains: the PAVN found it difficult to mass its forces and 
almost impossible to coordinate the separate offensives 
because of the damaged lines of communication. The offensive 
in Military Region 2, which threatened to cut South Vietnam in 
half at the end of April, had been effectively neutralized by 
the end of the next month. After two regiments of the 22nd 
ARVN Division had collapsed north of Kontum, President Thieu 
acted decisively. The inept commander of Military Region 
Region 2, Major-General Ngo Dzu, was relieved of his command 
and replaced with a "fighting general," Lieutenant-General 
Nguyen Van Toan.199 Toan, with critical reinforcements from 
the Joint General Staff's Strategic Reserve in the form of the
199 Maitland and Weiss, South Vietnam on Trial. p. 123
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3rd Airborne Brigade and the 369th Marine Brigade, was able to 
blunt the PAVN offensive in the Central Highlands.200 
Meanwhile, in Military Region 3, the North Vietnamese were only 
able to concentrate two divisions, the 5th and 9th VC for the 
crucial attack on An Loc.201 In addition, because of the 
lack of enemy activity in the Mekong Delta, the entire 21st 
ARVN Division was moved outside An Loc to break the siege.
North Vietnam's supply situation had by now become 
critical. The mining of Haiphong was accelerated by the 
dilapidated condition of the Chinese railways.202 At the 
summit in Beijing, the war in Indochina had been an important 
topic, and one of the reasons for Nixon's desire for improved 
relations with the Asian giant. Regardless of ideological 
commitments, the leaders of China, especially the Chairman of 
the State Council, Zhou Enlai, and the senior officers of the 
People's Liberation Army(PLA), Marshals Ye Jianying, Xu 
Xianqian, and Nie Rongzhen, realized that a major war of 
Vietnamese expansionism was not in their country's 
interest.203 The Vietnamese and Chinese have been historical 
enemies for more than two millennia. A strong, united Vietnam 
dominating Laos and Cambodia, possibly allied to the Soviet 
Union, was a threat to China. In addition, if China wanted
200 Ibid.
201 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1312.
202 Ibid. p.1316.
203 Alan P.L.Liu, How China Is Ruled , p.202
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the United States to act as an effective counterweight to the
Soviet Union, the United States had to extricate itself from
Vietnam. China's attitude towards the war in Vietnam was
expressed by Zhou Enlai to Henry Kissinger while Kissinger was
in Beijing from June 19 until June 23, 1972:
Chou asked pointed questions about 
Nixon's May 8 proposal (which was in 
effect a cease fire offer), repeated the 
standard line of China's historical debt 
to Hanoi, avoided any implication of any 
Chinese national interest in the war, and 
implied that most of China's supplies to 
Vietnam were foodstuffs.204
The realists of the Chinese Politburo had concluded that
improved relations with the United States had to take priority
over Hanoi's concerns.
By mid-June of 1972, the South Vietnamese were prepared 
to launch a general counter-offensive, concentrated in Quang 
Tri Province. The PAVN offensives against An Loc and Kontum 
had been effectively countered by American air power and the 
steadfast resistance of the ARVN.205 President Thieu would 
now shuffle his forces in preparation for the offensive to 
retake Quang Tri: Lieutenant General Ngo Quong Truong replaced 
the inept Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam and the whole of 
the strategic reserve was transferred to his command.206 By 
September 9, South Vietnamese Marines had recaptured the
204 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1343.
205 Ibid.
206 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
historic Citadel in Quang Tri. Quang Tri had been the first 
provincial capital to fall to the Communists during the Second 
Vietnam War and the North Vietnamese leadership clearly 
considered its retention vital for symbolic purposes. The 
ability of South Vietnamese Marines and airborne troops to 
recapture Quang Tri despite the fact the PAVN had committed 
seven of its best divisions to secure it clearly demonstrated 
that the Nguyen Hue Offensive was spent. This fact could not 
have been lost to the leadership in Hanoi.
Against this background of military reversal for Hanoi,
the Paris Peace Talks would once again commence in an attempt
to end the war. This scenario was exactly the one Henry
Kissinger had anticipated:
I had reckoned all along that Hanoi's 
offensive would culminate in a serious 
negotiation, whatever happened. If Hanoi 
were to prevail on the battlefield, Nixon 
would be forced to settle on Hanoi's 
terms; if the offensive...were blunted 
and Nixon looked like the probable winner 
[in the November, 1972 Presidential 
election], Hanoi would make a major 
effort to settle with us.207
Y
On June 29, Nixon announced that the plenaries would restart 
on July 16. A secret meeting was arranged between Le Due Tho 
and Kissinger at 11 rue Dartle, Paris, July 19.
Kissinger entered the meeting of July 19 very confident. 
The North Vietnamese were suffering very serious reverses in 
South Vietnam and, quite possibly, they were deeply concerned
207 Ibid. p. 1336.
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that Nixon would prove to be more hawkish if they could not 
settle with him before the Presidential election. An American 
policy of making no new concessions until Hanoi's intentions 
were clear was adopted. The National Security Advisor hoped 
to embrace the "dual track" negotiating strategy: "...settling 
the military issues, and leaving the political issues 
essentially to future negotiations among the parties. Such a 
settlement would preserve our allies and give them an 
opportunity to determine their future."208
The secret meeting of 19 July failed to provide any 
breakthrough, but Kissinger noticed a new attitude on the part 
of the North Vietnamese. They were "benign and friendly 
now"209 as compared to their arrogance in May. In addition, 
Le Due Tho, not Xuan Thuy, did most of the speaking for the 
North Vietnamese delegation, indicating that the North 
Vietnamese attached a new importance to the talks. Both sides 
agreed to hold another meeting on August 1.
At this meeting, Hanoi's delegation began to offer 
substantial concessions, the first time in the history of the 
Paris Peace Talks that it did so. The most important 
concession made by Le Due Tho concerned the deadline for the 
withdrawal of American forces: it was no longer unconditional, 
but linked to a cease-fire.210 Important concessions were
208 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1369.
209 Ibid. p. 1371. 'v
210 Ibid.
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also made concerning the provisional coalition government.
For the first time in nearly four years, the Par is. Peace Talks
were making progress. Further minor progress would be made at
the secret meetings of August 14, September 15, and September
27, but Hanoi would not fundamentally change its position
until October 8.
As the meeting of October 8 opened, Kissinger noticed two
large green folders in front of Le Due Tho. The National
Security Advisor sensed that they contained something
dramatic. At 4:00 P.M., Kissinger’s instinct proved correct.
Le Due Tho declared:
I think we cannot negotiate in the way we are doing 
now...In order to show our good will and to ensure 
a rapid end to the war, rapid restoration of peace 
in Vietnam, as all of us wish for, today we put 
forward a new proposal...211
The Paris Peace Talks had just entered a decisive stage.
Le Due Tho proposed that the United States and the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) sign an agreement settling
the military questions between them - withdrawal, prisoners,
and a cease-fire.212 Relating to the political settlement,
"we shall only agree on the main principles. After the
signing of this agreement a cease fire will immediately take
place."213 The entire concept of a coalition government was
dropped; instead an "Administration for National Concord" was
211 Ibid. p. 1395.
212 Nixon, No More Vietnams. p. 150.
213 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1385.
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to be established, being responsible for implementing the 
signed agreements, achieving national concord and "organizing" 
unspecified general and local elections.214 Hanoi also 
agreed to permit American military aid for South Vietnam to 
continue and to stop all infiltration into the South. If the 
United States could enforce the last provision of the accord, 
South Vietnam’s chances of survival would greatly increase. 
The United States now had the opportunity to establish a 
"protective umbrella" over South Vietnam with which Saigon 
would have the opportunity to address the fundamental social 
and political problems of the regime. This new proposal 
offered an excellent opportunity for ending the war, and to a 
much lesser extent, preserving the independence of South 
Vietnam.
Kissinger accepted this new North Vietnamese proposal in 
principle. There were still some serious gaps, such as the 
failure to provide cease-fires in Laos and Cambodia, but 
further negotiation could whittle away these points of 
contention. The war in Vietnam was not yet ended, but this 
substantial North Vietnamese proposal was the long-awaited 
"light at the end of the tunnel."
This chapter has studied the impact of the North 
Vietnamese Nguyen Hue Offensive on the Paris Peace Talks. The 
fact that the Paris Peace Talks had been stalemated for almost 
forty-one months when the Nguyen Hue Offensive was launched,
214 Nixon, No More Vietnams. p. 154.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
along with the PAVN build-up in the Laotian Panhandle and 
eastern Cambodia since the late fall of 1970 would seem to 
suggest that Hanoi never intended to settle the war by 
diplomatic means. Instead, a strong case can be put forward 
that the senior leadership of the Lao Dong Party and the PAVN 
had always planned to end the war by a military solution. 
Thus, this chapter has addressed three of the four questions 
raised in the introduction: What were the factors that led the 
respective parties to conclude the Paris Peace Accords in 
1973?; Why did the Paris Peace Talks drag on for so long?; 
Why did Hanoi accept a peace settlement that was not 
completely in its interests?
The first and third catalysts that were identified in the 
introduction were also clearly influencing the belligerents 
during this time period. If a belief that final military 
victory was possible acted as the primary determinant in 
Hanoi's hard-line negotiating position, it was only logical 
that military reversal/stalemate could fundamentally alter it.
The impact of the failure of the Nguyen Hue Offensive on 
the North Vietnamese negotiating position in Paris was clearly 
critical. In his work, The Structure of International 
Conflict. Mitchell argues that a number of conditions must be 
met before conflict termination can begin:
1) The leaders of the party confronting failure 
must be agreed that they have, in fact, failed.
2) The loser's leaders must take a decision to make the 
best of some compromise settlement rather than 
"fighting on," in the hope that some near-miracle will 
save them.
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3) The definition of the current situation of success 
and failure held by both parties' leaders must be 
similar, in that one side has recognized the symbols 
of defeat (the loss of a capital, the defeat of the 
army in the field, the defection of a key ally), while 
the other recognizes that these are, in fact, symbols 
of defeat for its adversary.215
A strong argument can be made that by October of 1972, all of
the above conditions had been essentially met for the first
time in the situation facing the Politburo.
The magnitude of North Vietnam's military reversal was
complicated by the international balance of power. As has
been seen, Nixon's brilliant "triangular" diplomacy was a
driving force behind the decision of the North Vietnamese
Politburo to authorize the Nguyen Hue Offensive. However, if
the offensive, which was the largest and most complicated ever
attempted by the PAVN, was defeated or at least brought to a
standstill by the ARVN, then the influence of this third
catalyst would be greatly exacerbated on Hanoi. By the spring
of 1972, the North Vietnamese were feeling seriously isolated
from both China and the Soviet Union. The psychological
effects of pictures of President Nixon warmly shaking hands
with the Chairman of the State Council of the CCP, Zhou Enlai,
in Beijing in February and three months later, toasting the
General Secretary of the CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev, should not be
underestimated. In addition, both the Chinese and the Soviets
had already taken one concrete measure which threatened to
influence the balance of forces in South Vietnam: the decision
215 Ibid. p.181.
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not to send minesweepers to clear the approaches to Haiphong 
Harbour after it had been mined on May 8. The senior 
leadership of both the Lao Dong Party and the PAVN had good 
reason to fear future actions of China and the Soviet Union. 
The North Vietnamese Politburo realized only too clearly that 
the foreign policies of both China and the Soviet Union 
contained a fundamental contradiction: ideological commitments 
were often not compatible with national interests. This 
dilemma was further complicated for the North Vietnamese by 
the fact that President Nixon unlike his predecessor, 
President Johnson recognized the fundamental dichotomy that 
existed in the foreign policies of China and the Soviet Union 
and was determined to utilize it to help bring the war in 
Vietnam to an end.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER VII: DO THEY KNOW THAT IT'S CHRISTMAS TIME?
After the momentous secret meeting between American 
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and the nSpecial 
Advisor" to the North Vietnamese negotiating delegation, Le 
Due Tho, on October 8, 1972, both Washington and Hanoi had 
good reason to believe that the Paris Peace Accords were about 
to be concluded. Indeed, there is substantial evidence that 
President Richard Nixon sincerely believed that a peace 
settlement would be reached before the election in November. 
The optimism of the Nixon Administration was clearly revealed 
in a press conference given by the National Security Advisor 
on October 26, 1972. The hopes of a war-weary nation were 
greatly buoyed by Dr. Kissinger's famous announcement that 
"peace is at hand." Indeed, the secret meeting of October 8 
had brought forward the dramatic change in Hanoi's bargaining 
position that would allow the Paris Peace Accords to be signed 
on January 27, 1973. Yet, the path to peace would be a most 
arduous one: on December 18, Nixon would order the execution 
of Operation Linebacker II. the so called "Christmas 
Bombings." To this day, the "breakdown" of the Paris Peace 
Talks in early December of 1972 and the subsequent "Christmas
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Bombings" remain one of the most controversial episodes of the 
Second Vietnam War, and indeed, the entire Nixon Presidency. 
The purpose of this chapter will be to examine the two 
hypotheses raised in the introduction: that only a fundamental 
shift in the negotiating strategy of Hanoi allowed the Paris 
Peace Talks to be successfully concluded, and that the Nixon 
Administration was compelled to settle the Peace Talks because 
of strong anti-war sentiment in the United States, especially 
in the Congress. The first three questions raised in chapter 
one will be further analyzed, as will the fourth one: Why did 
the United States accept a peace settlement that was not 
completely in Saigon1s interests?
To understand the factors behind the "breakdown," one 
must first understand the importance of the schedule agreed 
upon by the two sides in October. The North Vietnamese 
obviously wanted the Paris Peace Accords concluded before the 
Presidential election on November 7, 1972. Hanoi's leaders 
were quite possibly concerned about the opinion polls 
regarding the upcoming American Presidential election. Nixon 
was going to be reelected in a huge landslide and it was only 
natural to expect manor Republican gains in Congress as well. 
Hanoi was probably concerned that the President might step up 
the military pressure after the Presidential election if the 
Paris Peace Accords were not concluded. Yet, Hanoi's strategy 
was based on a critical assumption: that hawkish Republicans 
would make major gains in the Congressional elections.
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Kissinger agreed to follow the schedule because he 
believed that the remaining areas of contention in the Paris 
Peace Talks, such as the status of the 10,000 Viet Cong being 
held in South Vietnamese prisons, American Prisoners-of- 
War(POWs) and Missings-in-Action( MIAs), and cease-fires in 
Laos and Cambodia, could be successfully resolved before the 
end of October and that the approval of South Vietnamese 
President Nguyen Van Thieu would be forthcoming. Indeed, all 
of the areas of contention in the Paris Peace Talks would be 
successfully concluded, with the ominous exception of a cease­
fire in Cambodia. Nonetheless, Kissinger believed that 
President Thieu's approval of the October 8 proposal would be 
readily forthcoming. Thus, in retrospect, Kissinger had every 
reason to be optimistic as he left Paris for Washington on 
October 12.
Yet, Kissinger's optimism was based on one critical 
assumption: that Thieu would be willing to accept the
proposal. Thieu had been informed of every major American 
initiative to end the war since Richard Nixon had entered the 
Oval Office. Thieu had claimed to have fully supported 
Nixon's Vietnamization policy and the concomitant troop 
withdrawals at the Midway Conference in 1969. When the United 
States had dropped its demand for mutual withdrawal of forces 
in October of 1971, Thieu agreed with this momentous 
concession. Thieu had been fully aware and apparently 
supportive of the American position going into the critical
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meeting of October 8. Thus, it was not illogical to expect 
Thieu1s acceptance of the new North Vietnamese proposal.
Yet, a fundamental and vital change had now taken place: 
the war was about to end and the remaining American forces 
were about to withdraw. Thieu had probably agreed to all the 
other American proposals because he expected Hanoi to reject 
them. If the Paris Peace Accords were concluded, Thieu would 
stand alone against the threat from North Vietnam.
President Thieu was a patriot and ultimately his actions 
were dictated by this fact. He had led his country through 
seven tumultuous years of bitter warfare. Now it must have 
appeared to Saigon that the United States expected South 
Vietnam to stand alone against the DRV. The Politburo in 
Hanoi could not be expected to abandon its quest to 
reunify Vietnam, and ultimately, to establish its hegemony 
over all of Indochina. The South Vietnamese were apparently 
left to their own fate, despite the fact that President Nixon 
had promised to enforce the Accords, a commitment that was 
plausible when the President's actions after March 31 are 
taken into consideration. Nonetheless, Thieu must have felt 
betrayed: in similar circumstances, the United States
maintained the 8th Army in the Republic of Korea as a 
deterrent against renewed North Korean-Chinese aggression.216 
Psychologically, South Vietnam did not feel prepared to stand 
alone against North Vietnam. For eight years the United
216 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1417.
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States had been responsible for most of the heavy fighting and 
now South Vietnam was expected to carry the burden.
Against this psychological background, Thieu met with 
Kissinger and Major General Al Haig, Special Military 
Assistant to the National Security Advisor, on October 19.217 
At this first meeting, Thieu adopted the tactic of stalling - 
a series of intelligent questions was asked, but none relevant 
to the Accords. Both parties agreed to meet the next day. 
The Americans now received some good news: the North
Vietnamese wanted to keep the original schedule and offered 
two major concessions, involving Viet Cong prisoners in South 
Vietnamese jails and military hardware replacement.218 The 
North Vietnamese had agreed to settle the fate of the Viet 
Cong prisoners through one of the mechanisms established to 
enforce the Accords, the Joint Military Commission(JMC), while 
strict limitations would be placed on the replacement of 
military hardware.
The meeting of October 20 was melodramatic and both sides 
proposed to meet on October 22, a day that would be as 
decisive as October 8. At the previous meeting, Thieu had 
recommended 23 changes to the original text.219 Although 
some of the changes were significant, Kissinger remained
217 Nixon, No More Vietnams. p. 150.
218 Lipsman and Weiss, The False Peace, p.37.
219 Karnow, Vietnam, p.652.
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confident as he prepared to meet with Thieu and the South 
Vietnamese National Security Council that afternoon. The 
American National Security Advisor received a very rude shock: 
Thieu rejected the proposal and stipulated that he would never 
put his signature on such a document.220 Kissinger now faced 
the prospects of four years of diplomacy and thousands of 
American lives being expended in vain.
Yet, from a South Vietnamese perspective, Thieu's 
objections were well-founded. The Accords would allow North 
Vietnam to maintain a force of 13 divisions and 26 independent 
regiments on South Vietnamese territory after the last 
American ground forces departed.221 In addition, Thieu was 
expected to resign a month before new Presidential elections 
in the South, a proposal that he had accepted nearly a year 
earlier.222 The South Vietnamese President, in all 
likelihood, had only agreed to this proposal because he never 
expected the Accords to be concluded. The only guarantee that 
he was specifically given concerning South Vietnamese national 
security against renewed encroachments by the DRV was a verbal 
commitment by President Nixon. The South Vietnamese President 
way very well have concluded that the war-weariness in the 
United States, particularly in the Congress, would prevent any 
forceful response from Nixon in the event of North Vietnamese
220 Ibid.
221 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1465.
222 Lipsman and Weiss, The False Peace, p.42.
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aggression. Clearly, Thieu had every reason to be less than 
pleased with the draft agreement. Yet the manner in which he 
feigned support for every American proposal since 1969 and, at 
the last second, revealed his real opinions, was truly 
treacherous. Richard Nixon, who had risked his political 
career over the war in Vietnam, deserved much better from an 
ally.
The United States had forced Hanoi to end its
intransigence in Paris by decisively routing the Nguyen Hue
Offensive but now faced the prospect of the Paris Peace Talks
collapsing because of a diplomatic conflict with its ally in
Saigon. On October 26, Hanoi, after being informed that the
United states could not honour the previously agreed upon
schedule, publicly released the draft peace agreement.223
The President authorized Kissinger to go ahead with a press
briefing in which the National Security Advisor stated:
We believe that peace is at hand. We
believe that an agreement is within
sight, based on the May 8 proposals of 
the President and some adaptations of our 
January 25 proposals, which is just to 
all parties. 24
Kissinger's statement "peace is at hand" would haunt him for 
the rest of his life. His critics would contend that this 
action was a blatant electoral ploy. Yet, a case can be made 
that although the upcoming Presidential election influenced
223 Ibid. p.38.
224 Ibid.
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Kissinger's positive assessment, it did not do so decisively: 
polls were clearly predicting a landslide for Nixon even if a 
peace agresment were not signed. Nixon deserves credit for 
not allowing the upcoming Presidential election to seriously 
alter his stance towards Saigon.
November 7, 1972, surely must have been the zenith of 
Nixon's political career. The President received 61.3 percent 
of the popular vote and he swept every state in the Union 
except Massachusetts.225 Traditional strongholds of
Democratic support, such as the Jewish vote, were undermined 
by Nixon. Yet, this victory was not complete. The 
Republicans actually lost two seats in the Senate, leaving the 
Democrats with 57 seats, while only seven seats were gained in 
the House, short of a majority by eight.226
The shrewd Politburo members in Hanoi must now have seen 
an excellent opportunity to promote North Vietnam's interests. 
The elections in early November had resulted in a strongly 
anti-war Congress. Nixon now faced the prospect of Congress 
terminating all military support to South Vietnam. Thus, the 
Administration considered it vital to conclude the Accords 
before January 30, 1973. Hanoi believed it was in its
interests to procrastinate.
225 Max Frankell, " Nixon Elected in Landslide:Margin About 
60%," The New York Times. Volume 122, No.41,927, November 8, 1972, 
p.Al.
226 R.W. Apple, Jr. " Democrats Retain Congress: Many Votes 
Split," The New York Times. Volume 122, No.41,927, November 8, 
1972, p.Al
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Against this background, Kissinger once again met with Le 
Due Tho on November 20 . 227 The South Vietnamese proposed 
changes were put forward and the next day Hanoi categorically 
rejected them. By now, the United States realized that any 
settlement would require the abandonment of the South 
Vietnamese proposals. On November 25, the Talks were 
recessed.
When the Talks were reconvened on December 4, the North 
Vietnamese had changed their position. Some positions 
previously agreed upon by Hanoi were withdrawn and new, 
unacceptable demands were put forward, such as the 
Demilitarized Zone(DMZ) not being a legal boundary. To state 
that the Talks had "broken down" would be incorrect. Both 
sides still accepted the basic proposal of October 8, but 
Hanoi was now demanding a few fundamental changes to the text. 
With Hanoi refusing to modify a few of its key new demands, 
Nixon ordered the Talks recessed on December 13. The much 
celebrated "breakdown" had occurred and prospects for the 
future were bleak.
The motives behind Hanoi1s actions have been greatly 
debated. Yet, in all probability, North Vietnam was not 
attempting to scuttle the Accords, but rather trying to force 
Nixon to make at least one major concession, regarding the 
DMZ, before the Congress reconvened on January 3, 1973.
Militarily, Hanoi's position had not improved since October,
227 Lipsman and Weiss, The False Peace, p.31
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1972: there was no longer a strategic reserve in North Vietnam 
and all the units in South Vietnam were seriously 
understrength.228 In addition, the Soviet Union and China 
were applying heavy diplomatic pressure on North Vietnam to 
conclude the Accords. North Vietnamese intransigence was thus 
fulfilling two major goals: pressuring Nixon to make a few 
major concessions and allowing various ancillary units, such 
as anti-aircraft battalions and construction regiments, to be 
rushed to the battlefield in South Vietnam before the cease­
fire was achieved.229
Nixon, however, was not prepared to make any further 
concessions. The Accords had to be signed as they currently 
existed. If any further concessions were made, conservatives 
could charge the President with betraying South Vietnam. Four 
years earlier, Nixon had promised the American people that he 
would obtain a "peace with honour" and that promise would be 
fulfilled before his second term began. In retrospect, it can 
perhaps be argued that this matter was quite possibly some 
sort of obsession for President Nixon.
On December 14, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer,(USN), (1970-1974), was
ordered to prepare contingency plans for massive air attacks 
to be carried out by the Strategic Air Command in and around
228 Ibid. p.42.
229 Tom Carhart, Battlefront Vietnam. (New York: Warner,
1984), p.137.
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Hanoi and Haiphong.230 This time, the restrictions on the 
military were lifted. Moorer was told by the President: "I
don't want any more of this crap about the fact that we 
couldn't hit this target or that one. This is your chance to 
use military power to win this war, and if you don't, I'll 
hold you responsible!1,231 Hanoi would be forced to return to 
the negotiating table and to sign the Accords at least 
partially due to the devastating strategic air campaign 
conducted by the United States.
Beginning on December 18, B-52s from the 3rd Strategic 
Air Division on Guam and other aircraft from the Air Force and 
Navy, would fly nearly three thousand sorties for the next 
eleven days, except December 25. Some 40,000 tons of bombs 
would be dropped on the most populated areas in North Vietnam 
with total North Vietnamese civilian casualties amounting to 
between 1300 and 1600. according to North Vietnamese 
sources.232 These controversial bombings have been called 
genocidal. Such a claim is false. If the United States had 
wanted to cause wanton civilian deaths, why were the dikes on 
the Red River not targeted? Even if the North Vietnamese had 
intentionally lowered their estimation of the casualties, why 
were total casualties only a tinv fraction of those in Dresden 
or Tokyo in 1945?
230 Ibid. P. 151.
231 Nixon, No More Vietnams. p. 125.
t
232 Lipsman and Weiss, The False Peace, p. 107.
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Nonetheless, despite the fact that civilian casualties in 
Hanoi-Haiphong were probably kept as low as possible, a 
devastating anti-war backlash resulted both domestically and 
internationally against the Nixon Administration's dramatic 
escalation of the war- Massive anti-war demonstrations took 
place not only throughout the United States, but also abroad. 
Perhaps most alarming for Nixon, there was revulsion in 
Congress over the "Christmas Bombings." As the New Year 
approached, such powerful senators as Mike Mansfield, the 
Majority leader in the Senate, William Fulbright, Chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and John C. Stennis, 
Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, called for 
strong action by the Congress to limit the President's scope 
of action as Commander-in-Chief.233 As made clear from his 
memoirs, President Nixon took the threats from Congress very 
seriously. Both the President and ranking members of the 
Administration believed that the Paris Peace Accords had to 
settled by the end of January, 1973, before the Congress could 
act. In retrospect, as argued by Gareth Porter, Richard Nixon 
had clearly miscalculated the degree of anti-war sentiment 
that would be generated by the "Christmas Bombings."234
However, the "Christmas Bombings" had their desired 
effect at least to some point: when Kissinger once again met
233 Small, Johnson. Nixon, and the Doves, p.223.
234 Porter, A Peace Denied, p.275.
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with Le Due Tho on January 8, the North Vietnamese were no 
longer intransigent. All proposed changes to the Accords 
previously made by Hanoi had been deleted.235 Although it is 
true that Kissinger was unable to obtain any further 
concessions, Le Due Tho made one verbal commitment promising 
token troop withdrawals. Significantly, shortly after the 
Accords were signed, the PAVN 308th and 312th divisions 
withdrew across the DMZ.236 Quite possibly, Hanoi would have 
honoured the Accords, agreed upon by Kissinger and Le Due Tho, 
on January 13, 1973, if Washington could have enforced them.
After January 13, 1973, the only serious obstacle left 
was Thieu's unwillingness to sign the Accords. Nixon now 
threatened to sign the Accords with or without South Vietnam. 
Thieu, realizing that South Vietnam would be in a difficult 
position, agreed to sign.
The purpose of this chapter has been to analyze the 
impact of the three catalysts on the two principal actors in 
the Paris Peace Talks, the United States and the DRV. By 
analyzing the importance of the three catalysts for the two 
principal belligerents, the two hypotheses raised in the 
introduction, that only a fundamental change in the 
negotiating strategy of Hanoi allowed the Paris Peace Talks to 
be concluded and that strong anti-war sentiment in the United
235 Ibid. p. 112.
236 Ibid. p. 106.
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States compelled the Nixon Administration to accept the Paris 
Peace Accords, have been addressed. The fact that Hanoi 
rejected the American proposals of May 2, 1972, but then 
accepted the same ones on October 8, 1972, clearly indicates 
a fundamental shift in the position of the Politburo. To 
rationalize the dramatic policy change by the senior 
leadership in Hanoi, it is necessary to study the changing 
circumstances of the war in South-East Asia, both militarily 
and politically. By the end of September, even the most 
ardent supporters of a military solution in the Politburo of 
the Lao Dong Party, First Secretary of the Party Le Duan, 
Chairman of the Party’s Organization Department Le Due Tho, 
and the Minister of Defence Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap had 
to recognize that the Nguyen Hue Offensive had failed. The 
’’doves" within the Politburo, senior Party theorist Truong 
Chinh and the Chairman of the Central Office for South 
Vietnam(COSVN) Pham Hung, were able, judging by the extant 
evidence available, to prevail upon their "neutral" cohorts, 
the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Pham Van Dong and the 
Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, to support a negotiated 
settlement to the conflict.237 Support for a conclusion of 
the Paris Peace Talks was based on a recognition of military
237 This speculation on the internal dynamics of the North 
Vietnamese Politburo is largely based on an article by William 
E.Colby, "Operation Phoenix" in Vietnam magazine in January of 
1994. Mr. Colby was the CIA Station Director in Saigon from 1967 
to 1969. From 1973 to 1976, Colby was the Deputy Director of the 
CIA under Stansfield Turner.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
148 .
reversal, as well as deep concern over domestic problems in 
the DRV.
According to the World Bank, in 1966 North Vietnam was 
one of the twenty-five poorest countries in the Third 
World.238 Along with the re-unification of Vietnam, economic 
development was one of the two most important objectives of 
the regime. Between 1954 and 1963, the policy of "socialist 
construction" would produce some beneficial results. 
Illiteracy was largely wiped out and basic health care had 
been extended to most sectors of the population. Yet, serious 
problems remained to be overcome.
By the early 1960s, agriculture was in a very deep 
crisis. The forced collectivization of farmland, after 1955, 
had led to serious disturbances in the countryside. Sources 
as diverse as Richard Nixon and Dr. Douglas Pike estimate that 
at least fifty thousand landlords and wealthy peasants were 
put to death during this period. Once the collectivisation of 
agriculture had taken place, the giant state farms were found 
to be extremely inefficient and cumbersome. As a direct 
result, agricultural production declined considerably.
The implementation of a Soviet-style command economy led 
to serious problems in the industrial sector as well. Between 
1954 and 1965, the DRV received massive amounts of foreign 
assistance. China contributed approximately $670 million
238 Michael Lee Lanning and Dan Cragg, Inside the VC and the 
NVA , p.261.
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during this period, while the Soviet Union contributed roughly 
twice this amount.239 Most of this foreign assistance went 
towards developing a nascent industrial sector. With some 
exceptions, such as the Thai Nguyen Steel and Rail Works, the 
industrial sector was very inefficient and characterized by 
bureaucratic corruption. As an industrial power. North 
Vietnam ranked behind states such as Uruguay and Lebanon.
If North Vietnam's economy was in a severe crisis in 
1965, it was on the verge of collapse in 1972, however. With 
the complete bombing halt announced by President Johnson in 
October of 1968, the North Vietnamese had made great progress 
in rebuilding the devastated economy of the DRV. Such 
accomplishments were all the more impressive because of the 
devastating effects of Operation Rolling Thunder between 1965 
and 1968. However, the country's infrastructure had been 
utterly shattered by the resumption of the American bombing 
campaign— Operation Linebacker I— in April of 1972. 
Continuation of the war could very well lead to an outright 
collapse of the economy of North Vietnam.
No less relevant, the United States had reacted 
forcefully in response to North Vietnamese aggression. The 
resumption of the bombing campaign in April had devastated 
the transportation and communications infrastructure in North 
Vietnam. Perhaps most ominously, in December of the same 
year, the United States had executed a brilliant strategic air
239 Ibid.
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campaign against Hanoi and Haiphong. By the end of December, 
the intricate anti-aircraft network in the Red River Delta had 
been neutralized by the Americans (notwithstanding different 
claims from writers such as Gabriel Kolko240) . By any 
objective analysis, Hanoi's military objectives had been 
thwarted by January of 1973.
The "moderates" in the Politburo now began to mobilize 
their colleagues to support the conclusion of the Paris Peace 
Talks. Powerful members of the Politburo, such as the 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Pham Van Dong, and even 
junior Politburo members, such as Nguyen Van Linh, now 
realized that acceptance of the terms offered by Washington 
was in Hanoi’s interests. There would be no military 
advantage in refusing to conclude the Paris Peace Talks and 
the Democratic Republic desperately needed to rebuild its 
shattered infrastructure. Instead, by focusing on "socialist 
construction" of the economy, the Democratic Republic would be 
in an enhanced position for the final showdown with the 
Republic of Vietnam.
Yet, the" moderates" within the Politburo may have 
failed to build the needed consensus if it had not been for 
support from senior officers of the PAVN. Clearly, serious 
organizational, command and control and logistical problems 
had plagued the North Vietnamese offensive in the South. 
Further time was needed for the PAVN to tranform itself into
240 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, p.426.
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a mechanized juggernaut on the model of the armies of the 
Warsaw Treaty Organization. Senior General Giap was revered 
by junior officers as a revolutionary hero and the victor of 
Dien Bien Phu, but by 1972, he was perhaps considered an 
anachronism. The dramatic decline in Giap's influence in both 
the military and Party after the summer of 1972, along with 
his poor health, probably isolated the remaining "hawks" in 
the Politburo.
A new generation of military men now emerged after the 
disastrous outcome of the Nguyen Hue Offensive. Giap was 
eclipsed in the Politburo by another military man, Senior 
General Van Tien Dung, PAVN Chief of Staff.241 Although Dung 
himself was an "old revolutionary"— he had commanded the 340th 
Viet Minh Division at Dien Bien Phu, he shared the 
professional aspirations of younger men, such as Lieutenant 
Generals Huang Cam , Le Due Anh, and Dong Sy Nguyen. For 
these generals, the re-unification of Vietnam would not be 
achieved by a reliance on Maoist guerrilla
doctrine, but rather, the principles of Soviet mechanized 
warfare.242 Thus, for the senior leadership of the PAVN, the 
influence of the Chinese "Yanan School" of revolutionary 
warfare would be eclipsed by the Soviet "Frunze School" of 
mechanized warfare, as demonstrated by the brilliantly planned
241 Lipsman and Weiss, The False Peace ,p.42
242 Ian Beckett, The March of Communism-1917 to 1984. p. 134.
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and executed offensives of 1975 and 1978, against South 
Vietnam and Kampuchea, respectively. The most important thing 
required by the PAVN at this period was time. Only with time 
could the military recover from its losses in 1972 and prepare 
the Soviet-style mechanized force that would reunify the 
nation.
By January of 1973, a consensus had been forged within 
both the powerful Politburo and the senior leadership of the 
PAVN. North Vietnam had suffered a very serious military 
setback, a fact that could not be ignored. The country now 
had to focus on rebuilding the economy and re-organizing the 
army for the imminent confrontation with South Vietnam. The 
remaining •'hawks," notably First Secretary Le Duan, could no 
longer resist the will of their colleagues in the Politburo.
Domestic concerns were clearly a consideration in Hanoi's 
decision to accept the Paris Peace Accords in January of 1973. 
Yet, the influence of the second catalyst identified in the 
introduction also affected the decision-making in the Nixon 
Administration. In the memoirs of all of the senior officials 
of the Nixon Presidency, notably the President himself and his 
National Security Advisor, the importance of concluding the 
Paris Peace Talks in the first term of the Administration was 
recognized. Dr. Melvin Small has concluded that ultimately 
President Nixon was able to neutralize the influence of the 
anti-war movement by his "Silent Majority" strategy, which 
involved a direct appeal by the President to the American
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people over the heads of academics and journalists, along with 
his successful diplomacy with China and the Soviet Union. In 
addition, the Federal Bureau of Investigation(FBI), headed by 
its controversial Director, J.Edgar Hoover(1924-1972), 
conducted a vigorous campaign against the principal anti-war 
organizations, along with prominent anti-war activists who 
ranged from Stokely Carmichael to John Lennon. Yet, twenty-two 
years after Mr. Hoover's death, the effectiveness of the FBI's 
campaign to neutralize the anti— war movement remains 
nebulous. However, Nixon was only too well aware that support 
for his policies in Indochina was at best tenuous. Small has 
noted:
The Silent Majority speech and the offensives 
against the movement on several fronts did not 
give him a free hand, although they did buy him "a 
lot of time and a lot of room." The population had 
rallied around his perceived moderate policies. Most 
Americans, even congressional and media leaders, 
accepted Vietnamization, the continuation of peace 
talks, and especially the staged withdrawals of 
American troops...Nonetheless, both he and the North 
Vietnamese knew that the moderate policy supported by 
most citizens would lead ultimately to a total 
American withdrawal...243
Thus, President Nixon did not have a free hand to escalate the
war as he saw fit as demonstrated by the massive protests that
erupted in response to the "Christmas Bombings" of 1972.
Nixon had clearly miscalculated his support in the country
when he ordered the controversial bombings to be executed.
The anti-war protests that resulted from Operation Linebacker
243 Melvin Small, Johnson. Nixon, and the Doves ,p.l91
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II weakened Nixon's political support, particularly in the 
Congress, and intensified the Administration's need for a 
settlement.
The role of the final catalyst, third party 
intervention/the international balance of power, was 
previously addressed in the preceding chapter. A determining 
factor in the Politburo's decision to fundamentally alter its 
negotiating position in October of 1972 was Nixon's 
"triangular diplomacy." Hanoi had become isolated from its two 
principal allies. Continued Chinese and Soviet support for 
the war in Vietnam could no longer be assured. This fact was 
obvious from the dramatic summits that President Nixon held 
with Mao and Brezhnev in February and May of 1972, 
respectively, and the failure of either China or the Soviet 
Union to offer to clear Haiphong after May 8, 1972. The
senior leadership of both the Lao Dong Party and the PAVN 
certainly concluded that it was in the DRV's interests to 
conclude the Paris Peace Talks because of the Chinese and 
Soviet desire to see the war in South-East Asia come to an 
end.
Along with addressing the two hypotheses raised in the 
introduction, this chapter has examined the four inter-related 
questions also posed in the introduction. By reference to the 
three catalysts, the four questions are substantially 
addressed. An in-depth anaysis of the hypotheses and 
questions raised in the first chapter will be presented in the
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PART V: NOW THE BATTLE IS OVER 
CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUSIONS
The analytical framework introduced in the first chapter 
provides a basic analytical tool with which to examine the 
dynamics of the Paris Peace Talks, and to a lesser extent, the 
Second Vietnam War itself. By reference to the three 
catalysts, the first hypothesis raised in the introduction, 
that only a substantial shift in the negotiating position of 
the Politburo in Hanoi allowed the Paris Peace Talks to be 
concluded, is effectively addressed. All the evidence clearly 
indicates that this hypothesis is valid. On May 2, 1972, the 
"Special Advisor" to the North Vietnamese Paris Peace Talks 
delegation, Le Due Tho, rejected the peace propsal put forward 
by the American National Security Advisor. Yet, barely five 
months later, Le Due Tho accepted the same offer. To 
understand the factors that led the North Vietnamese Politburo 
to radically alter its negotiating strategy in October of 
1972, by accepting an American peace proposal, which it can be 
argued it could have obtained in 1969 with vigourous 
diplomacy, it is necessary to refer to the catalysts.
The single greatest change that had occurred by October 
of 1972 was that the DRV had suffered a serious military
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reversal. Ever since the beginning of the Paris Peace Talks 
in November of 1968, neither the senior leadership of the Lao 
Dong Party nor the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) doubted 
that eventually North Vietnam would defeat South Vietnam. The 
Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was considered a "puppet 
army" not only by Hanoi, but also by many Western 
commentators. After November of 1968, North Vietnam was 
biding its time. The strong anti-war sentiment in the United 
States guaranteed that the winner of the 1968 Presidential 
election would be forced to continue President Johnson's 
policy of deescalation. Thus, as American troop withdrawals 
picked up momentum, Hanoi recognized that it would only be a 
matter of time before the ARVN faced the PAVN without American 
ground troops in Vietnam. In addition, as Hanoi waited for 
American troop withdrawals to pick up pace, it was also given 
valuable time in which to replenish the ranks of the PAVN that 
had been diminished through the heavy casualties sustained 
during Tet-1968.
Therefore, the first two "historical snapshots" which 
were isolated - the Tet Offensive of 1968 and the decision of 
the Johnson Administration to begin deescalation of the war in 
March of 1968, are critical to understanding the dynamics of 
the Paris Peace Talks which followed. The ability of the 
North Vietnamese to launch a country-wide offensive clearly 
indicated to the American people that the conflict in Vietnam 
could continue indefinitely. Public support for the war, which
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was in decline prior to Tet of 1968, now collapsed. The 
dramatic announcement made by President Johnson on March 31, 
1968 was a direct result of the Tet Offensive. In turn, the 
President's national television address was the genesis of the 
Paris Peace Talks. However, the results of the Tet Offensive 
also influenced the North Vietnamese Politburo’s decision to 
enter into the Paris Peace Talks. Both the PAVN and the VC 
had suffered crippling casualties and time was desperately 
needed to make good these losses.
Therefore, the North Vietnamese decision to enter into 
the Paris Peace Talks was motivated by the tactical military 
reversal suffered during Tet and the need for Operation 
Rolling Thunder to be brought to an end. Yet, by entering 
into the Paris Peace Talks, the Politburo in Hanoi never gave 
up its ultimate goals-the reunification of Vietnam and the 
establishment of Vietnamese hegemony over Indochina. 
Ultimately, the ARVN would have to face the PAVN alone. The 
shaky performance of the ARVN during Lam Son 719 in February- 
March of 1971 only strengthened the impression in Hanoi that 
the South Vietnamese military was "a puppet."
The second catalyst identified in the introduction, the 
threat of domestic instability, was also a factor for both 
Washington and Hanoi in the eventual conclusion of the Paris 
Peace Accords in 1973. Most of the literature focuses on the 
role of the anti-war movement in the United States. Although 
the strong anti-war sentiment was a leading factor in the
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decision of President Johnson to begin deescalation of the 
conflict in March of 1968 and President Nixon's determination 
to extricate the United States from the conflict in South-East 
Asia, its importance must not be overestimated. As noted by 
Small, the anti-war movement lost momentum and influence after 
the spring of 1970.244 Thus, President Nixon’s three-tiered 
policy for dealing with the anti-war movement- the "Silent 
Majority" Strategy, Great Power diplomacy, and increased 
activity by the FBI against prominent anti-war leaders- was 
ultimately effective in giving the Administration both the 
time and the manoeuver room needed to execute its policy in 
Indochina.
Yet, in no sense did Nixon's "neutralization" of the 
anti-war movement after June of 1970 mean that the 
Administation had "carte blanche" in its policy. The strong 
anti-war sentiment and general war-weariness in the United 
States acted as a powerful restriction on the Administration's 
Indochina policy, particularly the ability to escalate the 
conflict by the use of American ground troops after the 
Cambodian operation. Although President Nixon may have felt 
utter contempt towards the anti-war movement, he could not 
ignore its influence in the media and the Congress. A 
consummate politician, Richard Nixon realized that his support 
in the country was dependent upon deescalation as symbolized 
by the troop withdrawals and Vietnamization. The war had to
244 Melvin Small, Johnson. Nixon.and the Doves, p. 193.
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be brought to an end and, ultimately, it may be argued, this 
consideration became paramount for the Nixon Administation. 
Thus, there is also substantial evidence to support the second 
hypothesis raised in the introduction.
Most of the literature on the Second Vietnam War fails to 
address the importance of the second catalyst for Hanoi, 
however. Although the importance of the second catalyst would 
obviously be greater on Washington than Hanoi, the Democratic 
Republic was not immune from domestic concerns. Even in the 
left-of-centre accounts which tend to be more sympathetic to 
Hanoi and which might be expected co be more informed about 
its domestic situation, such as Gabriel Kolko's Anatomy of a 
War and Gareth Porter's A Peace Denied, there was found to be 
a common recurring fallacy: the DRV was portrayed as a
monolith. Even in Gabriel Kolko's very well researched work, 
terms such as the "party11 and the "revolution" are found 
throughout the text. Thus, the Politburo in Hanoi was 
inferred to be a united monolithic decision -making body with 
a single over-riding objective :the reunification of Vietnam.
Yet, this analysis is far too simplistic. In order to 
address the first, second and fourth questions raised in the 
introduction- What were the factors that led the respective 
parties to enter into the Paris Peace Talks in 1968, and 
subsequently, to conclude the Paris Peace Accords in 1973?, 
Why did the Paris Peace Talks drag on for so long ?, and, Why 
did Hanoi accept a peace settlement that was not entirely in
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its interests?, it is necessary to understand the nature of 
the Politburo of the Lao Dong Party. In almost all of the 
literature on Communist states, there was a consensus that the 
ruling parties were seriously divided over priorities. The 
same was true for the Lao Dong Party during the Second Vietnam 
War. The North Vietnamese Communist Party had two critical 
goals that were vital to maintaining its legitimacy, both 
domestically and internationally: "socialist construction" of 
the DRV, and of course, the reunification of Vietnam. 
Although these two priorities were in many respects 
complimentary to one another, critical divisions emerged 
within the North Vietnamese Central Committee over which one 
should take priority and the best way to achieve each 
objective. As a direct result, at least three factions 
emerged within the Politburo.
The first faction, referred to as the "hawks" by the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)245, was most closely 
identified with the First Secretary of the Lao Dong Party, Le 
Duan. This faction also included the Chairman of the Party's 
Organization Department, Le Due Tho, the Chairman of the 
Central Office for South Vietnam(COSVN) , Senior General Nguyen 
Chi Thanh up to his mysterious death in July of 1967, and his 
successor, Pham Hung. The second faction identified by the 
CIA was most closely associated with the senior theorist of 
the Lao Dong Party, Truong Chinh. This faction-the "doves
245 Lipsman and Doyle, The North. p.3o.
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argued that South Vietnam could not possibly be liberated 
until the DRV had built up a strong economy. Yet, from the 
extant evidence available, the balance in the Central 
Committee was determined by a third faction-the "neutrals." 
This faction was most closely identified with the Chairman of 
the Democratic Republic, Ho Chi Minh. After Ho's death on 
September 3, 1969, this faction became dominated by the
Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Pham Van Dong. The 
"neutrals," which also included the Foreign Minister of the 
DRV, Nguyen Duy Trinh, and possibly the Chief of Staff of the 
PAVN, Senior General Van Tien Dung, tended to be far more 
pragmatic than the two other more dogmatic factions. For 
these powerful members of the Politburo, the priorities of the 
DRV had to be dictated by circumstances, not iron-clad dogma.
The single greatest determinant for the "neutrals" 
regarding the ultimate objective of reunification was the 
situation on the battlefield. As long as victory still 
appeared possible in the immediate future, men such as Pham 
Van Dong and Nguyen Duy Trinh accepted the aggressive policy 
of the "hawks." Yet, when the battlefield situation turned 
against the DRV, the "neutrals" supported the more moderate 
policy of the "doves." In both March of 1968 and September of 
1972, the "neutrals" recognized that the DRV had suffered a 
critical military reversal and were willing to support the 
beginning of the Paris Peace Talks and the conclusion of the 
Paris Peace Accords, respectively.
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The third catalyst introduced in the first chapter, the 
role of third parties/the international balance of power, is 
also crucial in understanding the dynamics of the Paris Peace 
Talks. As was discussed in the third chapter, the threat of 
either Chinese or Soviet military intervention was a decisive 
influence on the Johnson Administration's decision to begin 
deescalation of the war in March of 1968. The role of third 
parties would also play a critical role in the North 
Vietnamese Politburo's decision to accept the Paris Peace 
Accords.
By 1972, the dramatic transition in the international 
balance of power, which had been underway since at least 1959, 
was obvious to the general public. The two dramatic summits 
held by President Nixon with Mao and Brezhnev in February and 
May of 1972 respectively clearly evinced the shift in the 
international balance of power. Super power detente and Sino- 
American rapprochement would act as a powerful impetus for the 
Politburo in Hanoi to risk the great military gamble of the 
Nguyen Hue Offensive and once it failed, to conclude the Paris 
Peace Accords.
The members of the North Vietnamese Politburo recognized 
that there were fundamental differences between Moscow and 
Beijing. China's and the Soviet Union's ability and 
willingness to assist the Vietnamese Revolution were 
ultimately determined by the relative balance of ideological 
commitments and national interests. Senior leaders of both
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the Lao Dong Party and the PAVN realized that improved 
relations with the United States was a priority for both 
Moscow and Beijing. Ultimately, the benefits that both Moscow 
and Beijing could hope to gain from a new relationship with 
the United States would greatly outweigh the advantages that 
could be gained by supporting the DRV in South-East Asia. The 
senior leaders of the DRV were only too well aware that China 
and the Soviet Union would not risk the new relationship with 
Washington in favour of the Vietnamese Revolution.
Yet, in the best accounts of the "triangular diplomacy," 
the memoirs of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, there is an 
inference that Moscow and Beijing "abandoned " the DRV in 
1972. Although both of the Communist giants wanted the 
conflict in South-East Asia brought to an end regardless of 
the views of Hanoi, the senior leaders of the Lao Dong Party 
were able to successfully manipulate the fundamental dichotomy 
in Communist foreign policy to their advantage. National 
interests dictated that China and the Soviet Union wanted to 
improve relations with the United States and to facilitate an 
end to the conflict in Vietnam. However, ideological 
commitments dictated that China and the Soviet Union had to 
support the Vietnamese Revolution.
Both China and the Soviet Union claimed to be the true 
leader of international socialism. Thus, both countries were 
required to support "wars of national liberation" against 
imperialism. Under the astute leadership of senior theorist
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Truong Chinh, the Lao Dong Party had argued that it was the " 
world revolution’s front line.”246 As noted by Gabriel Kolko, 
Vietnam had become the symbol of the world socialist movement 
by 1972, having defeated first French imperialism in 1954 and 
then having fought American imperialism to a stand-still.247 
Thus, the DRV could claim special legitimacy in the world 
socialist movement. This was a political fact that could not 
be ignored by the senior leadership in either Moscow or 
Beijing. Because of the ideological premises of both the 
revolutions of 1917 and 1949, neither of the Communist giants 
could be seen to be ’abandoning" the DRV. The leadership of 
the Lao Dong Party recognized this reality and thus, even as 
Moscow and Beijing applied diplomatic pressure on Hanoi to 
settle the Paris Peace Talks, the DRV was able to obtain 
commitments of massive amounts of Soviet and Chinese military 
and economic aid. After reading the memoirs of President 
Nixon and Dr. Kissinger, especially their analyses of why the 
Paris Peace Accords failed, one it is left with the impression 
that neither brilliant statesman fully understood the 
relevance of Chinese and Soviet ideological commitments to the 
DRV.
The analytical framework introduced in the first chapter 
provides a basic reference to understand the dynamics of the 
Paris Peace Talks. For almost fifty-one months, the delegates
246 Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War, p.407.
247 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
from the United States, South Vietnam, the DRV, and the 
National Liberation Front, engaged in often futile 
negotiations. The primary obstacle to a resolution of the 
Paris Peace Talks was the intransigient negotiating strategy 
of Hanoi. As long as the leadership in Hanoi believed that 
the conflict could be settled militarily, it would be 
unwilling to accept a negotiated settlement. Yet, this 
position was logical. As long as the Nixon Administration 
continued to gradually withdraw troops, Hanoi realized that it 
was only a matter of time until the PAVN faced the ARVN alone. 
Hanoi's assessment was further buttressed by doubts about the 
effectiveness of Vietnamization and the ability of President 
Nixon to drastically reescalate the conflict because of 
domestic anti-war sentiment. Only when Hanoi's Nguyen Hus 
Offensive had been decisively defeated by American airpower 
and steadfast resistance from the ARVN would the Politburo of 
the Lao Dong Party decide upon a fundamental shift in the 
negotiating position of the DRV.
The Paris Peace Accords were concluded more than twenty- 
one years ago. Yet, the successful resolution of the Paris 
Peace Talks remains one of the greatest diplomatic 
achievements for any American president since the end of the 
Korean War. When Richard Nixon entered the White House in 
January of 1969, his administration faced the most complicated 
foreign policy disaster for the United States in this century. 
The ability of the Nixon Administration to successfully
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
conclude a "peace with honour," which not only extricated the 
United States from Vietnam but also provided South Vietnam 
with at least a chance for survival, ranks as one of the 
greatest foreign policy achievements of Mr. Nixon's 
presidency. The fact that the Paris Peace Accords collapsed 
and South Vietnam eventually fell to the Communists in no way 
discredits the diplomatic success of the Nixon Administration. 
The Paris Peace Accords failed because of two interconnected 
developments that few could have foreseen in January of 1973: 
Watergate and a violently anti-war Congress. The question of 
whether South Vietnam could have survived if it had not been 
for the above two developments will never be known.
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PART VX: EPILOGUE
CHAPTER IX: FAILURE OF THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS
On April 30, 1975, Saigon fell to the People's Army of 
Vietnam's(PAVN) Ho Chi Minh Offensive; the next day, the last 
President of the Republic of Vietnam, Duong Van Minh, ordered 
the armed forces of the republic to cease all resistance. The 
fall of Saigon was symbolic in many respects of the brief 
history of the Paris Peace Accords. There was great optimism 
when the Accords were signed on January 27, 1973. However, 
both the North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese refused to 
abide by the Accords from the start. South Vietnam's
strategic position would gradually deteriorate after January 
of 1973. The purposes of this chapter are, first, by
reference to the three catalysts identified in the 
introduction to briefly analyze the underlying reasons for 
the collapse of South Vietnam, and second, to provide 
conclusions on the Paris Peace Talks in relation to the 
analytical framework presented in chapter one.
A Brief Analysis of the Failure of the Paris Peace Accords
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To understand why the Paris Peace Accords failed, it is 
first necessary to provide an outline of the Accords and the 
vital mechanisms established to enforce them. The Paris Peace 
Accords, or Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in 
Vietnam248, were composed of twenty-three articles, divided 
into nine chapters, as follows:
Article 1
It recognized the "independence, sovereignty, unity, and 
territorial integrity" of Vietnam as defined by the Geneva 
Accords.249 
Articles 2 to 7
They involved the cease-fire and American withdrawal. 
Importantly, North Vietnamese infiltration was supposed to 
come to a halt.
Article 8
It involved the return of all American Prisoners of 
War(POWs).
Articles 9 to 14
The political settlement yet to be reached by Hanoi and 
Saigon.
Article 15
Respect for the Demilitarized Zone(DM2).
Articles 16 to 19
In many respects the most important part of the Accords,
248 Lipsman and Weiss, The False Peace, p. 106.
249 Ibid. p. 112.
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it established mechanisms to enforce the agreement. The 
International Commission for Control and Supervision(ICCS), 
consisting of delegates from Poland, Hungary, Canada, and 
Indonesia, along with the Joint Military Commission, composed 
of delegates from the ARVN, the PAVN, and the Viet Cong, was 
designed to enforce the Accords when the parties involved had 
disputes.250 
Article 20
Reiterated the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords with respect 
to Laos and Cambodia.
Articles 21 and 22
The former called on the United States to provide aid in 
"healing the wounds of war" by contributing to "post-war 
construction of North Vietnam and throughout Indochina." With 
this aid serving as a foundation, Article 22 urged the United 
States and DRV to establish "a new, equal, and mutually 
beneficial relationship."251
Therefore, the Paris Peace Accords were far from perfect.
i:
The PAVN remained on the sovereign territory of South Vietnam
and there were still r.io cease-fires in Cambodia and Laos.
V
Yet, the prospects for South Vietnam were far from bleak in 
January of 1973. In a recently declassified memo sent to 
President Nixon in 1973, the last American Ambassador to
250 Edward Doyle, Fall of the South. (Boston: Little, Brown
and Co., 1985), p.47.
251 Nixon, No More Vietnams. p. 165.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
171 .
Saigon, Graham Martin, declared: "...we have every right to
confidently expect that the GVN can hold without the necessity 
of U.S. armed intervention.1,252
Graham Martin's optimism was well founded. In January of 
1973, the military balance favoured South Vietnam, at least on 
paper. The ARVN had a field strength of 450,000 men, 
organized into thirteen divisions. The Enhance and Enhance 
Plus programmes had re-armed South Vietnam: 550 M-48 medium 
tanks and M-41 light tanks, 1,200 M-113 armoured personnel 
carriers and 1,330 105 mm and 155 mm howitzers. In addition, 
Regional Forces and Popular Forces had a total strength of 
525,000 men. The PAVN's combat strength in South Vietnam had 
been reduced to about 148,000 troops organized into thirteen 
understrength divisions and 26 independent regiments. Perhaps 
most importantly, the South Vietnamese, on paper, enjoyed air 
superiority-
Ambassador Martin’s positive assessment was buttressed by 
the performance of the ARVN during the PAVN * s Nguyen Hue 
Offensive. The ARVN had stood up to the strongest PAVN 
offensive to date in an excellent manner. Morale in the army 
was very high,253 and the senior generals of the ARVN had 
proven their competence in combat. In addition, President 
Nixon had given his word that if Hanoi violated the Accords,
252 Ibid. p. 193.
253 Ibid. p. 187.
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the United States would react.254 Nixon had kept his word in 
July of 1973 when the North Vietnamese attacked Hon Ngu (in 
the Mekong Delta) by authorizing repeated B-52 strikes.
Throughout 1973, South Vietnam's position looked 
promising. The ARVN was on the offensive and the PAVN was in 
a difficult position. The number of combat personnel in the 
PAVN had fallen 25 percent by the summer of 1973.255 
Attempts to rebuild the Viet Cong infrastructure were very 
unsuccessful.256 Senior General Van Tien Dung, Chief of Staff 
of the PAVN, would declare in October of 1973 that North 
Vietnam faced a "critical situation. 1,257 Military reverses 
in the South, such as the destruction of the 1st PAVN Division 
in the Battle of the Seven Mountains, were exacerbated by a 
very weak economy and critical divisions in the Politburo. In
the summer of 1973, the Paris Peace Accords were holding,
however imperfectly, and the chances for South Vietnam's 
survival appeared to be good.
However, within 16 months, South Vietnam would no longer 
exist as a sovereign state. The PAVN's Ho Chi Minh Offensive 
would conquer South Vietnam in a mere two months in the spring 
of 1975. Military Regions 1 and 2 would fall almost without 
a fight! In many respects, the fall of South Vietnam in 1975
254 Palmer, The 25 Year War, p. 202.
255 Lipsman and Weiss, The False Peace, p. 109.
256 Ibid.
257 Ibid.
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was similar to the fall of France in 1940.
How could the Paris Peace Accords and thus South Vietnam, 
have collapsed completely within such a short period of time, 
especially when things were looking so promising in 1973? 
There are several factors: American domestic politics, a
massive PAVN build-up, and disastrous strategic and tactical 
blunders by the South Vietnamese High Command. The remainder 
of this section will explore the roles of military blunders by 
the South Vietnamese and American domestic politics in 
contributing to the final collapse of South Vietnam in 1975.
Thus, the final collapse of South Vietnam will be analyzed by 
reference to the three catalysts introduced in the 
introduction.
(a) The Balance of Forces in South Vietnam- 1973 to 1975
An objective military analysis clearly indicates that 
primary factors in South Vietnam’s collapse were a massive 
PAVN build-up in late 1973-1974 and a series of disastrous 
strategic and tactical errors by South Vietnamese generals. 
Thus, an argument can be put forward that the fall of South 
Vietnam was not a foregone conclusion even after the reduction 
of American aid. Instead, a strategy of duplicity on the part 
of President Thieu and his senior generals would destroy South 
Vietnam in 1975.
Immediately after the Accords were signed on January 27, 
1973, the North Vietnamese engaged in a huge build-up that
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would climax in the spring of 1974.258 By January of 1974, 
between 75,000 and 80,000 troops had been infiltrated into 
South Vietnam.259 Yet, this development was not critical: 
the infiltrations only brought PAVN strength up to its 1972 
level. More ominous were the dramatic improvements in North 
Vietnamese logistics and anti-aircraft defenses in occupied 
South Vietnam. Equally important, Senior General Dung had re­
established a general strategic reserve in the North of seven 
divisions.260 By early 1974, Dung had finished re-equipping 
and refurbishing his forces in the South. However, as noted 
earlier, he remained pessimistic.
General Dung's pessimism would be alleviated by the 
stupidity of the South Vietnamese High Command. Thieu faced 
two serious strategic problems: the complete absence of a 
strategic reserve and seriously overextended lines-of- 
communication. The North Vietnamese enjoyed the strategic 
initiative as a result. The PAVN forces could mass at 
isolated locations and enjoy massive local superiority, 
especially in the Central Highlands. Thieu really had only 
one option: truncation. South Vietnamese forces should have 
been withdrawn from Quang Tri province and the interior of the 
Central Highlands so that a strategic reserve could have been 
re-established. Such a move, advocated by high-ranking South
258 Ibid. p. 117.
259 Ibid.
260 Ibid.
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Vietnamese generals,261 would have caused political problems 
but there was no option. Thus, the first catalyst introduced 
in chapter one was clearly in favour of Hanoi by December of
197*.
(b) Collapse of American Support
Critics of the South Vietnamese regime alleged that its 
collapse in 1975 was proof that it was completely dependent on 
American support to survive. Obviously, the reduction of 
American aid was a critical factor in South Vietnam's 
collapse. However, the reduction of American aid compounded 
South Vietnam's strategic problems that were exacerbated by a 
series of disastrous blunders in 1975. No one factor can be 
studied in isolation from the others.
Richard Nixon clearly blames Congress for South Vietnam's
fall:
When the Paris Peace Accords were signed 
in January 1973, a balance of power 
existed in Indochina. South Vietnam was 
secured within the cease-fire lines.. .But 
United States power was the linchpin 
holding the peace agreement 
together...and without adequate American 
military and economic assistance, South 
Vietnam would lack the power to turn back 
yet another such invasion. Congress 
proceeded to snatch defeat from the jaws 
of victory.262
Nixon's assessment is essentially correct, but he should not
underestimate the devastating effect of Watergate. At the
261 Ibid.
262 Nixon, No More Vietnams. p. 167.
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most critical hour, the American Presidency was emasculated! 
In August of 1973, Congress cut-off all funds for military 
operations in Indochina. Nixon's control over the military 
was reduced by the War Powers Act of October, 1973. Thus, the 
United States was "shooting itself in the foot" at the same 
time that Senior General General Dung was apprehensive about 
the future.
The most damaging blow inflicted by Congress was 
reduction of economic assistance to South Vietnam. For Fiscal 
Year 1975, Congress only authorized a budget ceiling of $700 
million when the Administration was seeking no less than 
$1,126 billion.263 These serious budget restrictions would 
force President Thieu to drastically reduce supplies for the 
military. Stocks of ammunition totalling 177,000 tons in 
January of 1973 had fallen to 121,000 tons in May of 1974. By 
April of 1975, South Vietnam only had adequate ammunition for 
the M-102 howitzer for fifty-two days of light fighting.264 
Over half of the air force was grounded due to a lack of fuel 
and spare parts; only 55 percent of all motor vehicles were 
still on the road by April of 1975. The ARVN had lost its 
firepower and mobility.
At the same time that South Vietnam was being starved of 
aid, North Vietnam was the recipient of Chinese and Soviet 
largesse. In 1973, Hanoi imported 2.8 million metric tons,
263 Ibid.
264 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
177 .
while in 1974 it imported 3.5 million metric tons.265 
Interestingly, the Communist giants lost any desire to 
restrain North Vietnam, as in 1972, only after the United 
States lost the will to do so. A devastating psychological 
blow fell on Saigon on August 8, 1974: Richard Nixon resigned 
from the Oval Office under threat of impeachment. The tragedy 
was now ready to enter the final act. Thus, the role of 
domestic politics in the United States and of third parties 
would play a critical part in South Vietnam's fall.
South Vietnam was in a serious position by early 1975. 
Yet, its final collapse was in no way assured. A series of 
critical blunders would lead to final defeat. The beginning 
of the end for South Vietnam began in December of 1974 when 
the Ninth Plenary of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong 
Party convened in Hanoi. The Chairman of the Central Office 
for South Vietnam, Pham Hung, had been convinced by his senior 
military commander, Lieutenant-General Tran Van Tra, to 
propose to the Politburo the execution of a large-scale 
offensive against ARVN positions in the province of Phuoc 
Long.266
In retrospect, it is now clear that Pham Hung was risking 
his considerable prestige in backing Lieutenant-General Tra's 
bold plan. From the extant evidence available , Tra appears 
to have been considered a maverick by the senior leadership of
265 Ibid.
266 Lipsman and Doyle, The Fall of the South, p.31
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the PAVN, and to a lesser extent, the Lao Dong Party. He had 
been the ranking officer in COSVN since the death of Senior 
General Nguyen Chi Thanh in July of 1967. In this role, he 
had been responsible for the massive assaults on Saigon in 
1968 and 1972, which had failed disastrously with very heavy 
casualties. The fact that Tra was not in favour with the 
senior leadership in Hanoi seems to be indicated by his 
failure to be elevated to the powerful Politburo. Thus, when 
Pham Hung championed a plan put forward by Tra, his colleagues 
in the Politburo were undoubtedly sceptical.
Yet, the offensive devised by Tra was very bold and its 
potential ramifications went far beyond Phuoc Long province. 
As already discussed, the ARVN was stretched to the breaking 
point by late 1974-early 1975. Tra considered a large-scale 
offensive in Phuoc Long province to be a critical test of two 
factors: the ability of the ARVN Joint General Staff to
reinforce isolated regions of South Vietnam, and second, the 
reaction of the United States to clear cut North Vietnamese 
aggression.
In the first week of January, 1975, Pham Hung finally won 
approval for the offensive in Phuoc Long province. However, 
the offensive was only to be executed with available forces 
from the COSVN reserve. Also, the Politburo issued a dire 
warning that the attack ’'had to succeed at all costs.”267 
This ominous, rather bizarre declaration infers critical
267 Ibid.
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divisions within the Politburo. Quite possibly, if the 
offensive was a failure, the Politburo would have demoted Pham 
Hung and Tran Van Tra. Nonetheless, Lieutenant-General Tra 
realized that a"do-or-dien situation was now at hand. His 
deputy, Lieutenant-General Tran Do, would be responsible for 
executing the attack with three divisions, the 5th and 9th VC 
and the 7th PAVN.
On January 6, the capital of Phuoc Long province, Phuoc 
Binh, garrisoned by only a handful of Regional Force 
battalions, was struck by a devastating multi-divisional 
Communist assault. If the capital was to be recaptured, 
substantial reinforcements would have to be committed by the 
Joint General Staff in Saigon. The decision on whether or not 
to reinforce Phuoc Long province was the responsibility of the 
ARVN Military Region 3 commander, Lieutenant-General Le 
Nguyen Khang.268 After studying his situation maps and the 
ARVN's order-of-forces in Military Region 3, Khang realized 
that the situation was hopeless. Lieutenant-General Khang1s 
primary responsibility was the defence of Saigon. If valuable 
forces were to be committed to the battle in Phuoc Long 
province, they would have to come from Saigon^ defensive 
perimeter. The depleting of the forces defending Saigon was 
a decision that neither Khang nor his superiors was willing to 
take.
The fall of Phuoc Long and its capital, Phuoc Binh, had
268 Ibid.
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ramifications that were out of all proportion to the tactical 
victory itself. Since January, 1973, President Thieu of South 
Vietnam had declared that he would never cede sovereign 
territory to the Communists. The fall of Phuoc Long, the 
first province of South Vietnam to ever be captured by the 
Communists, clearly revealed that Thieu's policy was bankrupt. 
The South Vietnamese military was stretched as taut as a 
violin wire. Both the Politburo and the senior leadership of 
the PAVN now became convinced that one decisive blow would 
lead to the collapse of the Saigon regime. This strategic 
analysis was buttressed by the reaction of the United States 
to the PAVN offensive in Phuoc Long province. The reaction of 
the Ford Administration(1974-1977) to clear cut North 
Vietnamese aggression was timid at best. In stark contrast to 
the decisiviness of the Nixon Administration, the only action 
taken by President Gerald Ford was to lodge diplomatic 
protests with the ICCS, along with Moscow and Beijing. The 
weak nature of the American response could not have been lost 
on Hanoi. Perhaps most surprising, Washington did not even 
divert a carrier battle group, centred around the USS 
Enterprise(CVN-65), which had recently left Subic Bay Naval 
Base in the Philippines, to the region. Obviously, the senior 
leadership in Hanoi must have concluded that a " window of 
opportunity" now presented itself. In mid-January, Senior
General Dung was given authorization by the Politburo to
)
execute a corps-sized offensive against South Vietnamese
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Military Region 2. The events that followed in March and 
April would utterly surprise even the most optimistic members 
of the Politburo in Hanoi, not to mention the Ford 
Administration in Washington.
In March of 1975, the ARVN Military Region II commander, 
Major-General Pham Van Phu would make a series of errors, 
resulting in a decisive tactical defeat at Ban Me Thuot in the 
Central Highlands.269 The North Vietnamese were now in an 
excellent position to cut South Vietnam in half. A strategic 
crisis soon became a full scale disaster when Thieu decided to 
abandon Military Regions 1 and 2. By late March, the retreat 
had turned into a complete rout. By the middle of April, the 
PAVN had massed its forces for the final offensive against 
Saigon itself. On May 1, South Vietnam surrendered.
What is the importance of the Paris Peace Accords? There 
is no longer an independent South Vietnam? American foreign 
policy clearly failed in Itidochina. Yet, these judgments fail 
to understand the depth of the Paris Peace Accords.
The Paris Peace Accords were, as discussed, flawed. Yet 
if the United States had been able to enforce the provisions 
of the agreement and if the South Vietnamese had not made a 
series of critical blunders, there is a chance that South 
Vietnam could have survived. Nixon and Kissinger deserve the 
utmost credit for successfully concluding the Accords. In 
1969, the war in Vietnam was raging out of control because of
269 Palmer, The 25 Year War, p. 179.
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the errors of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Nixon's ability 
to "end" the war in an honourable manner and give South 
Vietnam at least a chance of survival was the most that could 
have been hoped for by any observer.
\.v
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Easter Offensive: HR 2 and 3
Following the Easter attack on Quang Tri Province, the Com­
munists continued their offensive with strikes toward Saigon 
and into the central highlands. Above left The NVA leapt out 
of Cambodia on April 5 with a three-division tank and ar­
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Counterattack on Qnang Tri
The recapture of Quang Tri Provtnca . 
began on May 13 when South Vietnamese 
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behind-the-lines raids around WundBr 
Beach. South Vietnamese forces then 
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Phase lino Gold, then Brawn, and finally
BIuo. The attacks moved quickly until they 
reached Quang Tri City, which President 
Thieu had made the new objective of the 
counterattack, rather than all of Quang 
Tri Province. Four months after tho attack 
bogan. Quang Tri City was again in AHVN 
hands, but tho offensive had fallun short 
of its originul objectives.
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